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Mathias Dewatripont and Xavier Freixas
The current crisis and its high social cost have shattered the confidence of 
economic agents in the banking system and questioned the capacity of financial 
markets to channel resources to their best use. While it is essential for the well 
functioning of economic activity that financial institutions do take risk, the 
decisions taken by financial intermediaries have proven ex post to be excessively 
risky. So, what was wrong with financial regulation? How were overoptimistic 
expectations, short termism and inaccurate risk models implicitly encouraged? 
This book is devoted to exploring the general issue of the origins of excessive 
risk-taking in the banking industry. The four years since the start of the crisis, 
covering the period from the first turmoil in the interbank market to the fully 
fledged sovereign crises of 2011, gives us sufficient perspective to make a better 
assessment of some of the main issues and challenges it has raised. We focus here 
on the four main issues that provide the incentives for excessive risk-taking. 
Because it is the board of directors that is ultimately accountable for the level of 
risk that is taken in a firm, we start with financial institutions’ corporate 
governance. We analyse whether, in their strategic decisions, board members 
consider their own bonuses, short-term stock price movements, shareholders’ 
short-run interests (rather than stakeholders’ long-run ones) or simply the 
financial institution’s culture of risk. 
We next turn to the misperception of risks, related to managers’ and shareholders’ 
understatement of the business-cycle risk of downturn, as the procyclicality of 
capital may lead to excessive lending, the emergence of bubbles and a financial 
accelerator effect. The regulatory proposal of Basel III on countercyclical buffers 
is intended to solve this issue. Still, rigorous analysis of the procyclicality of banks’ 
capital may indicate that the matter is more complicated than it seems. 
In a third chapter, we ask why neither supervisory authorities nor market 
discipline, which was given a preeminent role in Basel II, did a proper job. Is it true 
that information disclosure was inaccurate?  
Finally, in our last chapter we consider whether excessive risk-taking was the 
result of implicit guarantees such that all banks in distress expected to be bailed 
out. This implies that the way regulatory agencies and treasuries organise banks’ 
resolutions is critical in determining future moral hazard. It is therefore worth 
considering how a bank in distress can be restructured in an orderly way – 
whether it is to be closed or bailed out in such a way as to preserve banks’ 
incentives and be credible while limiting contagion to other banks. 
This volume will provide the analytical ammunition required to rigorously 
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One of the ways in which CEPR responded to the global financial crisis in early 
2009 was to quickly establish a project on ‘Financial Stability and Regulation’. At 
that time, in the aftermath of the Lehman Brothers debacle when the world was 
pretty much still in a state of shock, there was no clear-cut, synthetic view of the 
crisis, its origins or its potential impact. There were instead disparate perspectives 
with highly varying degrees of precision. It was clear that in order to draw reliable 
policy conclusions a more coherent view was required, one that was grounded in 
a clear theoretical model and which had been subject to empirical testing. 
The ‘Financial Stability and Regulation’ project was led by one of the co-editors 
of this book, CEPR Research Fellow, Xavier Freixas, Professor of Economics at 
the Universitat Pompeau Fabra in Barcelona. Professor Freixas, with help from a 
range of other CEPR researchers (including, most notably, Thorsten Beck, Mathias 
Dewatripont, Marco Pagano and Richard Portes) organised a series of workshops 
around Europe – open to both academics and practitioners – in order to co-
ordinate research efforts, to elaborate and test competing interpretations of the 
crisis and to explore the various policy implications. The opening conference was 
held at the Centre de Recerca en Economie Internacional (CREI) in Barcelona, 
with others following through 2009 and 2010 at Tilburg University, Duisenberg 
School of Finance, Amsterdam, IESE Business School, Madrid, and the Einaudi 
Institute for Economics and Finance (EIEF), Rome. The series culminated in a final 
conference held at the London Business School, at which the papers included in 
this current book, amongst others, were presented.
Whilst risk is essential for a well-functioning economy, it is now clear that 
excessive risk-taking, particularly in the banking sector, was a principal cause of 
the global financial crisis. Private sector risk has now become public sector crisis, 
particularly in Europe, with high social costs and implications. Moreover, the 
divorce between the management of risk at the level of an individual institution 
and the monitoring of financial stability has become more apparent than ever.
This book explores the general issue of the origins of excessive risk taking in the 
banking industry; it questions what went wrong with financial regulation and 
how overoptimistic expectations, short-termism and inaccurate risk models were 
implicitly encouraged. It focuses on four main issues that provide the incentives 
for excessive risk taking: 
• The corporate governance of financial institutions.
• The misperception of risk in relation to business cycles.
• The apparent failure of supervisory authorities and market discipline.
• The relationship of risk taking to implicit bail-out guarantees.
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11 Introduction
Mathias Dewatripont and Xavier Freixas
Université libre de Bruxelles and CEPR; Universitat Pompeu Fabra and CEPR
The current crisis and its high social cost have shattered the confidence of 
economic agents in the banking system and questioned the capacity of financial 
markets to channel resources to their best use. In particular, the financial industry 
investments have proven ex post to be excessively risky and the generally 
accepted view is that their risks were not ex ante sound, whether we refer to 
the subprime market or to the mortgages in markets characterised by real estate 
bubbles. The regulatory reforms that have taken place since the beginning of the 
crisis have intended, among other objectives, to curtail this excessive appetite for 
risk. Yet, for regulation to prevent future crises, it would be critical to know what 
the reasons were for this excessive risk-taking. The issue of judging whether this 
was the result of managers’ incentives, shareholders’ appetite for risk, a general 
culture of risk or the financial market’s ‘short termism’ is still a complex one. 
This book is devoted to exploring the general issue of the origins of excessive 
risk-taking in the banking industry.
The need to understand better what triggers excess risk-taking has led researchers 
to tackle a number of key questions that appear to be central to the development 
of the recent crisis and to relate their findings to the main regulatory reforms 
that have been undertaken. The timing of writing this volume, four years since 
the start of the crisis, and thus covering the period from the first turmoil in the 
interbank market to the fully fledged sovereign crises of 2011, gives us sufficient 
perspective to make a better assessment of some of the main issues and challenges 
it has raised.
To begin with, it is necessary to give a more precise definition of ‘excessive risk-
taking’ before trying to explore the reasons why banks choose to implement such 
a strategy. We will define excessive risk-taking as a level of risk such that, had it 
been known and taken into account ex ante by banks’ stakeholders, it would 
have made the net present value of the bank’s investment project negative. This 
view of ‘excessive risk-taking’ has the advantage of preserving the option for 
banks to invest in high risk ventures provided they result in a corresponding 
high return and do not jeopardise the continuity of the bank as a going concern. 
It does not emphasise financial institutions’ possibly overoptimistic expectations 
but rather the risk-adjusted cost of funds, as well as the lack of transparency 
that characterises investment in banks: lending to a financial institution on the 
basis of a reputation of safe investments in the banking industry supported by 
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a tradition of bail-outs by the Treasury where even uninsured debtholders have 
been protected from the bankruptcy losses.
This overall exploration of financial institutions’ excessive risk-taking has led us 
to examine four key issues we consider crucial for a deep understanding of both 
the roots of the crisis and the future of the banking industry.
First of all, excessive risk-taking is directly related to corporate governance. The 
decisions a bank takes regarding risk levels are ultimately the responsibility of 
managers and boards of directors. Whether in their strategic decisions managers 
consider their own bonuses, short-term stock price movements, shareholders’ 
short-run interests (rather than stakeholders’ long-run ones) or simply the 
financial institution’s culture of risk, these are all decisions that are substantiated 
by the board and therefore result from the structure of financial institutions’ 
corporate governance.
Second, the issue of excessive risk-taking may also be related to managers’ and 
shareholders’ understatement of the business cycle risk of downturn, as the 
procyclicality of capital may lead to excessive lending, the emergence of bubbles 
and a financial accelerator effect. The fact that banks did not have enough capital 
once the crisis unravelled is not only a failure of the Basel II regulatory framework 
and the models it is based on, but also evidence of how critical the issue of 
procyclicality is for financial stability. The regulatory proposal of Basel III on 
countercyclical buffers is intended to solve this issue. Still, rigorous analysis of the 
procyclicality of banks’ capital may indicate that the issue is more complicated 
than it seems.
Third, it may be argued that the curtailing of excessive risk-taking was the joint 
responsibility of supervision and market discipline, and that neither did a proper 
job. Theoretically both firms and gatekeepers are supposed to provide accurate 
information to the market and to supervisory agencies. This information 
transmission issue has been a key one in the analysis of the crisis, as it has been 
argued that it was the opacity of some of the structured products, asset-backed 
securities, collateralised debt obligations and so on, that was in part responsible 
for the first stages of the crisis. It has also been stated that the use of fair value 
accounting by banks aggravated the crisis. So it is clearly important to assess to 
what extent these claims are valid.
Fourth, excessive risk-taking may be the result of another form of market 
discipline if all banks in distress are to be bailed out. This would, of course, be 
taken into account by a bank’s managers and board of directors and completely 
distort the bank’s decision since, in this case, bankruptcy threats are no longer 
credible. Consequently, how regulatory agencies and Treasuries organise banks’ 
resolutions will determine future moral hazard. It is therefore worth considering 
how a bank in distress can be restructured in an orderly way, whether it is to be 
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closed or bailed out in such a way as to preserve banks’ incentives and be credible 
while limiting contagion to other banks.
This volume will be structured according to these four topics. Each chapter aims 
at providing a survey of the key issues in the field, critically reviewing the existing 
literature, examining the regulatory reforms that have been put forward since the 
beginning of the crisis and providing policy recommendations. In what follows 
we review some of the key insights the following chapters offer.
1 Corporate governance
In their chapter on corporate governance, Mehran, Morrison and Shapiro explore 
the issue of excessive risk-taking in financial institutions. The starting point in 
their analysis is simply to consider the characteristics of corporate governance 
in financial institutions and the difference with respect to non-financial 
corporations. The authors identify two key differences: the multiplicity of 
stakeholders (insured and uninsured depositors, the deposit insurance company, 
bond holders, subordinate debtholders and hybrid securities holders), and the 
complexity of banks’ operations. These two characteristics point to the possibility 
of a lower level of control by stakeholders over decisions by managers and boards 
of directors. In addition, the authors notice that the too-big-to-fail issue was a key 
element in the building of risks prior to the crisis and that the Gramm-Leach-Bliley 
Act promoted banks’ conglomeration, which in turn reduced market discipline 
and allowed banks to borrow at a cost that did not reflect the effective riskiness 
of their assets. This corroborates the view that financial institutions have been 
under lower levels of market monitoring than non-financial corporations.
The first natural question is whether banks’ executive compensation schemes 
were at the origin of their excessive risk-taking. The issue should be refined so as 
to be more precise. Indeed, there are two different questions to be addressed. Were 
managers taking too much risk because of the way executive compensation is 
designed, encouraging huge gambles? Or were managers following shareholders’ 
directives for more risk-taking by banks, in which case the executive compensation 
is a perfect fit with the shareholders’ objectives, even if those objectives may be 
socially biased?
The second question to be raised is that of the composition of boards. Boards 
differ in several dimensions, of which the main ones are the size of the board 
and the fraction of independent directors. Ideally, board composition should 
promote best practices and regulation should help to foster them. Still, 
supervisory authorities have not made much progress on that account, and one 
possible reason is that it is difficult to identify best practices for the board of 
directors. Here, the authors point out the importance of directors’ expertise, their 
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ability to voice independent opinions and their engagement, that is, investment 
of sufficient time and effort.
The third issue developed by Mehran, Morrison and Shapiro concerns risk-
taking by financial institutions. A number of relevant papers have explored 
the risk behaviour of financial institutions before and after the crisis and have 
found evidence linking the importance of the role of the chief risk officer in the 
organisation and the ‘residual compensation’ – that is, the part of compensation 
unexplained by observable characteristics such as size – to the level of risk-taking. 
This is analysed from two perspectives, first as a possible result of executive 
compensation, and second as the result of a ‘culture of risk’ within the bank, 
a culture that is permitted, if not encouraged, by the board of directors. In line 
with these findings, anecdotal evidence also points to the role of communication, 
prioritisation and lack of understanding of risk at the top levels as one of the 
key determinants of the overall attitude towards risk of managers and boards of 
directors.
The authors conclude by considering market discipline in its connection to 
corporate governance, and show why market discipline in large banks remains a 
serious challenge.
2 Procyclicality
Although there is general agreement that solvency regulation is necessary and 
that banks’ risk weights should be improved, the inadequacy of a solvency 
regulation that is independent of the business cycle has become apparent with the 
crisis. Of course, credit crunches occurred in the United States at the beginning 
of the 1990s and in South East Asia after the 1997 crisis. Prior to the recent 
crisis, the issue of identification was still under discussion. Indeed, the observed 
decrease in lending characteristic of a credit crunch could have been the result of 
a tightening of the credit standards and of an increase in the risk of lending and 
the corresponding margins, quite in line with a downturn, so that the decline in 
the amount of credit could be demand driven. If this was the case no procyclical 
amendment would be required in the efficient design of capital regulation.
With the crisis, the perspective has changed as banks have experienced sudden 
losses that have bitten into banks’ capital at an unprecedented speed. The 
observed reduction in the credit supply was therefore not to be attributed to the 
change in demand conditions, which could not happen as fast as the immediate 
tightening of the credit supply.
Once we agree that the lack of any anticyclical buffer in capital requirements 
aggravates the extent of banking crises, the specific type of buffer to be built 
should be considered. Three non-exclusive views are possible. First, because of the 
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distinction between expected losses to be covered by provisions and unexpected 
losses to be covered by capital, banks should make provision in an upturn for 
their expected losses in a downturn. Second, capital requirements should be 
tightened in an upturn so that banks accumulate capital in good times that they 
can deplete in bad times. Third, an additional capital buffer should be required if 
excessive credit growth jeopardises future financial stability. Notice that the fact 
that the credit cycle and the business cycle are not coincident is an additional 
complication in designing a well-functioning countercyclical mechanism to 
complement capital regulation.
Repullo and Saurina’s paper is devoted to this third issue, that is, to the mechanisms 
that should be in place to attenuate excessive credit growth. As a consequence, 
it considers, in particular, how the Basel III proposal tackles this issue and to 
what extent it reaches its objectives. Basel III on countercyclical buffers stipulates 
that an increase in capital ratios is required by a country whenever an excessive 
deviation of the credit-to-GDP ratio to its trend is observed. While the Basel 
III capital conservation buffer is aimed at building capital in good times, the 
countercyclical capital buffer objective is to limit the extent of credit crises that 
are generated by excessive credit supply. The task of the paper by Repullo and 
Saurina is to check whether countercyclical regulation achieves its objective. 
They begin by observing that any countercyclical capital regulation has to be 
based on a macroeconomic variable that will trigger the building of a capital 
buffer and therefore slow down credit growth. But, surprisingly, their analysis of 
how the Basel III macroeconomic variable of deviations of the credit-to-GDP ratio 
to its trend relates to GDP growth shows that, for the majority of countries, the 
correlation between these two variables is negative. This opens a completely new 
perspective on the impact of the countercyclical buffer. As the authors state, ‘a 
mechanical application of the buffer would tend to reduce capital requirements 
when GDP growth is high and increase them when GDP growth is low’. Of course, 
the Basel Committee leaves the ultimate decision to regulatory discretion, so 
that the application is not automatic. Nevertheless, if the objective is to have 
cross-country homogeneous rules so as to avoid a race to the bottom, regulatory 
discretion should be limited and countries will be expected to closely follow the 
deviations of the credit-to-GDP ratio to its trend to identify and correct excessive 
credit growth during a downturn.
From here Repullo and Saurina pursue their argument by simply considering an 
even simpler alternative to the deviations of the credit-to-GDP ratio to its trend, 
and that is the rate of growth of credit. They then show that the rate of growth 
of credit is positively correlated with the rate of growth. Thus the authors offer 
an insightful analysis to be considered in any discussion of the appropriateness 
of the Basel III countercyclical buffer.
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3 Disclosure, transparency and market discipline
Prior to the crisis, market discipline was thought to be the perfect complement to 
supervision. Its role in channelling funds to sound institutions while penalising 
those taking excessive risks was recognised in Basel II, where it constitutes the 
third pillar. Yet, with the crisis, the perspective has completely changed and both 
regulators and academics have come to regard market discipline with some degree 
of scepticism. Airing this view, the Turner report was adamant when it stated: 
‘A reasonable conclusion is that market discipline expressed via market prices 
cannot be expected to play a major role in constraining bank risk taking, and 
that the primary constraint needs to come from regulation and supervision.’  So, 
even if, in theory, an increase in market interest rate spreads and a limited access 
to funding should curtail banks’ risk-taking, in practice the market response may 
lead to a complete run on the banking system. Thus, although the mechanism 
of market discipline as a way to get rid of lame ducks in good times and improve 
the overall efficiency of the banking system is sound, during the recent banking 
crisis it appears, rather, to have throttled the financial system and deprived it 
of access to liquidity. This has led to two lines of research: one is to explain the 
failure of market discipline on the basis of financial market imperfections (bank 
runs, etc), and the other is to consider the imperfection of the mechanisms that 
allow markets to obtain information regarding banks. The latter view is the one 
taken by the Freixas and Laux in their paper, and this has led them to focus on 
market discipline in the broad context of information provision to the market. 
Indeed, as it has often been argued, a key issue in the collapse of some markets 
has been the fact that the assets that were traded were opaque and might have 
been the object of asymmetric information, with some informed agents having 
an advantage in trading. Thus the paper is devoted to information transmission 
as a key ingredient of market discipline.
The manner of information acquisition and processing is critical to investors’ 
trading decisions. Information regarding a firm reaches the market either because 
of disclosure by the firm itself or because of third-party (eg a credit rating agency) 
disclosure. Still, there is an element of processing in the use of publicly available 
information, as investors, possibly assisted by financial analysts, take their 
decisions only after carefully contrasting different sources of information and 
combining them. This leads the authors to distinguish the notion of disclosure 
from the notion of transparency. In their view, disclosure corresponds to the act 
of providing information on behalf of firms and issuers, while transparency arises 
when the disclosed information is effective in reaching the market and being 
adequately interpreted. Consequently, the analysis of transparency has to take 
into account not only the incentives and skills of firms and credit rating agencies 
in disclosing information to the market, but also the ability of the information 
receiver to invest into the processing of the disclosed information. Indeed, a 
failure at one of the two ends of the communication line is enough to make the 
information process fail.
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In order to view the process of information transmission to the market, Freixas 
and Laux argue that the best way is to consider it as a complex game between 
information providers and investors, where each agent will act according to 
its best interest and its best interest will be defined in equilibrium. Indeed, in 
equilibrium market participants understand where information comes from and 
are not easily fooled by accounting information. So, in particular, the issue of 
supervision, certification (eg by auditing firms) and their impact on prices as well 
as on firms’ behaviour (market discipline) is taken into account by firms choosing 
their disclosure strategy. The equilibrium financial markets’ imperfections, in 
particular in the possible overreaction of prices to disclosure, will be taken into 
account by firms and guide their disclosure decisions. By the same token, price 
reactions may lead to signalling in some variables such as current income, while 
‘other comprehensive income’ or some information included in the notes and a 
priori equivalent might be considered less relevant by financial analysts.
Once we take into account strategic disclosure by firms, it is necessary to 
acknowledge that transparency involves trade-offs that accounting standard 
setters have to take into consideration, since information disclosure has 
benefits but also has costs in equilibrium. From the perspective of the design 
of an information accounting system, the trade-offs imply the disclosure of a 
non-manipulable proxy rather than certain highly relevant but manipulable 
information. Yet the main difficulties with information communication stem 
from the fact that issuers prefer not to disclose information or to distort it and 
standard setters and regulators have to impose penalties, while markets have to 
rely on gatekeepers and use ‘second-best information’ the firm cannot manipulate.
With this perspective on information transmission as a background, the paper 
proceeds to focus on the main sources of information to the market: firms’ 
financial reports and credit rating agencies.
The crisis has seen a number of criticisms levelled at the use of fair value analysis. 
The critics argue that fair value accounting (FVA) forced banks to write down 
asset values, thus eroding their capital, increasing their counterparty risk and 
contributing to the uncertainty in the market and to additional decreases in asset 
prices and in access to liquidity. The authors review the literature and observe, 
first, that FVA plays a limited role as it only affects the trading portfolio and, 
second, that FVA offers substantial discretion to banks if the losses are considered 
temporary. So, the case against the use of FVA is a weak one. This does not mean 
that information transmission during the crisis has been satisfactory. On this 
account, the authors conclude that ‘information is more difficult to transmit when 
the market needs it most’. Their discussion addresses the issues of information 
aggregation, data reliability and interpretation through the crisis that have led to 
higher degrees of uncertainty. Overall, the quality of information worsens during 
a crisis because both firms and issuers have incentives to hide bad information.
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Regarding the role of credit rating agencies during the crisis, the authors analyse 
the market for credit ratings and the incentives of each of the main actors, 
issuers, agencies and investors. They conclude that the institutional background 
is inadequate to cope with the incentives for issuers to ‘shop’ for the best ratings, 
and remark that, although it is impossible to prove wrongdoing by the credit 
rating agencies, the incentives to inflate rates on structured issues were present 
and might have weighed on the agencies’ final rating. So, the regulatory policy 
on the role of credit rating agencies is particularly welcome.
4 Banking resolution
Banking resolution plays a key role in the whole of banking regulation, as the 
existence of a high social cost of a bank bankruptcy, in turn related to the existence 
of contagion, constitutes the raison d’être of banking regulation. Consequently, 
the first objective of regulation is to limit the impact of such an externality at 
the lowest possible cost. This is done by addressing the issue at the point where 
it originates, that is by reducing the cost of banks’ bankruptcies. The issue of a 
banking resolution could be either the liquidation of the bank or its continuation 
as a going concern. Although Dewatripont and Freixas acknowledge that this is 
an important issue, their paper does not address this issue directly but focuses on 
how to limit the cost to society of any type of banking resolution.
To begin with, the authors describe the banking resolution process as a bargaining 
game between managers-shareholders on the one hand and regulatory 
authorities on the other, with different objectives, as shareholders want to 
maximise the value of their shares while regulatory authorities’ main objective 
is to preserve financial stability at the lowest possible cost. This asymmetry in 
the objective functions, with time playing against the regulatory authority and 
to the advantage of shareholders, leads the authors to argue for a bank-specific 
bankruptcy rule, different from that for non-financial corporations, as otherwise 
the cost to regulatory authorities if the disagreement point is reached, possibly 
implying the malfunctioning of the payment system, is excessively large. In 
addition, the regulatory authority may be biased in its objectives as its perception 
of the welfare-maximising banking intervention may be incorrect either because 
of its overestimation of the costs of a bank’s liquidation or its capture by the 
banking industry. Yet, in the aftermath of Lehman’s bankruptcy, it is not clear 
that this is the case.
Next, even if a perfectly efficient bankruptcy procedure is in place, once a bank is 
in financial distress, regulatory authorities should take action quickly regarding 
its closure or its bail-out and, in the later case, regarding the way support is 
provided, whether as debt, equity or hybrid capital notes. The examination of 
the experiences of the banking crisis in different countries shows great variety 
in the procedures followed, while theory has no clear-cut recommendations to 
 Introduction  9
offer. The action to be taken by regulatory authorities will be the result of a cost-
benefit analysis, and it will be determined in the first place by whether the crisis 
affects a single institution or is pervasive and concerns all of them.
Finally, the ex ante design of the bank resolution mechanisms is critical. This is 
an area that has been the subject of new developments. Although some argue 
that a sufficient layer of capital is the best option to prevent future crises, the 
authors defend the possibilities opened by contingent capital (like contingent 
convertibles or capital insurance), arguing that these types of mechanisms would 
be an attractive way to limit moral hazard while enhancing financial stability and 
limiting the rise in the cost of extending credit. In any case, the very existence of 
a well-defined contingent bank resolution – rather than the regulators’ discretion 
in the choice of closure versus bail-out – can undoubtedly reduce the banks’ 
incentives to take risk.
The authors conclude by considering cross-country resolution and the challenges 
it implies and discuss the recent changes in the European banking resolution 
framework.
To conclude, although this volume is not intended to provide a comprehensive 
view of the causes of the crisis, by focusing on four critical topics it offers readers 
a thorough understanding of the main issues and provides them with arguments 
to sustain one or another policy option on the basis of academic research. The 
volume thereby contributes to the theory and policy debate by synthesising the 
main insights and views that have emerged from the crisis.
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2 Corporate Governance and 
Banks
 What Have We Learned from the 
Financial Crisis?
Hamid Mehran, Alan Morrison and Joel Shapiro1
Federal Reserve Bank of New York; Saïd Business School, University of Oxford; Saïd 
Business School, University of Oxford and CEPR
1 Introduction
The financial crisis exposed flaws throughout financial markets and has instigated 
much investigation into the way banks work. In this paper, we will focus on one 
line of investigation, that of the corporate governance of banks. We examine why 
governance is different in banks from non-financial firms, where the governance 
of banks failed during the crisis and recommendations to improve the governance 
system. There has been much recent academic work (see, for example, Table 1 in 
the appendix to this chapter) and policy discussion (Senior Supervisors Group, 
2008, 2009; Walker Report, 2009; Committee of European Banking Supervisors, 
2010) on this topic. Due to their contemporaneous nature, there has been little 
connection between the two. Our role is thus to frame the policy debate drawing 
on scientific evidence.
We begin by providing a twist on the usual question of what is different about banks 
by asking what differences are important to governance. We discuss two themes 
– the multitude of stakeholders in banks and the complexity of their business – 
that run throughout the paper. The stakeholders in banks besides shareholders 
are numerous (depositors, debtholders, and the government as both insurer of 
deposits and residual claimant on systemic externalities) and large (over 90% of 
the balance sheet of banks is debt). Yet shareholders control the firm. Evidence 
shows that both the boards and the compensation package for CEOs represent 
1 The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and are not necessarily reflective of views 
at the Federal Reserve Bank of New York or the Federal Reserve System. We thank participants at the 
conference, The Crisis Aftermath: New Regulatory Paradigms, Xavier Freixas, Luis Garicano and Marco 
Pagano for helpful comments, and Renee Adams and Bernadette Minton, Jérôme Taillard and Rohan 
Williamson for sharing their board structure data with us.
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the shareholders’ preference for increasing risks. Those preferences are to increase 
risk, which is in conflict with those of other stakeholders. Shareholders respond 
to their incentives; Laeven and Levine (2009) and Ellul and Yerramilli (2010) 
show that the presence of institutional investors increases the risk of the bank. 
The goals of increasing risk were largely successful, even though the realisations 
of that risk during the crisis were not.2
The natural next question is to ask what is different about banking in the crisis 
period versus before? Here is where the issue of complexity becomes important. 
The business of banks has shifted to become more complex and more opaque. 
Moreover, banks have become much larger and expanded dramatically into other 
businesses since the passage of the Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act in 1999. The business 
of banks has also been taken up by non-banks in the ‘shadow banking’ sector, 
creating exposures that are unregulated and uninsured. This added complexity 
has made the job of boards and managers difficult for many reasons. First, the 
simple number of activities to manage has multiplied. Second, the knowledge 
needed to understand these activities has also increased substantially. Third, 
techniques used to manage these activities (such as Value at Risk (VaR) in the 
case of risk management and credit ratings for capital requirements) have not 
performed well under this level of complexity and duress.
We proceed by examining in depth four topics in the corporate governance of 
banks: executive compensation, boards, risk management, and market discipline. 
We provide policy recommendations where possible, although we raise several 
issues to which there are no clear answers. Throughout the paper, we will refer 
to Table 1, which surveys the very recent literature tying measures of governance 
with measures of risk and performance in the years just before and during the 
crisis. Ideally, our goal would be to gain a robust sense of the role of governance 
features in risk-taking, in order to suggest best practices and/or regulatory 
guidance. However, the notion of causation is a tricky one, as one might equally 
think that a characteristic may lead to risky choices just as much as a culture of 
risk-taking leads a bank to have certain characteristics. Due to this endogeneity 
problem, we will interpret most of these relationships as correlations. Several 
papers use lags to improve this interpretation. A few papers, denoted with **, use 
further econometric techniques to push this interpretation further. Also, most 
of these papers are about large financial institutions, not just banks. With that 
caveat, we will discuss the results as they apply to banks. Lastly, we note that 
almost all of the correlations display the expected (or at least consistent across 
datasets) sign.3
2 Cheng et al (2010) describe how the realisation of this risk was successful in the late 1990s.
3 The main exceptions are when the measures of risk are (i) writedowns and (ii) receiving TARP funds. 
Neither of these are surprising. The meaning of writedowns is debatable. While they signify the 
realisation of losses, a bank has a certain degree of discretion is taking writedowns, implying they 
could be a sign of ex-ante risk taking (realised in losses) or ex-post prudent behaviour (managing 
expectations of how a shock has affected the firm). Regarding TARP funds, it is not obvious that the 
worst-off banks were the ones receiving funds, as there is a survivorship bias and some recent evidence 
suggests initial mispricing of recipients (Ng, Vasvari, and Moerman (2010)). Therefore, we will not 
discuss these two measures due to their ambiguity.
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We begin the discussion on governance failures by looking at executive 
compensation. We show trends in compensation packages and discuss recent 
evidence demonstrating how equity compensation promoted risk-taking. We 
then describe several recent papers that suggest that linking executive pay to the 
price of debt can reduce excess risk. Next, we discuss board characteristics. The 
major characteristics studied are the size of the board, the number of outside 
directors, the experience of the directors, and what else directors are doing. 
Most of the evidence does not point strongly in a way that suggests immediate 
reforms of the board. We also discuss the trade-offs that arise when board reform 
is discussed. Third, we look at risk-taking at the firm and the risk management 
function. Here there is unambiguous evidence for reform and strengthening 
of risk management roles within the firm. Fourth, we investigate the role of 
market discipline. We approach this by looking at two specific inputs that permit 
market discipline to function well (or not function well): capital requirements 
and the size and scope of banks. In recent years, banks have found ways to get 
around capital requirements, diminishing the effect of market discipline. At the 
same time, banks have increased their size, scope and complexity, making both 
regulation and market discipline less effective. At the same time, there is not 
much evidence that structurally changing the business of banks will improve 
matters because reduced banking also has its problems, and current banks may 
innovate around regulation. Lastly, we conclude.
2 Why is the governance of banks different from non-financial 
firms?
There are two key differences between banks and non-financial firms in terms of 
governance. The first is that there are many more stakeholders in banks than in 
non-financial firms. The second is that the business of banks is opaque, complex 
and can shift rather quickly. So while in the course of this paper we will obviously 
discuss the role of the board and executive compensation, we will also discuss the 
role of risk, incentives and regulation that may not be critical for non-financial 
firms.4
Let us first list the stakeholders in a bank beyond the shareholders. Banks consist 
of more than 90% debt (as opposed to an average of 40% for non-financial 
firms). The majority of debtholders are depositors and subordinated debt holders. 
The deposit insurance authority also has an interest in the bank’s health, as its 
insurance will be called upon in the case of insolvency. In so far as there are 
negative externalities on the financial system as a whole from a bank’s bankruptcy 
(certainly this is more relevant for larger institutions) and these externalities 
either need to be regulated, bailed out, or both at a sizeable cost to taxpayers, 
the government is also a stakeholder in the bank. Furthermore, as depositors are 
4 See Adams and Mehran (2003) and Adams (2010) for a discussion on differences between governance 
of bank holding companies in the US and non-financial firms.
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generally small and subject to free rider issues in monitoring, the importance of 
other non-equity stakeholders increases.
Despite the multitude of stakeholders, the board represents solely the views of 
shareholders (subject to regulatory constraints). Shareholders’ interests may 
diverge substantially from those of other stakeholders. This is especially true on 
the topic of risk, where shareholders prefer volatility and may have short-termist 
perspectives. Clearly, debtholders and regulators prefer low volatility and take 
longer term views. Bolton et al (2011) demonstrate in a model that shareholders 
may not have the incentive to reduce risk-taking at a firm even if it is in their 
own interest due to commitment problems.
The role of leverage differs across industries: in a non-financial firm, leverage is a 
source of financing, while in the banking sector it is a factor of production. Banks 
will deploy the cheapest factor in their production function. While debt and 
equity would be equally expensive in a Modigliani-Miller world, this conclusion 
is not correct in banking firms for a number of reasons. In particular, because 
depositors have access to a state-funded safety net, they are less sensitive to bank 
risk than other investors, and hence do not demand adequate compensation for 
risk-taking when they invest. Ceteris paribus, this renders debt a cheap source of 
funds, and biases banks towards it. One could attempt to correct for this bias 
by charging banks an economic price for their deposit insurance protection. 
However, although a risk-based deposit insurance system was adopted in the 
United States in the mid-1990s, firms still pay a fixed protection rate on their 
deposits. Moreover, the structural opacity of banking assets makes it very hard 
to determine a fair price for deposit insurance.5 As a result, it seems that for both 
practical and technological reasons, deposit insurance is underpriced, and banks 
are excessively willing to lever themselves. And, as a consequence of underpriced 
debt, many investment opportunities appear unrealistically attractive to bankers. 
Hence, one can argue that deposit insurance protection was an important force 
behind the recent rapid expansion in bank lending, and in the size of deposit-
taking institutions.
At the same time, banks are both opaque and complex. Levine (2004) says that 
‘banks can alter the risk composition of their assets more quickly than most non-
financial industries, and banks can readily hide problems by extending loans 
to clients that cannot service previous debt obligations’. Moreover, the business 
of securitisation has at its essence (1) sped up the process of lending at the 
origination stage and in interbank markets (eg repo), and (2) increased opacity by 
merging large amounts of information and relying on credit ratings.
There is an academic debate on how opaque banks truly are. Morgan (2002) 
shows that rating agencies disagree substantially more over ratings on bonds 
issued by banks than those of non-financial firms. Flannery et al (2004) show that 
the trading properties of banks and the accuracy of analysts’ earnings forecasts 
5 See also Freixas and Rochet (1995).
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for banks are similar to those of non-financial firms. Nevertheless, Flannery et 
al (2010) show that this similarity broke down right at the beginning of the 
financial crisis in mid-2007. While not a bank, Lehman Brothers and the case 
of Repo 105 certainly highlighted the possibility of the manipulation of balance 
sheets.
Opacity and complexity play a role in governance in both the interaction 
between the board and management and the relationship between the bank and 
its regulators. The question of how well boards represent shareholders depends on 
whether boards understand the inner workings of the bank. While obvious, the 
notion of independent board members having more financial market experience 
has become an important issue (this is discussed in section 3.3).
3 Corporate governance failures in the crisis
3.1  Executive compensation
Compensation practices are viewed by many as a contributing factor to the current 
financial crisis. Conventional wisdom states that the executive pay structure was 
designed to enhance risk-taking and create value for shareholders but not to 
protect debtholders. This dynamic was particularly strong within the banking 
industry because banks are highly levered and their leverage is subsidised. What 
has not been as widely discussed is the fact that government subsidies directly 
affect compensation.
The level of executive pay in a non-financial firm is generally related to the size 
of the firm’s assets (market value of equity or book value),6 its asset complexity 
and the industry structure and competition. Leverage has an insignificant effect 
on the level of pay and, on average, firms judiciously choose their leverage for its 
effects on their credit ratings and potential costs of distress. An industrial firm on 
average has about 40% debt in its capital structure.
A bank’s size and level of executive pay are highly correlated. Since the deposit 
insurance system contributes to the size and growth of the firm, it then 
contributes to the level of executive pay in the banking industry. It is for this 
reason that bank regulators have an economic argument for controlling the level 
of executive pay. In addition, bank boards should take into account the effect of 
compensation on solvency and capital adequacy, and banks should internalise 
the costs associated with risk-taking.
6 For example, see Gabaix and Landier (2008). For more on the relation between the governance of non-
financial and financial firms, see Adams (2010).
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Capital structure can directly exert an influence on the bank holding company 
(BHC) executive compensation structure. According to agency theory, 
stockholders want the board to compensate a CEO with stock options since 
they increase the CEO’s pay/performance sensitivity. A higher level of stock 
options, in theory, motivates the CEO to pursue riskier investment strategies. If 
the firm has debt in its capital structure, riskier strategies benefit stockholders at 
the expense of debtholders (eg Jensen and Meckling, 1976). In efficient capital 
markets, however, the incentive for risk-taking is anticipated by debtholders, and 
thus increased reliance on stock options gives rise to a debt premium or cost 
of raising debt (John and John 1993). The size of the premium is related to the 
leverage ratio. To reduce the cost of debt, leveraged firms may choose to scale 
back on their use of stock options. As BHCs are highly levered institutions, they 
may therefore want to limit their usage of stock options, since, for example, it 
could affect their cost of issuing subordinated debt. John and Qian (2003) and 
John et al (2010) provide support for this argument and document that the pay/
performance sensitivity for CEOs of BHCs is lower the higher the ratio of the 
BHCs’ debt to total assets.
3.1.1 Compensation trends
Figure 1 presents mean and median salaries for top executives of banking firms 
in Standard & Poor’s Executive Compensation for the period 1992–2007. There 
is an upward trend in nominal terms in the 1990s and relatively stable pay in 
the 2000s. Figure 2 presents mean and median bonuses for the same period. 
While the median bonus is relatively unchanged, the mean bonus for the 
industry increases for the most part after 1992. However, there is a sharp drop in 
bonuses in 2006/7, suggesting that pay is related to performance or market forces 
are at work. Figure 3 presents the dollar (Black-Scholes) value of stock option 
grants. The trend follows that of non-financial firms, increasing rapidly through 
2000, with a sharp drop thereafter. The cause of the drop is not fully clear. The 
increased scrutiny of pay following the dot-com bubble, particularly related to 
stock options, in the era of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) beginning in 2002 is 
likely to be a contributing factor.
Figure 4 presents the vesting schedule of options granted in the period 1996–2007. 
Of options granted to the top five executives at each bank, 20% had immediate 
vesting and nearly 26% had vesting of one year. The short option vesting may 
have provided incentives to focus on short-term return. Figure 5 documents 7,254 
exercises for the top five executives and documents how soon the options were 
exercised following vesting. About 34% of options were exercised immediately 
when they were vested. Another 15.5% of options were exercised in one year 
after vesting. The evidence in the two charts together suggests that stock options 
were not designed to promote decisions compatible with safety and soundness 
and the protection of creditors and taxpayers.
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Figure 1  Mean and median highest ranked executive salary in commercial banks, 
1992–2007
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Source: Standard & Poor’s Executive Compensation.
Figure 2  Mean and median highest ranked executive bonus in commercial banks, 
1992–2007
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Figure 3  Mean and median highest ranked executive option grant value in 
commercial banks, 1992–2007
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3.1.2 The link between compensation, performance and risk-taking during the 
financial crisis
One might ask why we have observed a change in compensation trends. The 
fact is that the wave of deregulation occurring at the end of the 1990s created 
unprecedented opportunities for risk-taking in the banking industry. It follows 
that top executives wanted to exploit these risky opportunities, but did not want 
to risk their own compensation. Consequently, the landscape of compensation 
changed, with further reliance on cash compensation and bonuses. Moreover, 
CEOs in the banking sector have had the highest pay of all executives in the 
economy since 2006.
Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2010) find that banks with CEOs whose incentives were 
better aligned with the interests of shareholders performed worse and find no 
evidence that they performed better. Banks with higher option compensation 
and a larger fraction of compensation in bonuses for their CEOs did not perform 
worse during the crisis. Suntheim (2010) shows that institutions where CEOs had 
more incentives to take risks (higher Vega) performed worse. Moreover, a whole 
host of papers (cited in Table 1) find that higher risk-taking incentives did indeed 
lead to higher volatility. The only result that may be at first glance surprising 
is that of Fahlenbrach and Stulz (2010). Why would shareholders want give 
incentives to perform worse? The other papers answer this question succinctly: 
shareholders gave CEOs the incentives to take on risk, which happened not to 
pay out in this realisation. This notion that shareholders created an incentive 
system in their own interest is something we will discuss throughout the paper.
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3.1.3 How should compensation be designed?
As we noted earlier, the CEOs’ incentives may be well aligned with shareholders’ 
preferences, but are not aligned with other stakeholders.7 To align the CEO’s 
objective with social objectives in terms of risk choice, Bolton et al (2011) propose 
tying a CEO’s compensation at least in part to a measure of default riskiness 
of the firm.8 Specifically, excess risk-taking may be controlled by tying CEO 
compensation to the bank’s CDS spread over the performance evaluation period. 
A high, and increasing, spread would result in a CDS lower compensation, and vice 
versa. They then demonstrate that shareholders would not choose to implement 
such a compensation scheme, instead preferring excess risk. Shareholders suffer 
from a commitment problem due to multiple factors: the ability to renegotiate 
the compensation contract and distortions in debt markets arising from deposit 
insurance and investors’ misperceptions of risk. The benefit of the CDS spread 
is that it is a market price for the probability of default that is liquid for large 
institutions. Bebchuk and Spamann (2010) and Edmans and Liu (2011) suggest 
linking compensation directly to debt.
Bolton et al (2010) provide supporting evidence that increased CEO financial 
exposure to underlying bank risk is perceived by the market to reduce risk-taking, 
reflected in lower CDS spreads. They exploit greater disclosure requirements by 
the Securities Exchange Commission for CEO pay in 2007 with respect to both 
deferred compensation and executive pension grants to compute the fraction 
of CEO pay that is at risk if the bank fails, that is, deferred compensation and 
pension payments. The higher this fraction is, the more the bank’s CDS spread 
decreases. Thus, as expected, the market believes that CEOs who stand to lose 
more financially in the event of the bank’s failure take lower risks.9 Tung and Wang 
(2011) provide additional evidence of reduced risk-taking by aligning the CEO’s 
compensation with the value of the firm. Higher ratios of inside debt (deferred 
compensation and pension payments) to equity imply lower idiosyncratic risk 
and less risky loans.
3.2 Boards
3.2.1 The evidence
A number of studies have argued that boards are shareholders’ first line of defence 
in governance and focused on factors that influence board effectiveness (for a 
review of the literature see Hermalin and Weisbach, 2003; Adams and Mehran, 
7 In section 3.4, we propose the use of options in compensation as backdoor equity financing to conserve 
capital. Here, we concern ourselves with incentive effects on CEOs.
8 There are, of course, other proposals for changing the composition of compensation, such as clawbacks. 
Clawbacks, however, may not be based on robust measures of risk-taking, especially since the amount 
clawed back may be determined by bank examiners.
9 One side-benefit of this approach is that it creates a built-in stabiliser using compensation. When banks 
are performing well and their credit quality is strong, bonuses will be paid out. However, when their 
performance deteriorates and their credit quality weakens (which would be reflected in an increase in 
their CDS spread), the banks will be forced to conserve capital through the automatic adjustment of 
bonuses. This is in a sense analogous to cutting dividends to protect the bank and its creditors. While 
cutting dividends imposes a cost on equity holders, this approach imposes a cost on risk-takers.
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2003; Adams et al, 2010; Adams, 2010; , Becht et al, 2012). Among the crucial 
factors are board size and outside director ratio. Some authors argue that large 
boards are value reducing because of free-rider problems. Others posit that an 
increase in outside director representation should improve firm performance 
because outside directors are more likely to be strong monitors than firm insiders. 
Although it has been documented that large boards are value reducing, Adams 
and Mehran (2010) do not find a negative correlation between board size and 
performance (as proxied by Tobin’s Q) for BHCs when using data spanning nearly 
four decades. Board size also has an ambiguous relationship with risk, as seen in 
Table 1. Consistent with studies on non-financial firms, Adams and Mehran also 
document that bank performance is unrelated to the outside director ratio. At 
the same time, several recent papers have found that the proportion of outside 
directors is negatively related to risk (see Table 1). As shown in Figure 6, the 
percentage of outside directors has had an upward trend since the mid-1990s, 
while the total number of directors has been declining over the past two decades.























































































Adams and Mehran (2010) show that the performance of BHCs deteriorates 
when directors who are busier serve on the bank board (that is, busy directors 
serve on other boards). This finding within the banking industry is consistent 
with other studies in non-financials (see Fich and Shivdasani, 2006). In addition, 
banks with busy bank executives serving as directors of other companies also do 
poorly. Finally, Adams and Mehran document that interlocks10 adversely affects 
bank performance. Minton et al (2010) find that a higher outside director ratio 
did not mean that a BHC fared better during the financial crisis.
While there is much discussion in policy circles that independent board members 
have little financial experience and that experience is crucial to understanding 
today’s complex financial markets, there may be a dark side to expertise – further 
alignment with risk-taking incentives. We know (Guerrera and Larsen, 2008) that 
10 An interlock is a situation where the chairman or the CEO of a BHC is a director in another company 
whose top management is on the board of the BHC.
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Northern Rock’s board included a former bank CEO, a top fund manager, and a 
previous member of the Bank of England’s governing body, while Bear Stearns had 
a board where 7 of 13 members had a banking background (on average, 17.8% 
members of US boards had previous banking experience in 2006, according to 
Ferreira et al, 2010). Empirical evidence adds to this impression: Minton et al 
(2010) show a positive relationship between experience for independent directors 
and volatility.11 These results do not imply causation. It may be that banks that 
want to take more risks hire board members with more expertise.
3.2.2 Governance from the supervisory point of view
There has been a recognition among the supervisory community that governance 
practices were often rather weak prior to the crisis, and a number of supervisory 
groups have addressed these issues quite thoroughly.12 However, while the 
supervisory community has made progress in the last several years in identifying 
stronger practices, many of the nuances of governance and incentive conflicts 
make the regulation and supervision of corporate governance difficult. Often, 
there are no hard and fast rules, and just when a practice becomes widely accepted 
as best practice, we start to see exceptions to the rules in precisely the firms most 
in need of good governance.
One of biggest challenges for supervisors is identifying and encouraging best 
practices while being mindful that one size cannot fit all: from a regulatory 
point of view, boards and management should be more focused on safety and 
soundness issues, but what governance structure is most conducive to achieving 
that end, and is it the same in all firms? What is the ideal make-up of a board 
of directors in a large and complex firm? And how far should supervisors go in 
criticising or endorsing firms’ governance practices – particularly when it comes 
to the board of directors?
One of the components of effective governance cited most often is the ability 
and willingness of bank boards to challenge management and engage in good 
dialogue to ensure that the company’s actions and decisions take into account 
the wide range of factors that could affect stakeholders. To gain comfort that 
a board is indeed capable of performing its duty to challenge and engage, one 
might ask the questions: Is the board composition conducive to achieving strong 
governance outcomes? Does it include the right people, with appropriate levels of 
independence and sufficient expertise? Do board members insist on receiving the 
kinds of information they need to understand the firm’s risks and vulnerabilities?
11 Garicano and Cuñat (2009) find evidence for Spanish cajas that goes in the opposite direction, 
demonstrating that cajas which had chairmen without previous banking experience (or without 
postgraduate education) performed worse. The non-profit nature of the cajas and their close link with 
political institutions make this striking result difficult to generalise to international banks. Similarly, 
Hau and Thum (2009) find evidence that lack of financial experience of board members in German 
banks was strongly positively related to losses by the banks. This lack of experience is correlated with 
being a political appointment and was much more present in public banks (Landesbanken).
12 For instance, the Basel Committee’s Corporate Governance Task Force updated its Principles for 
Enhancing Corporate Governance last year, and the Senior Supervisors Group has addressed governance 
weaknesses in three of its reports (Senior Supervisors Group, 2008, 2009,  2010).
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First there is the question of expertise. Naturally a board member cannot be 
expected to know as much about the business as a member of management. 
However, if a board member is to carry out his or her responsibility to challenge 
management, that board member must have the expertise necessary to grasp the 
complexity of the business and thus the associated risks. The question, however, 
is what constitutes appropriate expertise. Are additional expectations required 
to ensure that the board’s ‘financial experts’ are able to assess the risks posed by 
exposures to the more complex products at the larger securities firms? And how 
many ‘experts’ does a board need? Is there a role for non-experts? Some argue that 
the non-financial experts are the individuals who may ask the important, high-
level strategic questions while all of the more technical members are focused on 
the details.
Furthermore, expertise is not enough to ensure that the board will engage with 
and challenge management. Another important prerequisite is a board member’s 
ability to voice independent or potentially unpopular views. The idea that 
independence is important to good board governance is obviously not new and 
has been reinforced through law and regulations. Personal or informal loyalties 
can be just as detrimental to strong, independent views as more formal ties can 
be. The challenge for supervisors is how we assess whether board members, 
irrespective of official independence, exercise intellectual independence in 
carrying out their duties.
The level of board engagement is another component of a real challenge. 
Arguably, board members must invest sufficient time and energy to understand 
the risks to which their firms are exposed. Many have argued that board members 
at large financial institutions have too many other commitments to be able to 
devote sufficient time to carrying out their board responsibilities. On the other 
side of the argument, banks argue that their firms benefit from the input of 
individuals who understand global business trends and who can speak to some 
of the geopolitical issues these multinational firms face. They acknowledge that 
the most desirable individuals are by definition overcommitted, but regard them 
as crucial nevertheless.
How should supervisors address this tension? Should they limit the number 
of other directorships that a large bank board member can hold? Are gaps in a 
board member’s knowledge due to a lack of expertise, insufficient time invested, 
or some other shortfall? For instance, is management providing the board with 
the background they need? Regulators expect management to share the right 
amount of information, at the appropriate level of detail, to ensure that directors 
are getting what they need to do their jobs. At the same time, it is incumbent 
upon a conscientious board to demand the information they find most useful in 
the form that works best for them.
Supervisors can gain insight into the level of board engagement, expertise 
and independence through more intensive interaction with board members, 
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but the question remains – are engagement, expertise and independence 
enough? An engaged, expert and independent board member may see his or 
her sole responsibility as to the shareholder. Supervisors are interested in other 
stakeholders – like creditors, depositors and the public. How do they ensure that 
boards and senior management consider the interests of other stakeholders? How 
do they align their interests – at least to some extent – with the goal of containing 
downside risk? This is definitely an open question that needs addressing.
3.3 Risk and risk management
In order to understand the crucial connection between governance and risk, we 
will take two approaches. First, we will look at the big picture and connect some 
of the strands in previous parts of the paper to clarify how incentives played a 
role in excess risk-taking. Second, we will discuss risk management as a specific 
role within the bank.
While we have discussed compensation in section 3.1, it is worth discussing 
the notion of ‘residual compensation’ used by Cheng et al (2010), as it relates 
to the notion of a risk-taking culture at a bank. Residual compensation is 
constructed as the residuals of a regression of compensation on firm size (defined 
by market capitalisation) and sub-industry level characteristics.13 Hence it is the 
compensation unexplained by firm size (which also takes into account talent 
differences, as suggested by Gabaix and Landier, 2008). Interestingly, the firms 
with persistently high residual compensation include Bear Stearns, Lehman, 
Citicorp, Countrywide and AIG. The authors find that residual compensation is 
strongly correlated with several measures of risk-taking (summarised in Table 1) 
and is correlated with institutional ownership. They interpret this as a culture of 
short-termism present at these firms, in part due to the preferences of institutional 
shareholders. Ellul and Yerramilli (2010) and Laeven and Levine (2009) also 
find a significant positive relationship between institutional ownership and 
multiple measures of riskiness. The notion of a risk-taking culture is an important 
one. Official reports such as the Walker Report (2009) and those of the Senior 
Supervisors Group (2008, 2009) discuss risk supervision failures, incentives to 
take on excess risk and the need for a bank to define its risk appetite. However, 
little fault is placed on the firm for potentially having accurately represented 
the wishes of its shareholders (and having ignored other stakeholders, as we 
discussed in section 2).14
The importance of the chief risk officer (CRO) and the risk committee is examined 
in depth by Ellul and Yerramilli (2010). Using a sample of the 74 largest bank 
holding companies in the US from 2000 to 2008, they offer some details on 
13 This is broken down into three groups: primary dealers, banks who are not primary dealers, and 
insurance companies.
14 The point that risk-taking was intentional and potentially supported by shareholders is also suggested 
by the evidence on the experience of independent board members in the section on boards.
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the prioritisation of risk: 51.9% of the firms have a CRO as an executive officer, 
19.5% have a CRO among the top five executives in level of compensation, and 
23.2% of risk committees (they use audit if there is no risk committee) have at 
least one independent or grey director with banking experience. They construct 
a risk management index (RMI) using principal component analysis on the 
variables that define if a CRO is present, if the CRO is an executive officer, if the 
CRO is among the top five compensated, and the CRO’s compensation divided 
by the CEO’s compensation. In Table 1, we see that a higher RMI index means 
that three measures of volatility will be lower. This relationship also holds if the 
explanatory variable is just CRO compensation divided by CEO compensation. 
Similarly, Keys et al (2009) find that larger relative power for the CRO (measured 
by CRO compensation divided by the amount of compensation given to the top 
five executives in level of pay) implies lower default rates on loans (mortgages 
and home equity loans) originated by the bank. Moreover, Ellul and Yerramilli 
(2010) show that banks with a larger RMI had ‘lower exposure to private-label 
mortgage backed securities and risky trading assets, and were less active in trading 
off-balance sheet derivative securities’. Lastly banks with higher ‘quality of 
oversight’ (the average of dummies whether the risk committee is experienced15 
and whether the risk committee is active16) had lower volatility as well.
The Senior Supervisors Group (2009) interviewed managers and executives in 
large financial institutions about risk management practices. The governance 
issues they point out are the following:17
• Risk management is often separated along product and organisational 
lines.
• The board and senior managers often do not specify what risk level is 
acceptable to the firm.
•  Compensation practices are more related to attracting and retaining 
staff, not focused on sensitivity to risk. Moreover, risk-takers are 
rewarded with ‘status and influence’.
• The board of directors did not correctly perceive the risks the firms 
were taking.
The second and fourth points emphasise the role of communication and 
prioritisation of risk at the top levels. This is in line with the work of Ellul and 
Yerramilli (2010) in relating the centrality of the role of risk management with less 
volatility. This also seems to point to a lack of understanding of the board about 
risk practices. As we discussed earlier, this is certainly an issue, but it is not clear 
that increased board experience with financial markets would improve matters. 
This is because of the risk culture of the firm, which the Senior Supervisors Group 
also emphasises in the description of rewards for risk-takers.
15 This is defined by the risk committee having at least one member with previous banking experience.
16  An active risk committee is defined by meeting more times during the year than the average risk 
committee in the sample.
17 Of course, they point out many institutional arrangements and practices which led to excess risk-
taking. We only focus on the ones directly related to governance.
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Other reports have made similar points. The Walker Report (2009) and papers 
by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2009) and the Committee of 
European Banking Supervisors (2010) all highlight:
• The need to define the bank’s risk appetite at senior levels and 
communicate it;
• that there should be a risk management function with an experienced 
and independent CRO who is given appropriate status and 
compensation in line with their important role.
These suggestions seem like the minimum that is needed for risk to become a 
priority in a bank.
3.4 Market discipline
Corporate governance can be defined as comprising the procedures by which ex 
ante agreements on corporate actions are created and enforced. These procedures 
exist in the context of markets for corporate control, for managerial talent and for 
financial capital. In general, the effectiveness of corporate governance procedures 
is closely bound up with the effectiveness of the signals and incentives generated 
by these markets or, in short, in the quality of market discipline. Market discipline 
is the subject matter of this section. We examine the impact of bank capital 
regulation and of the expansion in the scale and scope of financial institutions 
on market discipline.
3.4.1 Bank capital
Bank capital is a particularly important source of market discipline in banks, 
and it is the focus of many regulations. A well-designed bank capital adequacy 
regime may serve as a partial substitute for formal corporate governance rules in 
banking, because capital regulation can strengthen market incentives for bank 
shareholders and managers to resolve governance problems. We investigate this 
possibility in this section.
Bank capital serves at least three purposes.18 First, it serves as a buffer against 
bankruptcy, and the attendant social costs. Second, should bank failure occur, 
capital is a buffer against losses to the deposit insurance fund and, hence, the 
taxpayer. And, third, bank capital exposes bank shareholders to losses, and so 
should serve to counter the excessive risk-taking incentives that are engendered 
by a deposit insurance fund with risk-insensitive premia. The third of these 
purposes gives bank capital structure a role as a governance vehicle.
18 See Furlong and Keeley (1989) and Morrison and White (2005) on the relationship between capital 
requirements and risk, and Gordy and Heitfield (2010) and references therein for an analysis of risk-
based capital requirements. Calem and Rafael (1999) calibrate a model that demonstrates a U-shaped 
relationship between capital levels and risk-taking incentives.
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Several authors argue that because they expose shareholders directly to the risk 
of failure, bank capital requirements encourage good risk management practices 
(eg Rochet, 1992; Kim and Santomero, 1994; Morrison and White, 2005).19 
Higher capital requirements should therefore mitigate in favour of better bank 
governance. However, recent work appears to indicate that, over the years 
leading up to the financial crisis, the composition of bank capital altered so as to 
undermine owner incentives. Acharya et al (2011) examine the composition of 
bank capital and the effects of bank dividend policies upon bank capital in the 
years leading up to the financial crisis. They find that the composition of bank 
capital has changed: most of the new capital issues in response to the crisis are of 
debt or of hybrid securities such as preferred stock. Moreover, bankers continued 
to pay dividends throughout the crisis: Acharya et al argue that this policy has 
served to break the priority of debt over equity, and has served as a form of 
risk-shifting. Their conclusions are supported by Khorana and Perlman (2010), 
who argue that the 150 largest banks have engaged in pro-cyclical distribution 
strategies that have served to jeopardise long-term value.
In replacing their share-based capital with arguably weaker forms of capital, 
banks leave themselves open to severe losses in future crisis situations. Indeed, 
Demirguc-Kunt et al (2010) find in a multicountry study that better-capitalised 
banks fared better during the crisis, and that higher-quality capital, such as Tier 
1 capital, was more relevant to their performance; Berger and Bouwman (2009) 
present evidence that bank capital is more important during financial crises, when 
it enables banks both to survive and to improve their market shares; Beltratti and 
Stulz (2009) show that banks with more capital, and from countries with stricter 
capital supervision, fared better during the crisis; Chesney et al (2010) also find a 
negative relationship between Tier 1 capital ratios and write-downs.
That banks failed to account for the effects identified in the previous paragraph 
suggests that capital requirements alone are not a sufficient bank governance 
mechanism. Reducing the quality of the bank’s capital raises the value of 
the government safety net which, while it is socially sub-optimal, increases 
shareholder wealth. Macey and O’Hara (2003) argue that the right response to 
this problem would be to extend the fiduciary duties of banks beyond the usual 
shareholder-maximisation objective, to include an obligation towards the safety 
and soundness of their institutions. Hence, they argue, bank directors should 
explicitly account for solvency risk, and should be personally liable for failures 
to do so.
Macey and O’Hara’s idea is an attractive one, but it may be subject to the same 
problems that hamper general governance arrangements in banks: namely, the 
opacity of banks and the non-contractibility of their activities. It may prove very 
difficult to prove in court that a bank’s directors failed to fulfil a wider fiduciary 
19 In addition, Boot and Marinc (2010) demonstrate higher capital requirements can raise stability by 
inducing entry by higher-quality banks, who believe themselves less likely to be undercut by poor 
bankers taking advantage of the deposit insurance fund, and so raise competition.
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duty of this type: indeed, it is precisely this type of problem that makes bank 
capital an important governance tool. It may therefore prove simpler to address 
the problems that make equity capital an unattractive source of funds for banks. 
In the absence of tax advantages and government support for debt, there is no 
particular reason to believe that equity is a more costly bank liability than debt 
(see Admati et al, 2010). Further, Mehran and Thakor (2011) provide a theoretical 
argument showing that bank value and capital are positively correlated. Their 
empirical work supports their theory.20 Hence, one way to reduce the propensity 
of banks for debt finance would be to reduce the value of the deposit insurance 
net. A simpler, and probably more effective, approach would be to abolish the 
tax advantage on corporate debt. This seems unlikely to occur.21 Three alternative 
proposals have been advanced recently: (1) to extend the tax advantage to certain 
types of equity capital, which has been the effect of the contingent convertible 
bond, or CoCo bond,22 and a related instrument, ‘bail-inable’ debt as a resolution 
mechanism (Ervin, 2011); (2) Special Capital Account, as in Acharya et al (2011); 
and (3) using options in compensation as backdoor equity capital.23
3.4.2 Scale, scope and corporate governance
Recent years have seen a significant increase in the scale and scope of financial 
institutions. This has affected the formation of market prices, and as a result 
the functioning of market discipline, in several ways. Large banks are perceived 
as too-big-to-fail, and are possibly also too-complex-to-fail. They may also have 
succeeded in extending the reach of the deposit insurance net beyond its intended 
narrow use in retail deposit-taking. Each of these effects has reduced the sensitivity 
of bank investors to bank risk-taking, because investors anticipate a degree of 
state support even in failure states. The consequence is a severe attenuation of 
market discipline and, hence, in the ability of outside stakeholders to align the 
incentives of bank managers with their own. To the extent that this is the case, 
new governance arrangements are needed that either substitute for, or restore 
market-based incentives. In this section, we discuss the attenuation of market 
discipline in large financial firms, and we examine possible policy responses. We 
find no clear solutions to the governance problems that we identify, although 
we are able to identify areas upon which future research and policy discussions 
could focus.
Bank scope has expanded in recent years in both the US, where the November 1999 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act dismantled the barriers to universal banking that were 
created in the US by the Glass-Steagall Act, and in Europe, where conglomeration 
has been occurring for at least two decades.24 The repeal of Glass-Steagall reflected 
industry pressure, and also a realisation that contemporary justifications for its 
20 See F Allen et al (2011) for another argument suggesting that banks with more capital are more valuable.
21 For a brief recent discussion of the politics of reform, see Surowiecki (2010).
22 See Flannery (2009), and Albul et al (2010), who argue respectively that CoCo bonds would reduce the 
incidence and the costs of financial distress in banking firms. Sundaresan and Wang (2011) discuss the 
difficulty of pricing contingent convertible bonds.
23 See Mehran and Rosenberg (2008) and Babenko and Tserlukevich (2009) for related evidence.
24 See Morrison (2010) for a survey of universal banking. Lown et al (2000) discuss the pressures that led 
to financial conglomeration.
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passage had little empirical support.25 But, as we note below, the repeal had some 
apparently unanticipated deleterious effects upon market discipline in financial 
institutions.
The crisis reinforced the fact that some large financial institutions are too big and 
systemically important to fail. Ben Bernanke (2009) acknowledged that ‘in the 
present crisis, the too-big-to-fail issue has emerged as an enormous problem’. The 
inevitable consequence of this observation is an attenuation of market discipline 
in financial conglomerates. This can be addressed partly through improved 
bankruptcy procedures for large banks, but it is unlikely that very large and 
complex financially fragile institutions will ever be treated precisely as smaller 
banks are.
Bank conglomeration has not only expanded the scale of banks, but also the 
scope, and so potentially worsened a too-big-to-fail problem. By expanding 
the range of activities in which deposit-taking institutions participate, it may 
also have extended the reach of the deposit insurance safety net to securities 
businesses:26 if a systemically important firm is engaged in securities business 
then the prudential authorities may feel that the securities business should 
be protected in the event of its failure so as to avoid damaging contagion to 
the deposit-taking business. In this way, conglomeration may serve to damage 
market discipline in businesses where it was formerly very effective. Moreover, 
it may prove a rationale for more conglomerate risk-taking: absent enforceable 
fiduciary responsibilities of the type envisaged by Macey and O’Hara (2003), 
banks will take advantage of opportunities to extend the deposit insurance safety 
net and, in particular, financial conglomerates might be expected to engage in 
more risk-shifting.27
The apparent diminution of market discipline caused by financial conglomeration 
has undermined traditional governance arrangements in banks. Several possible 
responses present themselves. First, shareholders and regulators could demand 
that bankers report their activities in greater detail, and so improve the ex ante 
contracting environment. Such reporting could be further strengthened by 
trusted third-party information providers. Second, regulators could attempt 
to alter the institutional structure within which banks operate, and so resolve 
some of the incentive problems caused by a weakening of market discipline. We 
examine these possibilities in turn below. Neither appears to be a panacea.
If better reporting would improve contracting, and so strengthen bank governance 
arrangements, one might ask why it has not already emerged through a process 
of market discovery. One explanation may be that, because shareholders and 
managers have a shared desire to extract a deposit insurance fund subsidy, 
25 See Morrison and Wilhelm (2007, pp 196–215); Krozner and Rajan (1994); Ang and Richardson (1994).
26 For theoretical models of this effect, see Freixas et al (2007) and Dewatripont and Mitchell (2005).
27 Stiroh (2004) and DeYoung and Roland (2001) provide evidence that diversified financial institutions 
take more risks.
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neither has an incentive to produce reports that might make it harder to do 
so. If this is the case then there is an argument to be made for state-mandated 
reporting, possibly by a neutral third-party information provider. But such a 
requirement would run up against two problems. First, regulatory intervention 
in market-based information generation can undermine the incentives that 
ensure its veracity; second, banks are increasingly too complex for outsiders to 
comprehend.
A greater investment in third-party information provision would certainly 
generate more information upon which shareholder and supervisor governance 
arrangements could be predicated. But such information is valuable only in so 
far as it is accurate. The evidence from a strong reliance upon credit ratings in 
financial regulations28 suggests that it may not be: ratings for structured products 
had to be revised sharply downwards after the crisis, and firms that had relied 
upon them experienced significant losses.29 If the credit rating agencies lowered 
their standards prior to the crisis, it is possible that they did so in response to the 
hard-wiring of their data into regulatory standards. Partnoy (1999) argues that 
when investors have a legally imposed mandate based upon a credit rating, they 
become less concerned with the quality of the rating than with its existence; as 
a result, the rating agency’s concern for its reputation may be subordinated to 
its desire to attract business by selling regulatory certification, and the quality of 
ratings may diminish. Moreover, ratings shopping by issuers may exacerbate the 
conflicts of interest, as in Bolton et al (2010). Ratings accuracy is also likely to 
suffer most in booms, as in the recent crisis (Bar-Isaac and Shapiro, 2010). Issuers 
may design bonds so as to achieve the necessary rating by the lowest possible 
margin: consonant with this hypothesis, Benmelech and Dlugosz (2008) find a 
very high degree of uniformity in the design of loan-backed notes, and Coval et 
al (2009a, 2009b) and Brennan et al (2008) show that these notes were structured 
so as to maximise their market betas, and hence their yield.
Quite apart from the difficulties associated with mandated third-party information 
provision, it seems unlikely that it is technologically possible to generate data 
that could support better governance in large financial firms. There is plenty of 
evidence that such firms are now almost too complex to manage. For example, 
Herring and Carmassi (2010) note that Citi has nearly 2,500 subsidiaries, and 
that it operates in 84 countries. Bank officers faced with this sort of complexity 
naturally struggle to manage every aspect of their business effectively, so that 
additional agency problems are introduced into complex financial firms. It may 
be impossible to generate a report that an outsider could understand and use 
as the basis for a governance contract. Nevertheless, shareholders tolerate this 
situation. This may be because it is unclear to the regulatory authorities what 
28 US banks were referred by the Comptroller of the Currency to the rating agencies to identify the 
speculative-grade bonds that should not form a part of their portfolio as far back as 1936 and, more 
recently, ratings have played an increasing role in the determination of regulatory capital ratios. See 
the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (2006).
29 See, for example, Davies (2007), reporting the downgrade of over 2,000 securities in November 2008, 
over 500 of which moved down over 10 notches on the standard ratings scale.
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the consequences of firm failure in a complex organisation would be, so that, 
when push comes to shove, complex firms may receive a bail-out. In short, a 
‘too-complex-to-fail’ problem may exacerbate the governance problems caused 
by a too-big-to-fail problem.
The preceding argument suggests that governance problems deriving from a 
failure of market discipline in large firms is not susceptible to a formal, ‘box-
ticking’ solution, precisely because it reflects an inability of regulators and 
bankers to contract ex ante upon banker actions. This suggests that the only 
effective governance responses to the expansion of scale and scope in financial 
firms are likely to be institutional: that is, banker incentives to engage in risk-
shifting in large financial firms may be best countered by altering the structure of 
the firms and the regulatory landscape in which they operate.
Several authors have suggested that an effective institutional response to market 
discipline problems in large financial firms would be to completely separate 
commercial and investment banking;30 some have even gone so far as to advocate 
narrow banking legislation.31 The ‘Volcker Rule’ proposed a partial separation in 
the form of a ban on proprietary trading for banks with a deposit insurance safety 
net (see Group of Thirty, 2009); a watered-down version of this rule made its way 
into the Dodd-Franks Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act of July 
2010.
The argument for narrow banking is seductive, as the evidence for scope 
economies in banking is mixed.32 If the evidence for scope economies in banking 
is not compelling, then perhaps the incentive benefits from exposing risk-takers 
to better and more focused market discipline may outweigh their cost. However, 
this argument requires regulators to be able to credibly commit not to bail out 
non-narrow institutions. Recent evidence suggests that such a commitment 
is unlikely to be enforceable. An example that is particularly germane to this 
discussion is the shadow banking sector, comprising vehicles financed with short-
term funds and holding in longer-term assets, but without deposit insurance and, 
hence, not regulated as banks. Most of the assets held in the shadow banking 
sector immediately before the crisis were bank-originated loans, transferred to 
the shadow banks via securitisations.
The shadow banking sector grew very rapidly in the years prior to the financial 
crisis,33 and, while shadow banks were not subject to financial regulation, some 
30 Herring and Carmassi (2010) report that some degree of separation between lending and securities 
activity is already commonplace in countries that permit banks to engage in both activities.
31 See, for example, Kay (2009).
32 Barth et al (2000) make a technological case for economies of scope, and Berger et al (2000) identify 
some potential economies in universal banks. However, L Allen and Rai (1996) and Vander Vennet 
(1999) find only limited evidence of scope economies in European universal banks, although Cyberto-
Ottone and Murgia (2000) show that scope expansion can raise shareholder wealth.
33 Adrian and Shin (2009) show that immediately prior to the crisis, the shadow banking sector had more 
assets than the banking sector. Gorton (2009) tracks the evolution of the shadow banking sector.
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received state support during the crisis.34 The growth of the shadow banking sector 
has two related implications. First, it suggests that bankers will innovate their 
way around complex regulations. If so, such regulations cause a misallocation 
of human capital within the banking sector, and hence an exacerbation of 
governance problems. Second, the crisis experience of money market mutual 
funds indicates that, moreover, the lines have blurred between institutions that 
are supported by the state and those that are not. In light of this observation, one 
might expect regulated institutions to shift the regulated parts of their business 
outside the ambit of the supervisor, while retaining the assets that benefit most 
from government support.35
In summary, the case for legislation that restricts the activities of deposit-taking 
firms is mixed. Such legislation might be effective if it could be enforced. But the 
crisis experience of the shadow banking sector suggests that enforcement would 
be difficult, and that scope-restricting legislation may serve further to undermine 
market discipline.
An alternative institutional response to weakened market discipline in large 
banks might be simply to force them to shrink, so that they are once again small-
enough-to-fail. In line with this suggestion, Čihák et al (2011) find evidence that 
market discipline is effective for smaller to medium-sized banks that are unlikely 
to receive a government bail-out: executives in such banks are more likely to be 
dismissed if they assume risks, and if they incur losses, cut dividends, have a high 
charter value, and hold high levels of subordinated debt.
While smaller banks would be less able to take advantage of government support, 
they would also be more competitive. Every economics undergraduate understands 
that heightened competition is good for consumers. However, starting with 
Keeley (1990), a strand of banking literature identifies a confounding effect in 
banking, suggesting that competition could result in more financial fragility, 
because it would lower the value of the bank’s franchise, and so encourage risk-
taking.36 This effect might outweigh the governance benefits that flow from 
reduced access to government funds. However, recent theoretical work suggests 
that this effect is not cut-and-dried,37 and recent empirical work indicates that, 
34 Kacperczyk and Schnabl (2010) document a run on the money market mutual fund sector. Despite the 
fact that money market mutual funds were not formally covered by the deposit insurance fund, the 
US Department of the Treasury reacted to the run by announcing temporary insurance for investors in 
money market mutual funds.
35 Acharya, Schnabl and Suarez (2010) present evidence in line with this from the asset-backed commercial 
paper market, where securitisations prior to the crisis reduced capital requirements without reducing 
the riskiness of the originator’s asset portfolio.
36 See also Besanko and Thakor (1993) and Hellman et al (2000).
37 See Boyd and De Nicolo (2005), who argue that heightened bank competition may reduce borrower 
risk-shifting, although Martinez-Miera and Repullo (2010) argue that this effect is ambiguous.
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while bank competition may be associated with heightened financial fragility, 
the causal link is not certain.38
This section has identified a serious governance problem in large financial 
institutions stemming from the weakening of market discipline and the difficulty 
in implementation of formal regulations due to the extreme complexity of the 
institutions. The only effective approach to these governance problems may be 
institutional. However, the natural argument for narrower banks is undermined 
by the ability of banks to innovate their way around scope regulation, and the 
case for smaller banks is still unproven. Market discipline problems in large banks 
therefore remain a serious challenge. The crisis has at least generated plenty of 
data that will facilitate future research and inform future policy debates.
4 Conclusion
Shareholders in banks have created incentives for taking risks and maximising 
leverage due to the deposit insurance subsidy, at a substantial cost to other 
stakeholders. This has been amplified in recent years as banks have been able 
to push into newer, complex activities and broadened their scope. The nature 
of these businesses has made it difficult for regulators to keep up and analyse 
the implications of the expansion. In this paper we offer some suggestions based 
on the recent finance literature that may diminish governance issues. We also 
present problems which have no easy answers. Further research will be needed to 
make headway into such issues.
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3 The Countercyclical Capital 
Buffer of Basel III
 A Critical Assessment
Rafael Repullo and Jesús Saurina1
CEMFI and CEPR; Banco de España
1 Introduction
Since their first meeting during the financial turmoil, which took place in São 
Paulo on the second weekend of November 2008, the G20 has been aware of the 
problem of procyclicality in the regulatory framework. They agreed that it was 
important ‘to address the issue of procyclicality in financial markets regulations 
and supervisory systems’. One week later, in Washington, they referred again to 
this problem, now under one of the five principles for reform of financial markets, 
namely the principle of ‘enhancing sound regulation’. They also instructed the 
International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Financial Stability Forum (FSF), later 
renamed Financial Stability Board (FSB), and the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (BCBS) ‘to develop recommendations to mitigate procyclicality, 
including the review of how valuation and leverage, bank capital, executive 
compensation, and provisioning practices may exacerbate cyclical trends’. Not 
only these institutions, but also the G20 finance ministers were requested to 
formulate recommendations on ‘mitigating against procyclicality in regulatory 
policy’. Therefore, from the beginning of the crisis procyclicality was regarded as 
a key issue to be addressed. 
Four months later, a progress report was more specific,2 making reference to 
‘building buffers of resources in good times and measures to constrain leverage’ 
in order to ‘ensure that financial regulations dampen rather than exacerbate 
economic cycles’. This sentence would appear in the following G20 statements. 
1 The views expressed in this paper are those of the authors and should not be attributed to the Banco 
de España or the Eurosystem. We would like to thank Ugo Albertazzi, Michael Gordy, Xavier Freixas, 
Michal Kowalik, Luis Servén and Javier Suarez for helpful comments, as well as Carlos Trucharte for 
his contribution to our related work on the procyclicality of Basel II, and Francesc Rodríguez for his 
excellent research assistance. Financial support from the Spanish Ministry of Science and Innovation 
(Grant No EC2008-00801) is gratefully acknowledged.
2 ‘Progress report on the immediate actions of the Washington action plan prepared by the UK chair of 
the G20’, 14 Mar 2009. This and subsequent G20 documents referred to are available at http://www.
g20.org/en/financial-track/documents (accessed Feb 2012).
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The ‘Progress report on the actions of the Washington Action Plan’, presented 
on 2 April 2009 in London, stated that the FSF had formed three work streams 
to study the forces that contribute to procyclicality in the financial system, 
one of them focusing on bank capital. Moreover, a deadline of the end of 2009 
was set to take forward ‘implementation of the recommendations to mitigate 
procyclicality, including a requirement for banks to build buffers of resources in 
good times that they can draw down when conditions deteriorate’. 
In September 2009, another progress report highlighted the efforts to come up 
with a proposal:3 ‘The BCBS has developed objectives for what a countercyclical 
capital buffer should achieve and concrete proposals for how it could work. An 
integrated proposal will be reviewed at the BCBS’s September meeting.’ It also 
added that ‘the BCBS continues to work on approaches to address any excessive 
cyclicality of minimum capital requirements’. This was the first time that the G20 
made an explicit reference to the cyclicality of minimum capital requirements. 
The statement of the following Pittsburgh summit called on finance ministers 
and Central Bank governors to reach agreement on an international framework 
of reform in four critical areas, the first one being ‘building high quality capital 
and mitigating procyclicality’. It was also noted in the progress report of 25 
September 2009 that
‘the Group of Central Bank Governors and Heads of Supervision, the 
oversight body of the BCBS, reached agreement in September to introduce 
a framework for countercyclical capital buffers above the minimum 
requirement. The framework will include capital conservation measures 
such as constraints on capital distributions. The Basel Committee will 
review an appropriate set of indicators, such as earnings and credit-based 
variables, as a way to condition the build up and release of capital buffers.’
In December 2009, the Basel Committee published a consultative document that 
considered a series of measures to address procyclicality (BCBS, 2009), with the 
following four key objectives: dampen any excess cyclicality of the minimum 
capital requirement, promote more forward looking provisions, conserve capital 
to build buffers that can be used in stress, and achieve the broader macroprudential 
goal of protecting the banking sector from periods of excess credit growth. The 
third objective gave rise to the capital conservation buffer and the fourth to the 
countercyclical capital buffer of the new regulatory framework known as Basel III. 
The rationale for the countercyclical capital buffer was presented in the following 
terms:
‘As witnessed during the financial crisis, losses incurred in the banking 
sector during a downturn preceded by a period of excess credit growth 
can be extremely large. These can destabilise the banking sector, which in 
turn can bring about or exacerbate a downturn in the real economy, which 
3 ‘Progress report on the actions of the London and Washington G20 Summits’, 5 Sept 2009.
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can further destabilise the banking sector. These inter-linkages highlight 
the particular importance of the banking sector building up its capital 
defences in periods when credit has grown to excessive levels. As capital 
is more expensive than other forms of funding, the building up of these 
defences should have the additional benefit of helping to moderate credit 
growth.’
A key element of the proposal was to identify a macroeconomic variable or group 
of variables ‘to assess the extent to which in any given jurisdiction there was 
a significant risk that credit had grown to excessive levels’. The buffer would 
operate as follows: ‘For each jurisdiction, when the variable breached certain 
pre-defined thresholds this would give rise to a benchmark buffer requirement. 
This could then be used by national jurisdictions to expand the size of the capital 
conservation buffer.’ The Basel Committee added that ‘as an example, one 
variable which is being considered is the difference between the aggregate credit-
to-GDP ratio and its long term trend’, but they also noted that ‘the proposal 
under development could not be implemented as a strict rules-based regime. 
Such an approach would require a high degree of confidence that the variables 
used would always, under all circumstances, perform as intended and would not 
send out false signals. This level of confidence will not be possible.’
In July 2010, the Basel Committee published for consultation the countercyclical 
capital buffer proposal (BCBS, 2010b). The proposal was justified by the aim 
‘to achieve the broader macroprudential goal of protecting the banking sector 
from periods of excess aggregate credit growth that have often been associated 
with the build up of system-wide risk’. The proposal, which will be described in 
detail in section 2 below, was to use the deviations of the credit-to-GDP ratio 
with respect to its trend as the macroeconomic variable that would drive the 
behaviour of the buffer. The consultative document also described how the 
buffer should be implemented for banks operating in different jurisdictions, as 
well as the principles that should govern the decisions on the buffer and its 
interaction with the capital conservation buffer. The proposal was incorporated 
with minor changes in the Basel III document issued by the Basel Committee in 
December 2010 (BCBS, 2010a). A guidance for national authorities operating the 
countercyclical capital buffer was published at the same time (BCBS, 2010c). 
The interest in using macroprudential instruments to deal with the procyclicality 
of the financial system goes beyond the circle of G20/FSB/BCBS. The Bank 
for International Settlements (BIS) has consistently supported the use of 
macroprudential instruments to address procyclicality. For instance, BIS (2010) 
contains a list of such instruments, including the Spanish dynamic provisions. 
Also a recent report of the Group of Thirty (2010) notes that procyclical practices 
within the financial sector can be reinforced by regulatory practices, including, 
among others, risk-sensitive capital requirements à la Basel II and Basel III. For 
that reason, they support the adoption of countercyclical capital buffers. 
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On the academic front, there is the early work of Kashyap and Stein (2004) in 
which they propose a simple framework for optimal bank capital regulation 
according to which capital charges should depend on the state of the business 
cycle. In contrast with the normative approach of Kashyap and Stein (2004), 
the approach of Repullo and Suarez (2009) is positive. They show that under 
risk-based capital requirements banks hold larger buffers in expansions than in 
recessions, but these buffers are insufficient to prevent a significant contraction 
in the supply of credit at the arrival of a recession. They also show that cyclical 
adjustments in capital requirements can ameliorate these effects. More recent 
arguments in favour of time-varying capital requirements may be found in 
Hanson et al (2010) and in Shleifer and Vishny (2010). The work of Gordy and 
Howells (2006) addresses how to correct the cyclicality of minimum capital 
requirements over the business cycle. Using Spanish data, Repullo et al (2010) 
compare the different procedures to adjust capital requirements over the cycle, 
concluding that the best procedure is to use a business cycle multiplier based on 
GDP growth. 
The purpose of this paper is to provide a critical assessment of the countercyclical 
capital buffer proposal agreed by the Basel Committee in December 2010. This 
buffer constitutes the most significant macroprudential element of the Basel 
III package. However, we argue that the key macroeconomic variable on which 
it based, the deviation of the credit-to-GDP ratio with respect to its trend, the 
credit-to-GDP gap, is for many countries negatively correlated with GDP growth. 
This result may be traced to the fact that credit usually lags the business cycle, 
especially in downturns, and that the use of deviations of the credit-to-GDP 
ratio with respect to its trend compounds the problem, because it takes some 
time before the ratio crosses the trend line. The implication is that a mechanical 
application of the new regulation would tend to reduce capital requirements in 
good times and increase capital requirements in bad times, so it may end up 
exacerbating rather than ameliorating the inherent procyclicality of risk-sensitive 
bank capital regulation. 
The paper is organised as follows. Section 2 describes the Basel III countercyclical 
capital buffer. Section 3 presents and discusses the evidence on the correlation 
of the credit-to-GDP gap variable on which the buffer is based and GDP growth. 
Section 4 considers whether it would have been better to use credit growth as the 
macroeconomic variable driving the behaviour of the buffer. Section 5 reviews 
the approach in Repullo et al (2010) of addressing the procyclicality of minimum 
capital requirements with a business cycle multiplier based on GDP growth. 
Section 6 concludes. 
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2 The countercyclical capital buffer
This section presents a summary of the countercyclical capital buffer described in 
section IV of the Basel III document (BCBS, 2010a) and in the guidance document 
(BCBS, 2010c). Basel III requires national authorities ‘to monitor credit growth 
and other indicators that may signal a build up of system-wide risk’. Based on 
this assessment they will put in place a countercyclical capital buffer which will 
extend the capital conservation buffer (described in section III of BCBS, 2010a), 
so banks will be subject to restrictions on capital distributions (dividends, share 
repurchases and discretionary bonus payments to staff) if they do not meet the 
additional capital requirement. 
The countercyclical capital buffer will range from zero to 2.5% of risk-weighted 
assets. National authorities will pre-announce the decision to raise the level of 
the buffer by up to 12 months, but the decision to decrease the level of the buffer 
will take effect immediately. 
The guidance document specifies five principles, the first restating the objectives 
of the buffer, the second noting that a useful common reference point for taking 
buffer decisions is the behaviour of the credit-to-GDP guide, the third warning 
about the possibility that this variable may give misleading signals, the fourth 
mandating the prompt release of the buffer in times of stress, and the fifth 
reminding authorities that they should also consider other macroprudential 
tools. Annex 1 of the guidance document presents a detailed description of the 
methodology developed ‘to calculate an internationally consistent buffer guide 
that can serve as a common starting reference point for taking buffer decisions’. 
This methodology may be summarised as follows. 
Let xt denote the aggregate private sector credit-to-GDP ratio, and let xt denote 
the Hodrick-Prescott trend of xt, computed using a smoothing parameter λ = 
400,000. Then the credit-to-GDP gap zt is defined as the deviation of the credit-to-
GDP ratio from its trend, that is: 
zt = xt - xt
The benchmark countercyclical capital buffer bt will be set according to the 
following formula:
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where L and H denote a lower and an upper threshold for the gap. The buffer 
bt will be zero when the gap zt is below the lower threshold L and will be at its 
maximum level (2.5%) when the gap zt is above the upper threshold H. Between 
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these two levels, the buffer is a linearly increasing function of the gap. With 
respect to the values of L and H the guidance states: ‘BCBS analysis has found that 
an adjustment factor based on L = 2 and H = 10 provides a reasonable and robust 
specification based on historical banking crises.’ Figure 1 plots the relationship 
between the countercyclical buffer bt and the credit-to-GDP gap zt.





The rationale for this specification of the buffer as well as for the choice of the 
credit-to-GDP gap as the ‘common reference point’ for taking buffer decisions is 
found in Drehmann et al (2010):
‘The analysis shows that the best variables which could be used as signals 
for the pace and size of the accumulation of the buffers are not necessarily 
the best signalling the timing and intensity of the release. Credit seems to 
be preferable for the build-up phase. In particular when measured by the 
deviation of the credit-to-GDP ratio from its trend, it has proven leading 
indicator properties for financial distress.’
They also conclude that ‘some measure of aggregate banking sector losses, 
possibly combined with indicators of credit conditions, seems best for signalling 
the beginning of the release phase’.
In other words, the strategy in their paper is to find the best leading indicator 
of systemic banking crisis, which they claim is the credit-to-GDP gap. They also 
acknowledge that this indicator does not perform very well in bad times, so they 
propose other indicators for the release phase. However, no consideration is 
given to the possible relationship between the credit-to-GDP gap and standard 
business cycle indicators such as the rate of growth of the GDP, which are key to 
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assessing the procyclicality of the proposed regulation. This will be the focus of 
our discussion in section 3 below. 
It is important to note that the guidance document introduced some caveats 
with respect to the use of the credit-to-GDP gap. First, they state that ‘authorities 
should look for evidence as to whether the inferences from the credit/GDP guide 
are consistent with those of other variables’. Second, they add that ‘given that 
credit growth can be a lagging indicator of stress, promptly releasing the buffer 
may be required to reduce the risk of the supply of credit being constrained by 
regulatory capital requirements’. In other words, they warn that the credit-to-
GDP gap may give misleading signals and should probably not be used for the 
release of the buffer. So judgement should be exercised in the build-up phase 
and especially in the release phase. In the Basel jargon, this means that the 
countercyclical capital buffer incorporates elements of both Pillar 1 (minimum 
capital requirements) and Pillar 2 (supervisory review process).4
3 The credit-to-GDP gap and the business cycle
In section 2 we noted that the choice of the credit-to-GDP gap as the ‘common 
reference point’ for taking buffer decisions was based on its properties as leading 
indicator of systemic banking crisis, without regard to how it might correlate 
with standard business cycle indicators such as the rate of growth of the GDP. 
This section looks at this correlation in order to assess to what extent the 
countercyclical capital buffer may have some undesirable side-effects on the 
procyclicality of the Basel III regime. 
We use the data on domestic credit to the private sector as a percentage of GDP 
from the database of the World Bank5 for a number of countries to compute the 
credit-to-GDP gap for the period 1986–2009, which we then correlate with the 
corresponding rate of growth of the GDP. 
Let us take the United Kingdom as an illustrative example. The solid line in Figure 
2 represents the evolution of domestic credit to the private sector as a percentage 
of GDP for the 24 years of the sample. This variable increases from 81.8% in 1986 
to 213.4% in 2009. The dashed line is the corresponding Hodrick-Prescott (HP) 
trend computed, as suggested by the guidance document (BCBS, 2010c), with 
a smoothing parameter λ = 400,000 (which makes it essentially a linear trend). 
4 In the words of the guidance document: ‘The countercyclical capital buffer … is like a Pillar 1 approach 
in that it is a framework consisting of a set of mandatory rules and disclosure requirements. However, 
its use of jurisdictional judgement in setting buffer levels and the discretion provided in terms of how 
authorities explain buffer actions are more akin to a Pillar 2 approach.’
5 See http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FS.AST.PRVT.GD.ZS (accessed Feb 2012).
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The solid line in Figure 3 represents the evolution of the credit-to-GDP gap zt in 
the UK, that is, the difference between the credit-to-GDP ratio (the solid line in 
Figure 2) and its HP trend (the dashed line in Figure 2). The gap starts from 2.9% 
in 1986, it peaks at 18.5% in 1989, it then decreases until it reaches its minimum 
at −19.5% in 1999, thereafter increasing until it reaches its maximum at 31.4% 
in 2008. The dashed line in Figure 3 represents the corresponding evolution of 
real GDP growth, denoted yt. It is pretty clear that the two variables are negatively 
correlated: when GDP growth is low (as in the two recessions in the sample) the 
credit-to-GDP gap tends to be high, and vice versa. 
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To further illustrate this point, Figure 4 shows the scatter plot of the two variables, 
GDP growth yt in the horizontal axis and credit-to-GDP gap zt in the vertical axis, 
together with the corresponding regression line. The slope coefficient is negative 
and statistically significant, with a p-value of 0.003. 
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Finally, Figure 5 shows the scatter plot of GDP growth yt in the horizontal axis 
and the countercyclical capital buffer bt in the vertical axis. Note that the buffer 
bt is zero for those years in the sample for which the gap zt is below the lower 
threshold L = 2%, and it is at its maximum (2.5%) for those years for which the 
gap zt is above the upper threshold H = 10%. The corresponding regression line 
has a negative slope coefficient, which is again statistically significant, with a 
p-value of 0.017. 
We have computed these correlations for six other countries: France, Germany, 
Italy, Japan, Spain, and the United States. The first column of Table 1 shows 
the correlations between GDP growth yt and the credit-to-GDP gap zt for these 
countries. All the correlations are negative, except the one for the US, but the 
average correlation across countries is −0.21. The second column of Table 1 
shows the correlations between GDP growth yt and the countercyclical capital 
buffer bt for these countries. All the correlations are again negative, except the 
one for the US, with an average across countries of −0.19. Figures A1–A6 in the 
appendix represent the credit-to-GDP gap and GDP growth for the six countries. 
Table 1 Correlation between GDP growth yt and the credit-to-GDP gap zt and between 
GDP growth yt and the countercyclical capital buffer bt for selected countries, 
1986–2009, using World Bank data on domestic credit to the private sector





Spain −0.29  −0.01
United Kingdom −0.58 −0.48
United States   0.30   0.26
To check the robustness of these results we have computed these correlations 
using the data on private credit by deposit money banks and other financial 
institutions as a percentage of GDP in the new database of the World Bank on 
Financial Development and Structure.6 The first column of Table 2 shows the 
correlations between GDP growth yt and the credit-to-GDP gap zt for the alternative 
credit measure. All the correlations are negative, except the one for Germany, but 
the average correlation across countries is −0.21. The second column of Table 2 
shows the correlations between GDP growth yt and the countercyclical capital 
buffer bt for the alternative credit measure. Here all the correlations are negative, 
except the one for Spain, but the average across countries is −0.19. The positive 
correlations for Germany and Spain are, in any case, very close to zero. 
6 See http://go.worldbank.org/X23UD9QUX0 (accessed Feb 2012) and Beck and Demirgüç-Kunt (2009).
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Table 2  Correlation between GDP growth yt and the credit-to-GDP gap zt and 
between GDP growth yt and the countercyclical capital buffer bt for selected 
countries, 1986–2009, using World Bank data on private credit by deposit 
money banks and other financial institutions
Corr. (yt , zt ) Corr.( yt , bt )
France −0.61 −0.65
Germany   0.07 −0.10
Italy −0.32 −0.40
Japan −0.26 −0.28
Spain −0.43   0.05
United Kingdom −0.72 −0.67
United States −0.23 −0.18
It is important to note that correlations for individual countries are very sensitive 
to the definition of the credit variable and the choice of sample period. For 
example, the ones for the US go from positive in Table 1 to negative in Table 
2. Also, leaving out 2009 changes the figure for Germany in the first column of 
Table 2 from 0.07 to −0.29, and it changes the figure for the US in the second 
column of table 2 from −0.18 to 0.05. 
The conclusion from these results is that the variable chosen by the Basel 
Committee as ‘common reference point’ for taking buffer decisions fails the 
Hippocratic dictum: ‘First, do no harm.’ Its correlation with GDP growth is 
generally negative, which means that the credit-to-GDP gap would tend to signal 
to reduce capital requirements when GDP growth is high, and to increase capital 
requirements when GDP growth is low. Thus, the countercyclical capital buffer of 
Basel III appears to contradict the mandate of the G20 to require banks ‘to build 
buffers of resources in good times that they can draw down when conditions 
deteriorate’. 
The problems with the credit-to-GDP gap variable may be traced to the following 
two sources. First, there is the empirical regularity that credit usually lags the 
business cycle (see, for example, the evidence in Giannone et al, 2010). In 
particular, in downturns the credit-to-GDP ratio continues to be high because of 
greater credit demand by households and firms (making use of credit lines, partly 
to finance inventory accumulation) and a slower, sometimes even negative, GDP 
growth. Second, the use of deviations of the credit-to-GDP ratio with respect to 
its trend compounds the problem, because it takes some time before the ratio 
crosses the trend line. This is clearly illustrated in Figures 2 and 3. In 2009, in the 
middle of the biggest recession since the Great Depression, the credit-to-GDP gap 
in the UK was 29.9%, way above the upper threshold H = 10% below which the 
buffer starts to be reduced from its maximum 2.5% level, and even more distant 
from the lower threshold L = 2% below which the buffer is completely released. 
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However, one should note the caveats of the Basel Committee with respect to the 
mechanical use of the credit-to-GDP gap. In particular, they acknowledged that 
the gap may not be a good indicator of stress in downturns and proposed to use 
supervisory judgement to release the buffer. 
We have a number of concerns about this proposal too. First, the key role 
given to supervisory judgement may create an unlevel playing field at the 
international level. Second, the mixture of Pillar 1 and Pillar 2 elements may 
pose implementation problems in some jurisdictions. For example, in the US, 
the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA) requires 
supervisors to undertake certain actions only when specified Pillar 1 capital ratio 
thresholds are breached. Third, a micro-oriented supervisor concerned about 
bank failures would naturally be averse to reducing capital requirements in a 
downturn. Finally, financial markets might react very negatively to a supervisory 
decision on release of the buffer due to the worsening of economic conditions. 
Thus, even a macro-oriented supervisor would probably do too little too late, 
which could contribute to further reducing the supply of credit in downturns. 
4 Would credit growth be better?
An obvious alternative to using the credit-to-GDP gap as the ‘common reference 
point’ for taking buffer decisions would be to use credit growth, or to be more 
precise the deviations of credit growth with respect to a long-run average. It 
would share the same rationale as the credit-to-GDP gap in terms of being a 
leading indicator of systemic banking crisis,7 and it would also have the problem 
of lagging the business cycle, but at least it would not have the additional lag 
introduced by using deviations of the credit-to-GDP ratio with respect to its trend. 
As in the previous section, we look at how credit growth correlates with GDP 
growth in order to assess to what extent a countercyclical capital buffer based 
on credit growth would contribute to the procyclicality of the Basel III regime. 
Again, we take the UK as an illustrative example, and use the data on domestic 
credit to the private sector from the database of the World Bank.8 We use the GDP 
deflator to get from nominal to real values. The solid line in Figure 6 represents 
the rate of growth of real domestic credit to the private sector in the UK for the 24 
years of the sample. The series exhibits four peaks, in 1988, 1995, 2000 and 2007, 
and shows negative values for 1991, 1992, and 2009. The dashed line in Figure 
6 represents the corresponding evolution of real GDP growth. The two variables 
seem to be positively correlated, with a lagged response of credit apparent in 
1988, 1995 and 2008. 
7 Recent work by Jordà et al (2010), based on data on financial crisis in 14 countries during the past 
140 years, concludes that ‘credit growth generates the best predictive signals of impeding financial 
instability’.
8 See http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/FS.AST.PRVT.GD.ZS.
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To further illustrate this point, Figure 7 shows the scatter plot of the two variables, 
GDP growth yt in the horizontal axis and real credit growth crt in the vertical axis, 
together with the corresponding regression line. The slope coefficient is positive 
and statistically significant, with a p-value of 0.002. 
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We have computed the correlations between credit growth (both in nominal 
and real terms) and GDP growth for the seven countries considered in section 3. 
The first column of table 3 shows the correlations between GDP growth yt and 
real credit growth crt for these countries. In sharp contrast with the results for 
the credit-to-GDP gap in tables 1 and 2, all the correlations are now positive, 
with an average across countries of 0.51. The second column of table 3 shows 
the correlations between GDP growth yt and nominal credit growth cnt for these 
countries. Again, all the correlations are positive, with an average across countries 
of 0.55. 
Table 3 Correlation between GDP growth yt and real credit growth crt and between 
GDP growth yt and nominal credit growth cnt for selected countries, 1986–
2009, using World Bank data on domestic credit to the private sector 






United Kingdom 0.62 0.55
United States 0.43 0.44
The conclusion from these results is that credit growth appears to be a much 
better common reference point for the countercyclical capital buffer, in the sense 
that it is a good signal of the build-up of systemic risk and it does not exacerbate 
the underlying procyclicality of the minimum capital requirements. For purpose 
of regulation, it would make sense to introduce it in deviations with respect to 
a long-run average. Further work would be needed on the precise definition of 
the long-run average as well as on the choice between real and nominal credit 
growth.9
However, it is important to note that this improved common reference point 
for the countercyclical capital buffer leaves essentially untouched the really 
important problem, which is the cyclicality of the minimum capital requirement. 
We now turn to this issue. 
9 One advantage of the latter would be that it is available with a shorter lag and it is not subject to the 
problem of revisions in the GDP deflator.
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5 The procyclicality of the minimum capital requirement
As noted above, the December 2009 consultative document of the Basel 
Committee (BCBS, 2009) considered a series of measures to address procyclicality 
with four key objectives, the first one being to ‘dampen any excess cyclicality of 
the minimum capital requirement’. They noted that ‘it is still too early to opine 
on whether the Basel II framework is proving to be more cyclical than expected’, 
adding that ‘should the cyclicality of the minimum capital requirement be greater 
than supervisors deem appropriate, the Committee will consider additional 
measures to dampen such cyclicality’. No such measures were introduced in 
the Basel III document (BCBS, 2010c), which only repeats this last sentence. In 
fact, the document explicitly downplays the importance of the issue: ‘It is not 
possible to achieve greater risk sensitivity across institutions at a given point in 
time without introducing a certain degree of cyclicality [our italics] in minimum 
capital requirements over time.’
In our view this is unfortunate. The work of Kashyap and Stein (2004), Gordy 
and Howells (2006) and Repullo and Suarez (2009) warns about the potential 
business cycle amplification effects of Basel II. More recently, the empirical 
work of Repullo et al (2010) shows that Basel II capital requirements are highly 
negatively correlated with the business cycle. The analysis is based on the results 
of the estimation of a logistic model of the one-year-ahead probabilities of 
default (PDs) of Spanish firms during the period 1987–2008, using information 
from the Credit Register of the Bank of Spain.10 The explanatory variables used 
comprise characteristics of the firm (industry, location, age, credit line utilisation, 
and previous delinquencies and loan defaults), characteristics of its loans (size, 
collateral and maturity), characteristics of the banks from which the firm borrows 
(distribution of exposures among lenders and changes in the main provider of 
finance) and macroeconomic controls (the rate of growth of the GDP, the rate of 
growth of bank credit, and the return of the stock market). The estimated point-
in-time PDs are then used to compute the corresponding time series of aggregate 
Basel II capital requirements per unit of loans. These requirements move 
significantly along the business cycle, ranging from 7.6% (in 2006) to 11.9% (in 
1993). The variability of 57% from peak to trough in Basel II capital requirements 
contrasts with the flat 8% requirement of Basel I. Earlier work of Saurina and 
Trucharte (2007) had found an even larger variability for the mortgage portfolio 
of Spanish banks: minimum capital requirements based on point-in-time PDs 
could increase more than twice from peak to trough.11
All in all, this evidence suggests that the procyclicality of Basel II is a real problem. 
The same can be said about Basel III, since the new regulation does not change 
the risk sensitivity of minimum capital requirements. The result is that bank 
10 This is a comprehensive database containing information of any loan granted in Spain by any bank 
operating in Spain above a minimum threshold of €6,000. Further details of this database may be 
found in Jiménez et al (2009b).
11 The effect could be even bigger if losses given default (LGDs) and exposures at default (EADs) also vary 
with the business cycle; see Repullo et al (2010) and Jiménez et al (2009a), respectively.
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capital regulation may amplify business cycle fluctuations. The effect could be 
especially important in downturns, with banks possibly facing a ‘capital crunch’ 
that would further restrict their lending.12 
Therefore, an outstanding policy issue is how to mitigate the procyclicality of 
minimum capital requirements embedded in Basel III. According to Gordy and 
Howells (2006) there are two basic alternatives: One can either smooth the input 
of the Basel III formulas, by using some sort of through-the-cycle adjustment of 
the PDs, or smooth the output by using some adjustment of the Basel III capital 
requirements computed from the point-in-time PDs.
A note published by the joint FSF-BCBS Working Group on Capital Issues in 
March 2009 recommended that ‘the Basel Committee should monitor the impact 
of the Basel II framework and make appropriate adjustments to dampen excessive 
cyclicality of the minimum capital requirements’, adding that ‘the preliminary 
conclusion of the Committee is to maintain the risk sensitivity of the inputs of 
the Basel II capital requirements and instead focus on dampening the outputs’. 
Although this statement pointed in the direction of ‘smoothing the output’ 
approaches, nothing has been done along these lines, and the Basel Committee 
now seems to favour the alternative through-the-cycle approaches.13
The use of through-the-cycle approaches was criticised by Gordy and Howells 
(2006) on the grounds that they are ‘less sensitive to market conditions than 
point-in-time ones, [so] they are less useful for active portfolio management and 
as inputs to ratings-based pricing models’. Moreover, they also noted that ‘despite 
the ubiquity of the term “through-the-cycle” in descriptions of rating methods, 
there seems to be no consensus on precisely what is meant’. The UK Financial 
Services Authority (2009) found challenging adjusting PDs so that they reflect ‘an 
average experience across the cycle’, since it requires ‘the ability to differentiate 
changes in default experience that are due entirely to the economic cycle from 
those that are due to a changing level of noncyclical risk in the portfolio’. 
We share these concerns about through-the-cycle approaches. In particular, we 
believe that the proper assessment of risk, for both management and regulatory 
purposes, should be done conditional on the state of the economy, not in an 
unconditional manner. Doing the latter, which is the essence of through-the-
cycle approaches, may contradict the Basel Committee requirement of using ‘all 
relevant and material information in assigning ratings’ (BCBS, 2006, para 426).14 
12 For an earlier discussion of capital crunches and bank regulation see Bernanke and Lown (1991), 
Hancock and Wilcox (1994), and Peek and Rosengren (1995).
13 See BCBS (2010c), par. 20-22.
14 Also, forcing banks to use unconditional assessments of risk for regulatory purposes would contradict 
another requirement of the Basel II (BCBS, 2006, para 444): ‘Internal ratings and default and loss 
estimates must play an essential role in the credit approval, risk management, internal capital 
allocations, and corporate governance functions of banks using the IRB approach.’
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The preceding arguments suggest that ‘smoothing the input’ of the Basel III 
formulas has many shortcomings. Repullo et al (2010) analyse in detail the 
alternative of ‘smoothing the output’. Their proposal is to adjust the point-in-
time capital requirements with a multiplier µt defined by 
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where gt is the rate of growth of the GDP, g its long-run average, s its long-run 
standard deviation, N(.) is the standard normal cumulative distribution function, 
and α is a positive parameter to be estimated.15 The multiplier µt is continuous 
and increasing in gt, so capital requirements would be increased in good times 
and reduced in bad times, it is equal to 1 when gt = g, so there would be no 
adjustment at the mid-point of the business cycle, and it is bounded between 
0 and 2, so capital requirements would not increase without bound or become 
negative. The normalisation by sg allows the expression of capital surcharges or 
reductions per standard deviation of GDP growth. 
Repullo et al (2010) conclude that dampening the excess cyclicality of minimum 
capital requirements with a multiplier of this kind is better than through-the-cycle 
approaches in terms of ‘simplicity, transparency, low cost of implementation, 
consistency with banks’ risk pricing and risk management systems, and even 
consistency with the idea of a single aggregate risk factor that underlies the 
capital requirements of Basel II’.
It is important to stress that the proposal of smoothing minimum capital 
requirements using GDP growth is fully rule-based. There would be no intervention 
of supervisory authorities, and hence it would be a pure Pillar 1 approach. This 
is a significant advantage, since authorities may de facto be reluctant to adjust 
Pillar 2 surcharges with the state of the business cycle. Moreover, it would be 
completely transparent, so investors and analysts could at any point in the 
business cycle observe both the adjusted and unadjusted minimum capital 
requirements. Importantly, minimum capital requirements would retain the 
full risk-sensitivity of Basel III in the cross-section, but allow the capital charge 
curve to shift with the state of the business cycle. During expansions, minimum 
requirements would be above those based on point-in-time PDs, contributing to 
slow the lending cycle and to build up a higher cushion of capital to be used to 
protect banks’ solvency in bad times. Conversely, during recessions, minimum 
requirements would be below those based on point-in-time PDs, helping to 
support lending during downturns. 
15 Apart from GDP growth, they also consider bank credit growth and the return of the stock market, as 
well as proxies for the business cycle that are more closely related to banks’ business activity, such as 
loan losses or profitability (ROA and ROE). Their empirical results show that GDP growth is better than 
any of the other alternatives.
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6 Conclusion
The December 2009 consultative document of the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision (BCBS, 2009) considered a series of measures to address procyclicality 
with the following four key objectives: dampen any excess cyclicality of the 
minimum capital requirement, promote more forward-looking provisions, 
conserve capital to build buffers that can be used in stress, and achieve the broader 
macroprudential goal of protecting the banking sector from periods of excess 
credit growth. The third objective gave rise to the capital conservation buffer and 
the fourth to the countercyclical capital buffer of Basel III (BCBS, 2010c). 
We have assessed the countercyclical capital buffer, focusing our discussion on 
the proposed common reference point for taking buffer decisions, which is the 
difference between the aggregate credit-to-GDP ratio and its trend (the credit-to-
GDP gap). Our results show that the correlation between the credit-to-GDP gap 
and GDP growth is generally negative, which means that that the credit-to-GDP 
gap would tend to give a signal to reduce capital requirements when GDP growth 
is high, and to increase capital requirements when GDP growth is low. Thus, 
the countercyclical capital buffer appears to contradict the mandate of the G20 
to require banks ‘to build buffers of resources in good times that they can draw 
down when conditions deteriorate’. 
The Basel Committee was aware of the shortcomings of the credit-to-GDP gap, in 
particular in downturns, and proposed to use supervisory judgement to release 
the buffer. We have examined this proposal, and concluded that a micro-oriented 
supervisor concerned about bank failures would naturally be averse to reducing 
capital requirements in a downturn, and that even a macro-oriented supervisor 
would probably do too little too late, which could contribute to further reducing 
the supply of credit in downturns. 
Of course, banks may be able to use in downturns the flexibility provided by 
the capital conservation buffer, which amounts to an additional common equity 
requirement of 2.5% of risk-weighted assets. However, banks may prefer to reduce 
credit extension rather than being subject to restrictions on capital distributions 
(dividends, share repurchases, and especially discretionary bonus payments to 
staff) if they do not meet the additional capital requirement. 
The Basel III document makes no progress on the first two key objectives to 
address procyclicality, namely to dampen any excess cyclicality of the minimum 
capital requirement and to promote more forward-looking provisions. And this 
decision seems to have been endorsed by G20. Despite the initial prominent role 
given to ‘mitigating procyclicality’, the Seoul communiqué simply stated:
‘We endorsed the landmark agreement reached by the BCBS on the new 
bank capital and liquidity framework, which increases the resilience of the 
global banking system by raising the quality, quantity and international 
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consistency of bank capital and liquidity, constrains the build-up of 
leverage and maturity mismatches, and introduces capital buffers above 
the minimum requirements that can be drawn upon in bad times.’
We have argued that this is unfortunate. Risk-sensitive capital requirements are, 
almost by definition, highly procyclical, so correcting this feature with a business 
cycle multiplier of the type proposed by Repullo et al (2010) combined by some 
version of the Spanish forward-looking loan loss provisions is, in our view, 
essential.  Such mechanisms would work as ‘automatic stabilisers’, increasing 
the buffers of capital and provisions in good times and using them in bad times, 
without supervisory discretion in any phase. 
By contrast, the countercyclical capital buffer of Basel III, in its current shape, 
will not help to dampen the procyclicality of bank capital regulation and may 
even exacerbate it. For this reason, the credit-to-GDP ‘common reference point’ 
should be abandoned. In fact, we believe that it will be abandoned, certainly in 
the US, where section 616 of the Dodd-Frank Act clearly states:
‘Each appropriate Federal banking agency shall seek to make the capital 
standards required under this section or other provisions of Federal law 
for insured depository institutions countercyclical so that the amount of 
capital required to be maintained by an insured depository institution 
increases in times of economic expansion and decreases in times of 
economic contraction, consistent with the safety and soundness of the 
insured depository institution.’
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4 Disclosure, Transparency and 
Market Discipline
Xavier Freixas and Christian Laux1
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1 Introduction
During the recent crisis we have observed how very liquid, highly rated financial 
assets all of a sudden became ‘toxic assets’, how ratings for structured products 
had to be continuously downgraded, how several markets, such as the interbank 
market, broke down, and how banks faced severe liquidity and funding problems. 
Information problems were at the heart of many of these problems. The opacity 
of structured products, which was not an issue in the boom, turned into a 
major drawback in the crisis; credit ratings were no longer trusted as providing 
reliable information about default risks; banks’ reported losses were viewed 
with suspicion by investors. The decision to relax accounting rules in response 
to public and political pressure was welcomed by the banks but viewed with 
suspicion by many investors as an attempt to restrict the quality of information. 
In contrast, the stress tests conducted by banks that were made public constitute 
an attempt to improve the quality of information available. These stress tests 
were quite successful in restoring investors’ confidence in the United States, but 
less so in Europe. It is important that stress tests are reliable as any doubt about 
their credibility undermines their effectiveness.
The crisis experience has changed our view of information transmission, 
transparency and market discipline and raised a number of important questions 
at both the academic and the policy level on how to improve transparency.
The first general question that it is important to address is how information reaches 
the market both in normal times and during a crisis, because in order to improve 
transparency and efficiency it is not sufficient to merely increase the provision 
and disclosure of information. One of the points we emphasise here is that it 
is important to distinguish between disclosure and transparency. We interpret 
disclosure as an act of providing information on behalf of firms and issuers. 
1 We appreciate helpful comments from Christian Leuz and Janet Mitchell. Christian Laux gratefully 
acknowledges research funding provided by the Frankfurt Institute for Risk Management and 
Regulation (FIRM).
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Important characteristics of the level of disclosure are the timeliness, reliability 
and comprehensiveness of information. In contrast, we argue that transparency 
arises when the disclosed information is effective in reaching the market and 
being adequately interpreted. For a given level of disclosure, transparency 
depends on investors’ information processing capability, behavioural biases and 
information needs. Thus, disclosure is a necessary but not a sufficient condition 
for transparency in the information transmission process.
This will lead us to address more specific questions regarding the incentives of 
firms and issuers to disclose relevant material information, as well as to ask how 
the market reacts to this information. The two sides of this communication 
process are intimately related. On the one hand, investors react to information 
by allocating capital and through corporate governance decisions, thereby 
affecting market prices and influencing managerial actions. On the other hand, 
a firm’s incentives to disclose information depend upon investors’ reaction, 
and investors’ incentives to demand information depend on the expected value 
of this information for their decisions. Management may fear that investors 
herding and markets sentiment leads to an overreaction of market prices to this 
information. The market’s reaction to negative information may be an increase 
of spreads or a liquidity shortage that may put the firm in an untenable position, 
thus generating the incentives not to disclose this information. The process is a 
complex one as the market reaction will result from a complex game between 
information providers and investors, where the nature of the equilibrium, 
pooling or separating, will prove to be crucial. Moreover, investors’ incentives 
to demand, carefully collect and analyse information may be distorted by 
regulation, requiring for instance that some mutual funds invest exclusively in 
AAA issues, and by the expectations that some systemically important financial 
institutions would be bailed out by the government.
By developing this distinction between disclosure and transparency, we expect 
to clarify the role of information transmission when market discipline plays a 
limited role, as happened during the recent crisis. This is all the more important 
because, presently, regulatory authorities seem to promote disclosure, as in the 
case of the recent proposal by the Bank of England that also emphasises the 
greater role of market discipline. However, the efficiency of disclosure depends 
upon how information translates into transparency in terms of the correct 
assessment of the probability of counterparty risk in financial operations by 
investors providing market discipline.
The second general question to keep in mind is that transparency involves 
trade-offs, which accounting standard setters have to take into consideration. 
Information disclosure has benefits but also entails costs. Moreover, the different 
objectives of users and the ability of investors to interpret the information lead 
to a complex strategy of disclosing some information in the notes or of preferring 
to disclose a loss in ‘other comprehensive income’ rather than in the net income. 
The problem is reinforced by a heuristic focus on earnings by managers and, 
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possibly, users of accounting information (Verrecchia, 2010). One important 
trade-off is the level of reliability in the data disclosed by firms. It implies that 
regulators and users might require the disclosure of a non-manipulable proxy 
rather than the disclosure of highly relevant but manipulable information. 
Information has to be truthful, timely and material, and again there is a trade-off 
between, say, accuracy and timeliness.
In the information communication game the issue of market discipline is crucial. 
As is well known, market discipline is supposed to be, as the third pillar of Basel 
II, an essential ingredient of banking stability. As such, it plays a critical role in 
defining the market feedback to information disclosure. Yet, regulators are often 
silent about how market discipline should work. Possible problems arise on the 
two sides and include a lack of incentives for investors to use information, a lack 
of power or incentives for investors to discipline banks and a lack of incentives 
for banks to disclose information. The analysis of the effectiveness of market 
discipline has been the subject of a large number of contributions and is beyond 
the scope of this paper, as we focus on transparency and not on the mechanism 
by which this feeds into market discipline. (See eg Flannery, 1998, De Ceuster 
and Masschelein, 2003, Hellwig, 2005, and Admati et al, 2010, for a discussion of 
the underlying issues and evidence.) In any case, the faith in market discipline 
has been hit hard in the financial crisis. It seems that there was a lack of market 
discipline during the boom as well as in the crisis. In the crisis, access to liquidity 
was limited for all banks, thus creating more of a panic than an efficient 
disciplining device, which would discriminate between solvent and insolvent 
banks. However, it is important to note that the reasons for the lack of market 
discipline in the boom and in the crisis may be very different. In the boom it is 
quite likely that the major problem was a lack of market participants’ incentives 
to use or demand information. In contrast, in the bust, the dominant problem 
seems to be that transparency is most difficult to achieve when it is needed most.
In order to analyse these major issues, it is critical to focus on the main source of 
information to the market. Our view is that the two main sources of information 
are financial reports and credit rating agencies.2 Their roles and accuracy both 
before and during the crisis have been questioned for different reasons.
The regulatory authorities’ view of financial reporting and its impact on the 
crisis has been mixed. On the one hand, in October 2008, by allowing financial 
institutions to reclassify some assets on their prices of July 2008, prior to the 
Lehman bankruptcy, regulatory authorities seemed to promote the opacity of 
financial institutions’ balance sheets, prevent investors from distinguishing 
between different levels of counterparty risk in financial institutions and impair 
market discipline. On the other hand, the stress tests that regulatory authorities 
2 Other third-party providers of information have a minor role. The role of auditing firms is to certify the 
accuracy of financial statements, and consequently does not provide additional information. Financial 
analysts focus on stocks, and the information they provide has only an indirect impact on an asset’s 
probability of default.
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implemented, first in the United States and one year later in the European Union, 
were crucial in providing the market with the ability to discriminate among 
different levels of bankruptcy risk for financial institutions, even if the ulterior 
Irish banking crisis reduced the credibility of the European stress test exercise.
Regarding credit rating agencies, the issues are completely different. Credit rating 
agencies played a key role in the development of the market for securitisation 
by providing good ratings to securitised issues that were later to become ‘toxic 
assets’. The complexity of the structured issues made it difficult, if not impossible, 
for investors to rigorously identify the cash flows associated with each issue and 
their risks. This made ratings essential to the well functioning and liquidity of the 
market for mortgage-backed securities, asset-backed securities and collateralized 
debt obligations (CDOs). Once the crisis set off, credit rating agencies had to 
downgrade the issues in order to keep in line with the information provided by 
market prices.
In order to examine the different issues, we will start by discussing how information 
is disclosed by firms and issuers and how it is interpreted by investors, thus 
determining the allocation of capital. Next, in section 3, we examine the specific 
role of information transmission during the crisis. Section 4 is then devoted to 
policy recommendations regarding the provision of information to the market.
2 Transparency: benefits, costs and limitations
In order to clarify the role of transparency, we will first consider its role in the 
general process of resource allocation. We then consider the reasons why investors 
have to act upon limited information, and examine the impact of regulation 
on the information transmission process. However, we focus on selected issues 
and do not provide an exhaustive coverage. For surveys on transparency and 
disclosure and additional references, see, for instance, Healey and Palepu (2001), 
Verrecchia (2001), Hellwig (2005), Leuz and Wysocki (2008), Armstrong et al 
(2010).
2.1 The role of information
Information is of prime importance in making investment and production 
decisions and in allocating capital to its most productive use. Thus, it is crucial 
that market participants have access to the appropriate information. This is 
particularly true of the capital market, where financial information allows 
investors to identify the ‘quality’ of a potential investment in terms of risk and 
return.
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The simplest way to view the role of information is to consider a neoclassical 
financial model like the capital asset pricing model, where information 
underlies investors’ capital allocation decisions and ultimately affects asset 
prices. However, the implicit assumption of a stylised frictionless capital market 
where information can be collected, shared and verified at no cost leads to a 
simplistic view of the world. A richer approach is to see different parties as having 
heterogeneous information. The equilibrium information level then depends 
upon managers’ incentives to disclose information, investors’ incentives to 
collect additional information and, of course, on the informativeness of asset 
prices that depend upon the informational efficiency of financial markets. The 
equilibrium in a ‘laissez faire’ economy may be characterised by extreme forms of 
adverse selection and moral hazard and their resulting inefficiencies. It therefore 
seems natural to look for mechanisms that foster information disclosure and 
transparency and to define legally binding information standards.
In the presence of market frictions and incentive problems, information plays a 
particularly important role in guaranteeing that capital is used in the best interest 
of investors, which, in the absence of externalities, corresponds to putting capital 
to its most productive use. First, in addition to affecting market prices, information 
is used in contracts, such as in covenants on debt contracts, or to align incentives 
in management compensation schemes. For example, according to Holmström’s 
(1979) informativeness principle, any piece of information that is related to the 
manager’s unobservable effort level should be included in the compensation 
contract to reduce the cost of providing incentives. Second, information is 
relevant for investors to take actions that can discipline management. For 
example, investors can deprive management of financial resources by not 
providing or extending funds, withdrawing funds or firing a manager. Managers 
will take into account the impact of their decisions on investors’ actions, which 
aligns the interests of management and investors. This form of market discipline 
can play an important role in corporate governance. Its prerequisite is investors’ 
access to accurate, relevant and timely information, a condition that may not be 
met when market discipline is limited and managers run the banks.
In this framework, it is important to distinguish between public and private 
information. Public information reduces the level of asymmetric information, 
which is beneficial in dealing with incentive problems. It also reduces the risk 
of market participants in trading with a better informed market participant 
and thereby increases market liquidity. As public information and transparency 
usually result in a reduction of the heterogeneity of information, it can be 
desirable to impose regulation that increases market transparency.
It is also important to realise that investors often have multiple sources of 
information and can use this information in different ways. An example is the 
financial statement, which conveys information about a firm through the balance 
sheet, the income statement and the notes. Various parties use this information 
for investment and credit decisions, for private contracting, for corporate 
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governance and for regulatory purposes. But in addition, several other sources 
of information are available that market participants can use for that purpose. 
In addition, regulators and investors can and do adjust accounting numbers for 
regulatory and contracting purposes. It is certainly naive to argue that specific 
accounting rules are irrelevant as in the case without market frictions. However, 
it is equally naive to believe that market participants do not understand where 
the accounting information comes from, are easily fooled by different rules or 
blindly use accounting information for contracting purposes.
For financial statements, but also, more generally, for information disclosure, it 
is important to distinguish between voluntary and mandatory disclosures and 
whether information can be certified by third parties (auditors, credit rating 
agencies, credit registers, financial market regulators) or not.
The increasing perception of the importance of information in efficient capital 
allocation has been progressively incorporated in the regulation of financial 
markets, with rules for information disclosure, utilisation and dissemination 
becoming increasingly strict. This is now evidenced in the financial markets by 
the informed trading regulation, regulation FD (Fair Disclosure), to eliminate 
selective disclosure of material non-public information by public companies, or, 
in the banking industry by the third pillar of Basel II (market discipline). The Basel 
Committee on Banking Supervision has introduced new disclosure requirements 
for banks to make bank management accountable and allow markets to react 
if management does not act in investors’ best interest. Market discipline was 
supposed to complement capital requirements and supervision in the prudential 
regulation of banks. One conclusion that might be drawn from the current crisis 
is that the market did not have sufficient information, or that it did not have 
sufficient incentives to discipline management. Indeed, both conclusions may 
well have merit. Market discipline is no panacea. First, transparency is not without 
cost. Second, market discipline will only be effective if the market has the right 
incentives to use the information effectively and the adequate mechanisms to 
affect managerial actions.
2.2  Restrictions on perfect information
As a communication process, information transmission might be hampered by 
restrictions at the receiving or the sending end of the communication line.
2.2.1 Market reaction to information
Information is complex and costly to communicate, understand and interpret. 
It has to be communicated in a way that is both easy to understand and relevant 
(material), two features that can be in conflict, with different parties disagreeing 
about relevance. For market prices and capital allocations to be efficient, it is 
important that market participants process information in an efficient way. 
Therefore, a potential imperfection corresponds to market overreaction. If 
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market participants overreact to good or bad news, information can actually 
distort decisions and reduce efficiency. There is an active academic debate about 
the role of behavioural biases of investors and the efficiency of capital markets 
(see eg Shleifer, 2000; Barberis and Thaler, 2003). However, we are not aware of 
any academic papers that would argue that it is optimal for firms to disclose 
less information because of behavioural biases and potential overreactions. In 
contrast, some bankers and regulators seem to believe that it is reasonable not 
to disclose bad news in a crisis to avoid destabilisation from overreactions of 
market participants. Although there may be cases where this type of policy can 
be effective, it is not clear that overall efficiency is actually increased.
An alternative to assuming market overreaction is to consider the microeconomic 
foundations of information processing, which is a more interesting approach 
to investors’ reaction to new information. This may take different forms, but 
basically it involves costly or limited information processing or moral hazard, 
which can result in situations where more information is detrimental.
In a world where investors have varying skills for the interpretation of complex 
public information, public information can increase the winner’s curse problem if 
it increases the information advantage of sophisticated investors who are willing 
and able to read and understand it, a point made by Pagano and Volpin (2009) 
in the context of credit rating agencies. If information in a crisis is particularly 
complex, unsophisticated investors will be more wary and react more strongly 
than in normal times. This response might be interpreted as overreaction, but 
it is a rational response of unsophisticated market participants to increased 
informational heterogeneity in a crisis.
In a similar vein, if information is disclosed only to some agents, it may create 
an adverse selection problem leading to an equilibrium à la Akerlof. This idea has 
been developed by Dang et al (2009), who explore how asymmetric information 
may interact with the information sensitivity of a security.
Using the global games approach, Morris and Shin (2002) analyse the welfare 
effects of increased public information. They take as a starting point the 
coexistence of public and private information and then consider the impact of 
agents’ decisions on the market allocation. Because agents’ decisions will have 
an impact on the equilibrium allocation, the resulting allocation will not only 
reflect the averaging of individual information, but will also reflect the agents’ 
decisions and the existing strategic complementarities or substitutabilities. In 
such a framework, it is not unambiguously optimal to increase the level of public 
information.
A different issue arises if users of accounting information amalgamate real 
performance and accounting measures of performance, or, for that matter, if 
managers believe that users can be misled and therefore put too much emphasis 
on earnings. Verrecchia (2010) refers to this phenomenon as ‘accounting alchemy’ 
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and documents cases where managers seem to believe that the disclosed earnings 
matter even when real performance is not affected and when it is straightforward 
for users to look through the accounting numbers.
2.2.2 Incentives to disclose information
The main difficulties in information communication stem from the fact that firms 
and issuers may prefer not to disclose information, or to distort it. Information, 
such as, for instance, management’s expectations about the business outlook, is 
usually private and difficult to verify by outside parties. Whenever information 
is relevant, there is a legitimate concern that management might misreport and 
provide biased or even false information. If the market understands management’s 
incentives and the costs and benefits of distorted information, the market may 
not be fooled and correctly interpret the information. However, this is no longer 
possible if the costs or benefits to management of distorting information are 
uncertain (Fischer and Verrecchia, 2000).
There are three ways of dealing with the problem, all involving their own costs 
and limitations and interacting with each other. First, incentives can be provided 
for management to reveal information truthfully. Providing incentives is usually 
costly because of risk aversion and rents earned by agents.
Second, information intermediaries and gatekeepers (such as auditors, credit 
rating agencies and financial analysts) can confirm and certify information 
and potentially produce additional information. This alternative has its own 
limitation, because, on the one hand, not all information can be verified, and 
on the other, even if certification is possible, the gatekeeper may not have the 
incentives to incur the monitoring costs and to reveal the information truthfully. 
Thus, a whole set of new incentive problems arise, limiting the use of information 
intermediaries.
Third, the market might use the proxy of ‘second-best information’, which is 
more difficult to manipulate or easier to verify. For example, investors can use 
interim earnings or cash flows to update their beliefs about the quality of an 
investment decision. However, such information can, again, cause incentive 
problems. For instance, Stein (1989) shows that if investors rely on interim 
earnings, management has an incentive to choose short-term over long-term 
projects. Investors are not fooled about the quality of the project, but the 
choice of the short-term project is inefficient. Also, additional information can 
be detrimental in the presence of managerial career concerns. For example, 
information that allows the market to update its beliefs about managerial ability 
can reduce managerial incentives. Potential reasons are that uncertainty about 
ability provides management with incentives to exert effort (Holmström, 1999) 
and makes it easier to be tough after low performance (Cremer, 1995). Thus, if 
costless first-best information is not available, second-best information can be 
detrimental and it is not possible to conclude that more information is always 
better than less information.
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2.3  Market failure and regulation
A straightforward but important insight of the discussion above is that information 
transmission involves benefits and costs. The optimal trade-off is difficult to 
determine and depends on the specific setting. Therefore, it seems reasonable 
to leave the determination of the optimal level of disclosure to the market. So, a 
preliminary point is to understand why the level of disclosure has to be regulated 
and, in particular, whether there are specific aspects of the financial and banking 
industry that make regulation even more essential.
There are two basic arguments as to why the market for information has to be 
regulated: the allocation of the costs of information transmission, and the public 
good dimension.
The allocation of costs in information transmission is specific because the 
receiver’s cost of decoding information depends upon the coding activity of the 
sender. So, in order to minimise total costs, regulation has a role in making firms 
and issuers commit to disclosing standardised information. Thereby investors 
can directly compare firms’ performances and interpret information in a cost-
efficient way. Also, information disclosure is potentially easier to enforce when 
disclosure is legally required rather than agreed to in a contract between private 
parties.
Potentially more important is probably the fact that information is often a public 
good and that information causes positive external effects that are not taken 
into account when the optimal level of voluntary disclosure is chosen. As a 
consequence, the privately optimal level of information is lower than the socially 
optimal level. This divergence of the privately and publicly optimal levels of 
information is an important reason for regulation.
A related problem in banking is likely to arise because of government 
intervention, in particular, government bail-outs. For example, for mortgage-
backed securities, transparency is particularly important when house prices 
drop and the probability of default increases. Information disclosure helps to 
reduce market failure and inefficiencies in a crisis. Because of bail-outs and 
guarantees, the taxpayer is a main beneficiary of this information, but the cost 
of designing and issuing transparent products is borne by banks’ stakeholders. 
Thus, voluntary transparency will be inefficiently low. More generally, banks 
have no incentives to voluntarily build up an information structure that would 
help in winding them up in a crisis. This includes providing detailed information 
about structured products such as securitised loan portfolios or a risk map that 
would help to value the products or identify the exposure of individual banks 
in a crisis. Put differently, information that would be valuable to investors and 
therefore provided by banks in the absence of bail-outs might not be voluntarily 
provided with bail-outs.
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Government intervention can be a justification for regulating disclosure. 
However, for the same reason, even if banks have to disclose more information, 
transparency and financial stability may not improve by much. The reason is 
that investors’ incentives to use the information will be limited for the same 
reasons that the market did not demand the information in the first place: 
government bail-outs. For example, if a financial institution’s debt is explicitly or 
implicitly guaranteed by the government, debtholders do not need information 
about the bank’s risk exposure. Thus, the need to provide the information is 
greatly diminished compared to a situation where no such guarantees exist. 
Consequently, a necessary condition for market discipline to work is that market 
participants bear the consequences of their decisions and not the taxpayers. But 
this condition is not sufficient. Market participants’ reaction to information has 
to affect managerial behaviour. For a critical discussion of the possible channels 
through which investors’ information may affect managerial actions and the 
limited role of market discipline and corporate governance see Hellwig (2005).
Another phenomenon that limits the effectiveness of regulation is the issue 
of regulatory competition. Firms and issuers may leave one financial market 
to operate in another that they consider to be friendlier, because it is less 
demanding in terms of disclosure and transparency. So, for instance, if disclosure 
requirements for firms that are listed on the stock exchange exceed the privately 
optimal level, some firms might avoid the stock market.3 Although the purpose 
of higher transparency of publicly listed companies will be served, the potential 
detrimental effect of such a delisting or, more generally, delocalisation is that 
fewer firms use the stock market. Of course, the reverse is also possible, that is, 
more firms choose to list if higher transparency requirements reduce incentive 
and information problems by allowing firms to commit to provide information.4 
Financial institutions may shift business to shadow banks and hedge funds if 
disclosure requirements increase. In this case, a counterargument for the reverse 
effect of higher disclosure requirements is more difficult to make.
3  Lessons from the crisis
The recent crisis has challenged the usual role of information transmission. 
Information has been scarcer, less accurate and less timely. The sudden illiquidity 
of the financial market and its impact on asset prices has definitely had an adverse 
3 Chemmanur and Fulghieri (2006) present evidence on the role of listing standards in the presence 
of competition between stock exchanges, and Leuz et al (2008) find evidence of firms going dark in 
response to the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which increased the disclosure requirements for publicly 
held companies in the US.
4 The possibility of these two types of outcomes is reminiscent of Morrison and White’s (2009) result 
that shows how, in a set-up of international integration, imposing a ‘level playing field’ in terms of 
deposit insurance and capital requirements will lead to a race to the bottom, while laissez-faire will 
give efficient regulators incentives to signal themselves by tough regulatory requirements, so that, 
depending on the efficiency level of the regulators, it is efficient or not to impose common minimal 
regulatory standards.
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effect on the level of transparency. In this section, we examine how the crisis 
has affected transparency by considering, first, financial reporting and, next, 
reporting of ratings by credit rating agencies.
3.1  Financial statements
As mentioned in the previous section, a key aspect of information transmission 
is the way market participants react to the information provided by banks’ 
financial statements. For example, in the context of the crisis, was uncertainty in 
the market fuelled by accounting? And, if yes, what was the dominant factor, the 
reporting of losses due to fair value accounting or the fear that banks were hiding 
potential risks and losses?
Critics argue that fair value accounting (FVA) forced banks to (excessively) 
write down asset values, jeopardising their financial health and contributing 
to the uncertainty in the market. At the other extreme, users argue that the 
implementation of FVA allowed banks too much flexibility and that banks used 
this flexibility to hide losses and their true risk exposure, thereby contributing to 
the uncertainty in the market. However, the use of historical cost allows banks to 
sell winners and keep losers, a practice called ‘gains trading’ that permits banks’ 
profits to be inflated while hiding their losses. The two perspectives show that 
transparency is neither a panacea nor easy to achieve.5
One important critique addressed to marking to market is that it has caused 
downward spirals and contagion as banks were forced to write down the value 
of their assets to distorted market prices. These problems have been formalised 
by Allen and Carletti (2008) and Plantin et al (2008). In the following subsection 
we discuss how banks’ fair value accounting as implemented in practice radically 
differs from marking to market, and why some objections of opponents to fair 
value accounting are often simplistic and ill-founded. Another issue, which 
we will address in section 3.1.2, is the relevance, reliability and timeliness of 
accounting information and the reaction of investors to this information.
3.1.1  Assessing the impact of FVA on the severity of the crisis
In its pure form, fair value accounting involves reporting assets and liabilities 
on the balance sheet at fair value and recognising changes in fair value as gains 
and losses in the income statement. Fair value accounting in its pure form only 
applies to assets that financial institutions hold in their trading portfolio. Thus, 
it is only relevant for investment banks and very large bank holding companies 
and commercial banks with large proprietary trading or investment banking 
activities. Assets held for trading are generally assets that are traded in liquid 
markets for which market prices are available from orderly transactions (Level 1 
inputs) that have to be used as the measurement for fair value. It is this archetype 
5 See Laux and Leuz (2009) for a discussion of the different arguments surrounding the use of FVA and 
references.
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of FVA that most people have in mind when they talk about mark-to-market 
accounting.
When Level 1 inputs are not available, models are used to determine fair value. 
Models have to use observable inputs (Level 2), which include quoted prices 
for similar assets and other relevant market data. If observable inputs are not 
available, unobservable inputs including model assumptions have to be used 
(Level 3). According to the International Monetary Fund’s Global Financial 
Stability report, on average, financial institutions value some 69% of their fair-
valued assets using the Level 2 methodology.
Laux and Leuz (2010) analyse the role of FVA for US banks in the financial crisis. 
Based on their analysis and the available evidence in the literature, they conclude 
that it is unlikely that FVA contributed to US banks’ problems in the financial 
crisis in a major way, for two reasons.
The first reason is that FVA plays a much more limited role for most bank assets 
and regulatory capital than often claimed. Loans (including mortgages) and 
held-to-maturity securities are reported at amortised costs so that historical cost 
accounting applies. Like trading assets, available-for-sale securities are reported 
in the balance sheet at fair value. But unrealised fair-value changes of available-
for-sale securities only affect book equity, not the income statement. Moreover, 
unrealised losses of available-for-sale debt securities do not affect regulatory 
capital. Fair-value changes of available-for-sale securities have to be realised when 
the asset is sold or other than temporarily impaired. A bank can treat fair-value 
losses of an available-for-sale debt security as temporary and avoid the effect of 
these losses on its income and regulatory capital if the bank has the intent and 
ability to retain the security for a period of time sufficient to allow for a recovery 
of its market price. Full FVA only applies to trading assets, since for trading assets 
there is no real alternative to FVA and even the American Bankers Association 
acknowledges that FVA is appropriate in this case. To be clear, many banks did 
have huge problems in their trading portfolios, but historical cost accounting 
for the trading portfolio would not have been an effective or reasonable solution 
to the problem for reasons that are discussed in greater detail in Laux and Leuz 
(2010) and below.
The second reason is that FVA offers substantial discretion that was used by banks 
in the financial crisis. In particular, banks argued that losses related to mortgage-
backed and other securities were temporary, switched to models to value assets, and 
reclassified assets. For example, Citigroup reported its first other than temporary 
losses on available-for-sale and held-to-maturity securities in the financial crisis 
in the fourth quarter of 2008, and the amount was only $2.8 billion compared 
to a decrease in fair values of these assets of $19 billion. In the same quarter, 
Citigroup reclassified debt securities with a carrying value of approximately $60 
billion to held-to-maturity, for which historical cost accounting applies unless 
the asset is other than temporarily impaired. Moreover, from the third quarter 
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of 2007 to the first quarter of 2008, Citigroup transferred assets with a value of 
$53 billion into Level 3 and moved to an ‘intrinsic cash-flow methodology’ to 
value their mortgage-related securities by the fourth quarter of 2007. Thus, the 
‘problem assets’ were largely marked to models and not mechanically marked to 
distorted market prices.
In light of this observation the fierce critique that FVA received in the crisis is 
surprising. The limited role of FVA for many bank assets and the discretion it 
offers provide a cushion for banks. This cushion may be good when dealing 
with procyclicality and market distortions but bad for transparency and market 
discipline.
3.1.2  The shortcomings of information disclosure during the crisis
One of the main lessons of the crisis regarding the communication of information 
to the market is the bleak prospect that information is more difficult to transmit 
when the market needs it most. Of course, it may be the case that the current 
crisis was ‘special’, as the level of opacity in financial assets was particularly high. 
Thus, a second lesson in the crisis is that once a crisis unfolds it is too late to turn 
opaque assets into transparent assets.
When, in 2007, US house prices plummeted and mortgage default rates 
skyrocketed, there was huge uncertainty in the market for complex, mortgage-
backed securities and the market for these securities dried out.6 Part of the reason 
why the market for securitised products dried out was uncertainty about the 
valuation of these assets and the fear of adverse selection due to the opacity of the 
products and underlying assets and the complexity of the financial arrangements 
and contracts. (See Ashcraft and Schuermann, 2008, Rajan et al, 2008, Hellwig, 
2009, and Gorton, 2009, for a discussion of these problems.)
Many of these securities were held by investment funds and financed with short-
term capital and redeemable funds. In the crisis, investors withdrew their funds, 
and refinancing of the assets became a huge problem. The originators of the 
funds bailed out the investment funds by providing guarantees and secured 
loans and by taking on the special investment vehicles on their balance sheet. 
Thereby the refinancing problems associated with asset-backed securities spilled 
over to the originators, who themselves relied heavily on short-term financing. 
It was virtually impossible to use some of the asset-backed securities as collateral. 
In addition, other assets that could have been used as collateral were already 
leveraged up to the limit and, as price volatility increased, haircuts for these 
assets increased as well. Thus, as the role of collateralised lending decreased, the 
level of counterparty risk became more important to obtain financing. However, 
counterparty risk and uncertainty regarding counterparty risk increased jointly 
with uncertainty about the exposure of individual banks. As the crisis unfolded, 
the uncertainty about individual assets migrated to financial institutions. Because 
of the lack of collateral, financial institutions needed unsecured lending, but in 
6 Parts of the discussion in this section are based on Laux and Leuz (2010).
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order to grant a loan, investors will first check the financial institution’s financial 
statements to obtain information regarding the financial institution’s health, and 
the information was either lacking or unreliable. Indeed, financial statements did 
not provide the level of transparency needed to eliminate potential problems of 
asymmetric information or to calm investors in the financial crisis.
Opponents and proponents of FVA take different views about the source of the 
problem and its possible solution. Critics fear that FVA forced banks to report 
excessive losses which contributed to the uncertainty in the market. At the other 
extreme, there is the fear that FVA allowed banks too much flexibility, which 
banks used to hide losses and their true risk exposure, thereby contributing to 
the uncertainty in the market. It is interesting to look at the way information 
was communicated during the crisis to understand some of the limitations and 
trade-offs that regulators face.
First, financial statements are not the only source of information that investors 
use. Thus, it is not possible to calm investors by a mere change of accounting 
rules. The uncertainty about the value of structured subprime products did not 
originate from the balance sheet of investment banks or bank holding companies. 
It is certainly naive to believe that Bear Stearns, Merrill Lynch and Lehman 
Brothers could have been saved if they could have reported their problem assets 
at historical cost. All three investment banks had substantial subprime exposure 
and experienced bank runs by other large and sophisticated financial institutions 
(Morris and Shin, 2008; Brunnermeier, 2009; Gorton and Metrick, forthcoming). 
These investors are not easily fooled by accounting numbers and are concerned 
about a bank’s exposures to certain assets and risks. In making this assessment, 
investors are interested in (market) expectations of the future values of the assets 
and cash flows of the bank. So, even if not disclosing negative information was 
desirable, an assumption with which we do not agree, the availability of other 
sources of information would constrain the possibility of controlling the flow of 
information to the market through accounting.
Second, financial statements provide information in an aggregate and condensed 
way to reduce the costs of providing and processing information. This is especially 
true for the balance sheet where financial assets are aggregated instead of being 
reported individually and where, in addition, they are reported using a single 
number (usually their fair value or their historical cost). Thus, the balance sheet 
does not provide detailed information regarding the types of financial assets or 
their risks. However, as we will discuss below, additional information is provided 
in the notes to the financial statement.
Third, accounting numbers always have to be interpreted. It is not straightforward 
to interpret and compare even seemingly straightforward accounting ratios such 
as a bank’s book debt/equity ratio. First, the debt/equity ratio has little meaning 
if the risks of the underlying assets are not taken into account. Second, the de 
facto leverage ratio is directly affected by the types of assets. For example, a long 
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position in a forward contract on a stock market index is akin to a debt-financed 
position in the index, but the book leverage ratio in each case looks very different. 
Third, the book equity depends on the accounting rule. For example, the effect 
of unrealised fair value losses of debt securities on book equity and regulatory 
capital depends on whether it is held as trading asset, available for sale, or to 
maturity. Views about what is appropriate and meaningful differ. Those who 
are interested in the leverage ratio might therefore want to make appropriate 
adjustments. Accounting rules should not be based on the presumption that 
market participants are systematically naive.
Another example is the interpretation of profits due to a decrease in banks’ 
liabilities after an increase in their own credit risk. There was a big outcry about 
the craziness of FVA when banks chose the fair value option and reported profits 
from a loss on their liabilities. However, it is unclear what the fuss was all 
about. These profits did not relax bank’s regulatory capital constraints because 
the relevant rules require banks to take these profits out when calculating their 
regulatory capital.7 Wary investors can certainly do the same and, given the 
extensive coverage in the press, even naive investors should have been aware. 
Indeed, proponents of FVA for liabilities argue that profits that stem from a 
bank’s liabilities are an important piece of (negative) information that market 
participants should have. To be clear, if a bank’s assets decrease in a crisis, the 
burden is typically shared between debt and equity. From the perspective of 
informing investors about the effect that the decrease in asset values has on the 
value of equity, it can therefore be reasonable to deduct the change in the fair 
value of liabilities from the (fair) value change of assets. However, the deduction 
is problematic and should be undone when the objective is to calculate the 
regulatory capital or to get an idea about a firm’s financial health.
Fourth, reliability of information is a big concern in any crisis. Both opponents 
and proponents of FVA criticise models for not being reliable. However, the 
conclusions drawn by the two parties differ. Opponents of FVA say that historical 
cost accounting (HCA) would have been more reliable in the crisis. But this 
argument ignores the fact that impairments also have to be recognised under 
HCA and that, in a crisis, when asset prices decrease and counterparty risk 
increases, the flexibility of determining the level of impairments is conceptually 
similar to the flexibility of using models to determine FVA. Being concerned 
about this flexibility, proponents of FVA propose a stronger reliance on market 
prices and stricter impairment rules. The perspective depends on the level of trust 
in markets and market prices, but also on the objectives of different users.
As noted in Laux and Leuz (2010), anecdotal evidence suggests that market 
participants feared that the investment banks were downplaying their losses 
and exposure. For example, investment banks and rating agencies continuously 
revised their valuations and ratings downwards (for example, Benmelech and 
7 A possible concern might have been that these gains increased managerial bonuses. However, we are 
not aware whether this was the case.
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Dlugosz, 2009). One reason for the gradual subsequent downward revisions 
was certainly that negative news arrived gradually. However, there was also the 
concern that financial institutions strategically tried to report inflated assets 
values for as long as possible. Specifically, the hedge fund manager David Einhorn, 
who sold Lehman’s shares short, criticised Lehman for overstating the value of its 
$39 billion commercial mortgage-backed securities portfolio as they wrote down 
only 3% when an index of commercial mortgage-backed bonds fell 10% in the 
first quarter of 2008 (Onaran, 2008). Another example is Merrill Lynch, which in 
the first quarter of 2007 reported a potential exposure of $15.2 billion to certain 
subprime investments only to revise this number to $46 billion three months 
later (Story, 2010). Merrill Lynch thought that it had protected itself against 
the difference through hedges and therefore did not report it; many of these 
hedges later failed. It seems that Merrill Lynch overestimated the effectiveness of 
the hedges. If it had reported the gross positions and the hedges separately, the 
market could have made its own judgement. Of course, given the uncertainty 
in the market, it is possible that the market underestimated the effectiveness of 
the hedges, but the revision of the ‘exposure’ might have been an even bigger 
problem if investors felt deceived.
Although the empirical evidence, which is discussed in greater detail in Laux and 
Leuz (2010), is not conclusive, it is consistent with the concern that investors 
feared that banks used accounting discretion to overstate the value of their 
assets. For example, Huizinga and Laeven (2009) find that, in 2008, investors 
discounted the reported values of banks’ real-estate loans by over 15% and of 
mortgage-backed securities by about 13%.
Fifth, the notes of the financial statements are important for providing 
information to the capital market. Some of the content is regulated and involves 
mandatory disclosures. But managers can also use the notes in the financial 
statements to provide additional voluntary information about the types of assets 
banks hold, their perspective on asset values and market conditions, assumptions 
underlying the models they use to derive fair values, exposures to specific risks, 
etc. This information could be used to reduce the level of asymmetric information 
in the market and make it possible for market participants to draw their own 
conclusions.
It is surprising that this possibility was not used more extensively by banks. An 
example is the stress tests, which helped to calm the market, as the evidence by 
Greenlaw et al (2011) and Peristian et al (2010) suggests. Why did (individual) 
banks not do stress tests voluntarily and provide information about the result to 
the market? One possible reason is that in a crisis, the cost of disclosing information 
by revealing proprietary trading strategies and compiling information may exceed 
the benefits to banks. First, during a crisis, banks may have more difficulties 
in credibly disclosing information. In particular, the market may believe that 
voluntary information is rigged. Moreover, incentives for bad banks to provide 
the same information as good banks increase in a crisis, leading to a pooling 
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equilibrium (Spargoli, 2010). Second, the market might be so depressed that the 
positive reaction would be slim if a single bank increased its transparency. For 
example, because of systemic linkages between banks, the benefit of providing 
information for an individual bank depends on the transparency of other banks. 
Third, another important effect is that much of the benefit would accrue to 
taxpayers, given the bail-outs of banks.
Consequently, truthful information communication appears to be more difficult 
during a crisis, because firms and issuers have incentives to hide bad information 
and because once the market coordinates on this adverse selection Akerlof type 
of market, it is even more difficult to produce a piece of information that clearly 
reveals that an institution is solvent. To improve the market equilibrium level 
of information in a crisis, energetic regulatory action may be required, in terms 
of information provision, commitment to bail out certain types of institutions 
and guarantees for counterparties. This is why the stress tests succeeded where 
private information did not. Indeed, stress tests were based on clear-cut identical 
scenarios for all financial institutions, and were implicitly certified by regulatory 
agencies so that they were credible and allowed market participants to compare 
the extent of the damage the crisis did to the different institutions.
3.2  Credit rating agencies
The role of credit rating agencies (CRAs) in providing information to the market 
has been increasing, in particular in the process of securitisation and rating of 
structured products. With the development of the market for these products, 
the CRAs’ role has become more dominant, with record high levels of activity 
and profits. Thus, Moody’s profits, for example, tripled between 2002 and 2006 
(Lowenstein, 2008).
The key function of CRAs has been recognised by financial regulation, making 
the rating of an issue a prerequisite for it to be eligible as an investment vehicle. 
Also, the standardised approach in Pillar 1 of Basel II requires a rating from 
eligible rating institutions.
The collapse of many AAA-rated structured products in 2007/8 has brought CRAs 
into the limelight. It was well known that the CRAs’ models were imperfect, and 
that the ratings were sometimes revised too late, once the credit event had taken 
place, as happened for the East Asian crisis of 1997. Yet, in the recent crisis, the 
number of securities that underperformed was unprecedented. So, in hindsight, 
the information provided by CRAs appeared to be misleading, and this was quite 
in contrast with the much more accurate performance of corporate bond ratings. 
So, a number of competing explanations have been put forward to understand 
the specific issues CRAs were facing, which we examine below.
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Before doing so, two points need making. First, it is of course difficult to identify 
whether the collapse in ratings in 2007 was due to the CRAs’ bad models, bad 
practices or to the crisis itself. Still, even if the crisis may have been the trigger for 
the breakdown of subprime-based asset-backed securities (ABS), the existence of a 
number of conflicts of interest that are detrimental to the proper functioning of 
the rating industry was bound to generate ratings inflation, thus amplifying the 
subsequent downfall. As we argue below, the conflicts of interest were particularly 
critical for structured products.
A second caveat concerns the extent to which the market was misled by ratings. 
After all, the spreads on some AAA-rated ABS were above those of AAA corporates. 
Clearly, the higher spreads meant that some agents did not view AAA-rated ABS 
securities as being equivalent to AAA-rated corporate bonds. Instead they were 
aware of the higher default or liquidity risk. Of course, with hindsight, the spreads 
may still have been too low compared to the fundamental risk underlying the 
issues, possibly because investors were also using the same incorrect models and 
model assumptions as the CRAs. But it is more likely that investors’ incentives 
also played a role. Investors who were constrained to invest in AAA securities 
or had committed to this specific mandate ‘for summarizing their risk appetite’ 
(CGFS, 2008, p 8) but wanted to earn a higher return might have been pleased to 
take the opportunity. In addition, unsophisticated investors who blindly trusted 
the rating as an unbiased measure of risk are likely to have been misled. We do not 
consider this point further, as it is beyond the scope of this paper. Still, it should 
be clear that AAA structured products were not considered a completely different 
class of investment vehicle when compared to traditional AAA corporates or 
sovereigns, which, ex post, appears as a clear mistake on the part of investors. 
For example, using Monte Carlo Simulation, Krahnen and Wilde (2010) find a 
significant and systematic difference between the risk properties of ABS tranches 
and the risk properties of corporate bonds with the same rating. It has been 
argued that CRAs should not have used the same rating notation that they used 
for corporates, but there was a huge demand in the market for AAA securities that 
issuers tried to cater for.
3.2.1  The institutional environment
A striking feature of the credit rating industry is that, since the 1970s, it has not 
been the user (the investor), the one who has a demand for precise and unbiased 
information, who pays for the service, but the issuer, who has an interest in 
obtaining favourable ratings. Before the 1970s the rating industry was based on 
the investor pays principle, providing rating agencies with the right incentives, 
but information resale problems set a limit on possible expansion for this market. 
As the technology reduced the cost of redistributing information, the industry 
had to switch to an issuer pays scheme.
A second key characteristic of the industry is that issuers are able to ‘shop’ for the 
best rating, choosing not to disclose ratings that are less favourable to their issue.
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A third, and surprising, feature of CRAs’ institutional structure is the lack 
of accountability. Indeed, under the protection of free speech, CRAs were 
immune to prosecution, a feature that makes them completely different from 
other gatekeepers, such as auditing firms. This has now been suppressed by the 
provisions made in the Dodd-Frank Act.
3.2.2  Explaining the collapse of structured products ratings
In addition to the risk underestimation factor (see CGFS, 2008), there are several 
competing explanations for the downfall of ratings in 2007, but two of them, 
related to the structure of the market and to agents’ incentives, are at the centre 
of the current regulatory debate: conflicts of interest, and shopping.
Conflicts of interest
As the industry is based on an issuer pays model, the incentives for a CRA to 
accurately report the rating it has obtained may be in conflict with its corporate 
objective to serve the issuer that is its client. In the long run the issuer is better 
served by an impeccable reputation for the CRA that makes the market value the 
rating. Still, as modelled in Bolton et al (2012), in the short run the CRA may face 
a conflict of interest and be tempted to inflate its ratings to benefit its client. As 
there is no legal liability attributable to a CRA report, the trade-off the CRA faces 
is between increasing current profitability by inflating ratings, and jeopardising 
its future reputation. So, when it comes to giving a rating for a structured product 
where, because of opacity, ex post verification of the accuracy of the rating is 
more difficult, ratings inflation seems a natural strategy for CRAs.
The empirical evidence of Griffin and Tang (forthcoming) supports this point as 
they show that CRAs used noisy credit risk models, to which they made frequent 
adjustments before determining the final rating, and these adjustments tended 
to shift the rating upwards relative to the model-predicted rating.
One of the implications of the reputation-based incentives is that competition, 
by decreasing future profits, may exacerbate the conflict of interests and make 
CRAs more subservient to the issuers. This is shown by Bolton et al (2012) and 
confirmed empirically by Becker and Milbourn (2010), who show that the 
greater competitive threat posed by Fitch in the corporate bond market coincides 
with a deterioration in ratings quality. So, a recommendation of increasing 
competition may backfire if the prerequisite of avoiding conflict of interest is 
not met. From this perspective the European Commission recommendation to 
promote competition in this market is ill-advised, because it does not hinge on 
the prerequisite of solving the conflict of interest and shopping issues.
Another empirical prediction of the reputation-based incentives is that CRAs will 
presumably inflate their ratings in good times when the probability of getting 
caught is lower and the demand for ratings is high. This result is consistent 
with the findings of Ashcraft et al (2009a), who show that ratings of mortgage-
backed securities were less accurate at the peak of the real-estate boom, whether 
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measured by actual performance or by ulterior downgrades. It is intuitively clear 
that at the peak of the real estate boom a higher volume of business generates 
incentives to inflate ratings. But the result is also consistent with all three CRAs 
making systematic mistakes by, for example, underestimating correlations and 
overestimating expected house price increases in the boom. We will return to 
this issue below.
As spreads are determined in equilibrium by demand and supply, the issue of 
why sophisticated market participants did not take advantage of the distorted 
incentives should be addressed. With Goldman Sachs charged with fraud for 
misleading investors into buying shares of the ABACUS 2007-AC1 CDO, we now 
know that some hedge funds did bet against presumably overpriced ABS. In this 
particular case, the allegation of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) 
is that the hedge fund Paulson & Co was involved in structuring the portfolio 
in which it took a short position. Nevertheless, the amount of the bets and their 
impact on the spreads is limited because of risk aversion, costs and restrictions on 
short selling. In addition, some agents might take the opposite view and consider 
the assets to be perfectly safe and the market overreaction to be transitory. This 
was the view of Lehman, which led it to increase its investment in the so-called 
‘toxic assets’. So, on average, it is not unreasonable to claim that the market at 
large used the same wrong models that rating agencies used.
Shopping
The complexity of structured products implies that different CRAs will give 
different ratings to the same issue. In addition, if the subordinated first loss 
tranche is broadened, some CRAs may be willing to reconsider the initial rating 
and report an improved rating for the issue. Consequently it is in the interest of 
the issuer to solicit formally or informally some pre-rating information and then 
choose the best ratings available, while the less favourable ones will be concealed 
from the market.
Notice that shopping reinforces the CRA’s conflict of interest because the CRA 
might lose its client if it offers an accurate but potentially unfavourable rating.
Investor’s confidence
When investors are perfectly rational, they discount for the ratings inflation that 
CRAs perform, so that investors read through the inflated ratings, whose bias is 
then discounted. So, part of the problem is due to investors’ overconfidence in 
taking the ratings at face value, since even if there are constraints on short-selling 
and incentive issues that limit the power of information disclosure, in a world 
of perfectly rational investors, the market spreads should be informative on the 
quality of the issue, as in the Grossman and Stiglitz (1976) framework.
It is true that the role of CRAs is to improve market efficiency by avoiding 
duplication of investors’ efforts in identifying good opportunities. Yet, if this 
leads to overconfidence in the CRAs’ ratings, the resulting allocation is inefficient. 
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Evidence on investors’ overconfidence is provided by Ashcraft et al (2009a), who 
show that mortgage-backed securities deals with opaque characteristics, such 
as a high fraction of low-documentation mortgages, underperform their rating, 
consistent with the predictions of recent theoretical literature.
Two other possible causes
The simplest possible explanation for the downgrade is the fact that models for 
structured products were incorrect. It is clear that CRAs’ models based on the 
statistical properties of pre-crisis real estate prices could not accurately predict 
either the end of the real estate boom and its impact on structured products, or 
the impact of liquidity dry-ups in the secondary market for ABS and CDOs. But 
it seems that the ratings systematically underestimated the potential risks. If the 
problem was a reliance on insufficient data (rather than distorted incentives), 
CRAs should have either abstained from computing a rating or disclosed the 
limited accuracy of the rating for that type of issues. Even if it is clear that CRAs’ 
models are imperfect, the fact that models for structured debt issues lacked the 
precision of models for corporates does not invalidate the existence of a conflict 
of interest and a shopping issue. Indeed, the underlying incentive problems may 
have reduced incentives to avoid systematic mistakes in rating models.
The second reason invoked to account for the failure of ratings to inform investors 
of the potential risks inherent in structured products is the lack of transparency 
of the rating process, a point already emphasised in the report of the Committee 
on the Global Financial System (CGFS, 2008). The issue of lack of transparency 
is complex as it may be interpreted in different ways. First, the argument is 
clearly legitimate when it concerns disclosure by CRAs to regulatory agencies. 
This point has repeatedly been made by the SEC in justifying its difficulties in 
regulating Nationally Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations (NRSROs). 
Second, transparency could provide information, such as the level of income 
documentation in residential mortgages, that is critical to investors if they are 
to assess how accurate and rigorous the rating is and to update their view of 
the CRA’s reputation. Yet, on the other hand, better knowledge of the CRAs’ 
models will allow issuers to fine-tune their issues, knowing the deficiencies and 
imperfections of the models and beating them on those points. Of course, it may 
be argued that issuers that aim at an AAA rating on a given issue will fine-tune 
their issue anyway (possibly with the help of rating agencies), but then the cost 
of doing so may be higher. Even without playing against the deficiencies of the 
models, more transparency would allow the issuer to structure an issue in such 
a way that it just gets the AAA rating, a phenomenon called ‘rating at the edge’. 
Rating at the edge is often criticised, but it is less clear what the problem is. For 
example, assume that, in the process of securitising a given portfolio of assets, 
the tranches are chosen such that each tranche is rated at the edge. If investors 
anticipate rating at the edge, they can adjust their default probability for each 
tranche. Indeed, one could argue that rating at the edge makes the ratings for 
the different tranches more precise and is only a problem if investors are naive 
and misled. Another reason why rating at the edge could be problematic is if it 
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induces inefficient risk-taking by the issuer. Third, more transparency combined 
with limited information on behalf of investors may lead to a situation where 
some investors have better information than others, which makes trading in 
the secondary market more costly for the uninformed investors, as suggested by 
Pagano and Volpin (2009).
4  Policy recommendations
As discussed in Section 2, it is generally agreed that market transparency leads 
to more efficient allocations and that transparency should be increased. Of 
course, market feedback, with overreaction, asymmetric information and market 
discipline that is not based on reliable information, attenuates this general view, 
especially during a crisis. Yet, the impact of the stress test exercises in the US 
and in Europe suggests that increased transparency is better in terms of capital 
allocation than the lack of trading that occurs when no information is available. 
Indeed, as stressed by Greenlaw et al (2011), US financial institutions did not 
raise any capital before the stress tests, but $50 billion in the months after the 
stress test results were announced. Assuming that the need for new capital did 
not take management by surprise, the fact that management waited until after 
the stress test information was revealed suggests that management felt that this 
information would help to raise capital by reducing uncertainty and asymmetric 
information in the market.
Against this general background it is important for regulators to recognise that 
compulsory disclosure may be ineffective if market participants do not understand 
it, do not trust it, or do not use it. More information does not automatically 
yield more transparency. Indeed, when market participants are characterised 
by limited or different levels of skills in processing the information available, 
providing additional information may be useless, and additional transparency 
may actually come from increasing market participants’ ability in processing 
existing information. As discussed in section 2, market participants may have 
no incentives to use information. Thus, it is important for regulators to consider 
market participants’ incentives to use it. Compulsory disclosure may also be 
ineffective if it is impossible or too costly to verify its accuracy, as sometimes 
courts are unable to enforce penalties when the imputed party wrongdoing is not 
verifiable. In this case, information disclosure regulation should, instead, focus 
on agents having, ex ante, the right incentives to disclose information and to 
signal its quality. This is obviously true at the level of corporations, but the recent 
crisis has shown that it is also true of the so-called ‘gatekeepers’, and in particular 
of credit rating agencies.
These provisions constrain our recommendations in a ‘realistic’ way and 
constitute the background against which we will assess the existing proposals.
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4.1  Improving market feedback
As mentioned in section 2.2, overconfidence, overreaction, behavioural biases 
and, broadly speaking, financial market informational imperfections might 
partially characterise the way financial markets react to new information. This is 
why, as a prerequisite for the improvement of information transmission, the first 
recommendation is to reconsider investors’ incentives and the agency problems 
they may face (for instance, in collective undertakings, such as mutual funds 
and pension funds, as these agents may have a huge impact on the market). At 
least two areas are critical where it has been clear during the crisis that investors 
have not been able to cope with the information that was produced. Although 
for completely different reasons, the market perception of credit ratings and 
the market perception of counterparty risks for financial intermediaries appear 
to have been based on erroneous preconceptions. We discuss credit ratings in 
greater detail below and only briefly mention counterparty risk here.
In the case of financial institutions counterparty risks, the contrast between the 
idyllic vision of perfect markets and the agency problems that limit transparency 
is particularly striking. Investors know that too-big-to-fail or, more generally, 
systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) will end up being bailed 
out. This may lead to a lower level of effort in processing information regarding 
these institutions, as the information is possibly irrelevant. Alternatively, when 
the expected bail-out does not take place, as happened with the bankruptcy of 
Lehman Brothers, the market collapse may be exacerbated by the investors’ lack 
of previously accumulated precise information on these institutions.
As a consequence, in order to improve the market reaction to information, the 
recommendation is to introduce a clearly defined speedy resolution mechanism, 
so that financial institutions counterparty risks are adequately taken into account 
by investors. This should be introduced while protecting depositors from panics, 
which implies a recommendation to implement procedures for the deposit 
insurance not only to guarantee the complete reimbursement of deposit funds, 
but also to guarantee its reimbursement in a short period of time, thus avoiding 
the panic of Northern Rock, which was triggered by co-insurance and the lack 
of any guarantee regarding the time when depositors would have access to their 
funds.8 
4.2  Improving financial statements
Setting accounting standards always involves trade-offs. Historical cost 
accounting and discretion in FVA might help to avoid procyclicality and facilitate 
compliance with capital regulation while increasing the risk of asymmetric 
information and market collapse. In contrast, a strict implementation of FVA 
8 Notice that the Icelandic crisis shows that residual risks still exist.
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increases transparency and makes it more difficult to hide problems, thereby 
allowing a timely reaction.
4.2.1  New proposals
In its proposals for changes of US generally accepted accounting principles 
(GAAP) after the crisis, the Financial Accounting Standards Board clearly focuses 
on transparency (FASB, 2010). The objective is to provide financial statement 
users with more timely and representative information about banks’ exposure. 
The proposal distinguishes between ‘derivatives and financial instruments 
held for trading’, on the one hand, and ‘financial instruments that are held 
for collection of payments of contractual cash flows’, on the other. The second 
group would, in particular, include loans. Derivatives and financial instruments 
held for trading would be recognised at fair value with all changes in fair value 
reported in net income. For financial instruments held for collection of cash 
flows both amortised costs and fair value would be recognised on the balance 
sheet; interest accruals, credit impairments, and realised gains/losses would be 
reported in net income, and all other fair value changes would be recognised 
in other comprehensive income. Moreover, credit impairments would become 
stricter as impairments should be recognised when a credit loss is expected and 
not, as previously, when it is probable. In addition, reclassifications would no 
longer be permitted.
Thus, there are two important changes with respect to the discussion in the 
present paper. First, the available-for-sale category would no longer exist. For 
assets that, under the new rules, would instead be classified as being held for 
trading, unrealised changes in fair value would no longer be reported in other 
comprehensive income but as net income. Second, fair values of loans and leases 
would also be recognised in the balance sheet and not merely reported in the 
notes, and unrealised changes in the fair values would be reported in other 
comprehensive income and thus affect book equity. Opponents of an extension 
of fair value accounting may warn that the risk of contagion and procyclicality 
increases and that the inclusion of a 2.5% capital buffer under Basel III is not 
sufficient or too costly for banks. However, proponents may stress that the 
reduction in opacity may limit the risk of a market collapse, a point to be also 
considered. More research is needed, but it seems more appropriate to tackle the 
concern of opponents of FVA by increasing the capital buffer or adopting an 
appropriate prudential filter rather than reporting historical cost.
4.2.2  Improving transparency in the financial statements
In general, market prices are more reliable than managerial estimates. However, 
in a crisis, markets can be very illiquid and price distortions would directly affect 
a bank’s balance sheet, net income, and bank equity through marking to market. 
But is this a reason not to use these market prices? Models and historical cost also 
have their shortcomings.
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A complete understanding of the way information improves capital market 
allocation requires additional research on bubbles, panics and runs. In particular, 
more research is needed on whether investors are more likely to overreact to 
bad news or to opacity (ie the fear that bad news is not revealed). With today’s 
understanding of what the nature of market feedbacks is, it seems to be the case 
that a lack of information leading to a paralysis of trading may be more harmful 
than disclosure. In addition, even if the market overreacts at times, disclosure 
of fair-value information acts as an early warning system. That is, even if banks’ 
shareholders would have been calmer in the absence of fair-value disclosure, fair 
value accounting may nevertheless be preferred to historical cost accounting 
(Laux and Leuz, 2010).
It seems to be important that investors have the information to draw their 
own conclusions. The interesting question is whether this information has to 
be provided in the notes or the balance sheet and whether it should affect net 
income or other comprehensive income.
Could it be sufficient to report the fair values of all assets in the notes to give 
justice to transparency? Opponents argue that investors ignore the notes, that 
information in the notes is less reliable because accountants audit the notes 
less diligently, that important information is hidden among less important 
information (as in the Enron case), that information alone does not give 
investors sufficient leverage to take actions (eg if contractual rights are based 
on accounting numbers) and that the balance sheet is published prior to the 
notes. However, these arguments are not really convincing. If the hypothesis 
is correct that the information is important, investors should look at the notes; 
accountants could be made accountable for the information in the notes; and 
regulators could require that the notes are structured so that information is easy 
to extract, for example in a virtual balance sheet with full fair value accounting, 
and this information could then also be used in contracts and published at the 
same time as the balance sheet. As emphasised all along in this paper, it is our 
view that the decoding of information by the receiver and the incentives of this 
receiving party to use this information when making decisions determine the 
level of transparency of the market, jointly with the disclosure requirements 
imposed on firms and issuers.
Alternatively, banks can recognise all financial assets at both historical cost and fair 
value in the balance sheet and report realised fair value changes and impairments 
in net income and unrealised fair value changes in other comprehensive income. 
This approach is followed in the FASB (2010) proposal for financial instruments 
that are held for collecting contractual cash flows. But, in principle, banks could 
use this approach for all financial instruments and report the information for 
different asset classes separately, so that users of financial statements have 
flexibility to decide for themselves how to use the information for regulatory 
and contracting purposes. However, this approach is not pursued by the FASB 
for financial instruments that are held for trading. In particular, it is proposed 
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to drop the available-for-sale category where fair value changes only affected net 
income when they were realised or other than temporarily impaired and were 
otherwise reported in comprehensive income.
One reason why many users might not feel comfortable with splitting fair value 
changes for each asset class in separate entries in total comprehensive income are 
complexity of information and the cost of communication. For example, users 
talk about and compare net income, or, synonymously, net earnings or (net) 
profits. However, it is not obvious what a reasonable definition of net income is. 
By changing the accounting rules (eg treatment of unrealised fair value changes 
of financial assets and own credit risk), the content and economic meaning of net 
income is also affected. But this should not per se preclude standard setters and 
regulators from changing the rules. It is very likely that the market will adjust.
There is no single information that would be optimal for all purposes. Therefore, 
it is important to give users reliable, timely and clear disaggregated information. 
Both FASB and International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) acknowledge 
this point by reporting both fair values and amortised cost for loans and leases. 
Laux and Leuz (2010) compare the expected loan losses of major US bank holding 
companies as implied in the fair values reported in the notes with expected loan 
losses for these banks as derived by analyst reports. The comparison shows that 
banks are systematically more optimistic about loan losses than external analysts. 
It is unclear whether this systematic bias can be resolved merely by recognising 
the fair values of the loans in the balance sheet rather than reporting them in the 
notes. After all, models and assumptions have to be used to value these loans that 
are not traded in the market. For the market to trust the fair values in a crisis, the 
market must have the information to verify them, as happened in the stress tests 
that were performed during the crisis (eg knowledge of the types of loans and 
underlying assumptions). An alternative approach to tackle the concern that the 
disclosed information may not be credible in a crisis is a sensitivity analysis (as 
proposed by FASB and IFRS) or the reporting of homogeneous stress tests based 
on reasonably unfavourable scenarios. This information would allow the market 
to assess how critical the model assumptions are for the health of a financial 
institution.
Disaggregated information is also important for contracting and regulatory 
purposes. For example, regulators might want to implement prudential filters and 
distinguish fair value changes due to credit risk and liquidity premiums. Even if 
the distinction is subject to managerial discretion, for regulatory purposes, this 
discretion might pose a lower problem than a mechanical use of fair values.
4.3  Improving the role of credit rating agencies
The existence of an objective measure of risk, such as the ratings of an issue, 
enhances efficiency as it avoids effort duplication. Indeed, if reliable, the benefit 
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of a rating is that investors can invest in the issue without spending time and 
effort to verify the information, which would not be worthwhile for many 
investors anyway. However, a downside is that incentives of rating agencies 
and issuers increase to issue distorted ratings without effective monitoring by 
market participants.9 Based on this observation and the analysis in section 3, 
recommendations regarding credit rating agencies should be based on four 
points: first, improving market feedback; second, eliminating or at least reducing 
conflicts of interest; third, eliminating shopping; fourth, monitoring the quality 
of credit rating agencies’ information production.
We will examine hereafter how these points should be addressed and to what 
extent the recent regulatory proposals may lead to an improved system of ratings.
4.3.1  Improving market feedback for credit ratings
The concern about investors’ reduced incentives to obtain additional information 
has led to a diffidence of regulators regarding the use of ratings by institutional 
investors. As mentioned in the first recommendation of the CGFS report, 
investment fund trustees and managers should review their internal procedures 
concerning how rating information on structured finance products should 
be used. Also, as the de Larosière report (2009) states, ‘the fact that regulators 
required certain regulated investors to only invest in AAA-rated products also 
increased demand for such financial assets’. This negative externality of ratings 
on institutional investors’ due diligence in the management of their portfolio 
has led some experts to the radical recommendation of removing AAA (or 
investment-grade) ratings requirements for institutional investors. The Dodd-
Frank Act considers a less extreme version of this requirement and imposes the 
removal of references to credit ratings in federal agencies’ regulation, although 
their substitution by alternative standards of creditworthiness is at best intricate 
and at worst wishful thinking. Also, the Dodd-Frank Act requires each NRSRO to 
establish procedures that clearly define the meaning of any rating symbol and to 
disclose the associated probability of default by the issuer. If adequately monitored, 
such a procedure would provide investors with probabilities of a downgrade and 
even the associated confidence intervals, thus establishing the accuracy of the 
rating, and would allow ratings based on a 50-year record, as for corporates, to be 
distinguished from those based on a six-year record, as for structured products, 
and even make the rating depend upon available documentation.
The recommendation here is to increase transparency by designing the disclosure 
of information that really matches the effective requirements of the industry. As 
mentioned, this may involve some trade-off between information precision and 
the difficulty for the market in interpreting and acting upon it. The difficulty is 
related to the argument by Pagano and Volpin (2009): an excess of information 
9 It has been argued that reports of auditors also led to excessive confidence. Yet, there is no evidence of 
wrongdoing on behalf of auditors in the crisis (European Commission, 2010) in the detection of fraud 
and the responsibility of management, although the presence of an audit might have engendered an 
expectation gap because of investors’ ignorance of the role and responsibilities of auditors. Here the 
problem is clearly the misinterpretation of what an audit report is, not the quality of the audit.
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disclosure imposed by regulation may lead to less transparency if the relevant 
information is obscured by the immaterial information. An excess of information 
disclosure imposed by regulation may lead to less efficient markets if it implies 
less liquidity.
The best way to envision such a trade-off is to consider that some agents are able to 
invest in information production, as in Grossman and Stiglitz (1976), while others 
benefit from prices reflecting information. This implies that the choice between 
transparency and liquidity would be endogenous. In equilibrium, a number of 
traders will trade on the basis of confidence, while others will use information to 
benefit from their transactions. The case of a hedge fund (Paulson) designing a 
portfolio of low quality CDOs (Abacus) and betting against it is then part of the 
equilibrium strategies. Such a paradigm is helpful in understanding the limits 
to regulation. First, it is impossible to limit the information of the sophisticated 
traders by regulation. Second, it does not help to require an increased disclosure 
of detailed specific information if confidence-based traders do not use it because 
it is too costly or complex. Third, it is important to disclose potential conflicts 
of interest. In this respect, an important piece of information is the stake that an 
issuer holds, be it long or short.
This is why our recommendation here is that rating agencies should report 
information in a consistent way, indicating the length of historical data, the 
models’ underlying macroeconomic assumptions and the sensitivity of the 
rating to changes in macroeconomic conditions, in line with the CGFS report. 
Moreover, rating information on structured products and corporate bonds should 
be comparable where the ratings have a similar meaning, but also highlight 
limitations and differences in the default characteristics of structured products 
and bonds.
4.3.2  Avoiding conflicts of interest
The regulation directed at eradicating conflicts of interest could be structured 
either as ex ante rules or as ex post penalties. Some of the current proposals 
emphasise the later, while from the point of view of incentives, ex ante restrictions 
are easier to monitor and to enforce and therefore seem to dominate.
Ex ante restrictions
Two obvious recommendations to be put in place to limit conflicts of interest are:
1. Setting a limit on the provision of advisory services that is now 
prohibited both by the Dodd-Frank Act and the European Commission.
2. The creation of firewalls so as to prevent sales and marketing 
considerations from influencing the production of ratings, a rule 
stated in the Dodd-Frank Act and to be enforced by the SEC. Failure to 
implement such firewalls may result in the NRSRO registration being 
suspended or revoked.
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Still, it is not clear that these limitations will solve the bulk of the existing 
conflicts of interest. As the problem is that CRAs want to serve their clients, there 
is a natural tendency to inflate ratings. So the main recommendations have to 
address the issue.
1. CRAs should not obtain higher profits if they issue a better rating. 
The Cuomo agreement between the New York State Attorney General 
Andrew Cuomo and the three major CRAs states precisely that CRAs 
cannot charge different prices for ‘good’ and ‘bad’ ratings. Of course, 
because of repeated business and the creation of relationships between 
a CRA and its customer, the issuer, this may be difficult, but at least it 
goes in the right direction as it softens the main conflict of interests.
2. In addition, a supervisory board that has a long horizon and is 
determined to preserve the CRA’s reputation will complement the 
scheme. The board will have to oversee policies and procedures for 
the management of conflicts of interest. This consideration has 
led recent regulation to require a fraction of CRAs’ board members 
to be independent, where the required fraction is at least a third in 
the European regulation and at least 50% in the Dodd-Frank Act. In 
addition, the Dodd-Frank Act also requires NRSROs to designate a 
compliance officer with no responsibility either for sales of for models 
to be fully assigned to verify the mechanisms by which the NRSRO 
copes with the current regulation.
Finally, as mentioned in Bolton et al (2012), increasing competition among CRAs 
could be hazardous from a conflict of interest point of view, as this will increase 
the bargaining power of the issuers while decreasing the value of reputation to 
the CRAs, thus providing incentives to inflate ratings. This does not mean that 
limits to competition and barriers to entry should be imposed. Rather it is the 
current relationship between the issuer and the CRA that has to be reconsidered.
Ex post surveillance
Ex post surveillance will complement the ex ante regulatory rules. So, the 
European regulation requires CRAs ‘to comply with rigorous rules to make sure 
(i) that ratings are not affected by conflicts of interest’, which is a weak form 
of self-regulation. In addition, and presumably more effective, the European 
regulation includes an effective surveillance regime whereby European regulators 
will supervise credit rating agencies (European Parliament, 2009). But of course, 
if their compliance with regulation is to be assessed on the basis of their 
publication of an annual transparency report, the report will clear the CRA of 
any wrongdoing.
4.3.3  Eliminate shopping
As shopping is, jointly with conflicts of interest, one of the major causes of ratings 
inflation, this is one of the key recommendations. The recommendation here is 
that once a rating is asked for it should be publicly displayed. Unfortunately this 
may be difficult to enforce, as it requires a process of cooperation and information 
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transmission between the issuer and the CRA. Still, publicly announcing that a 
rating has been solicited for an issue obviously goes in the right direction.
In recent regulation, the most radical and challenging proposal here is the 
Franken amendment to the Dodd-Frank Act, that has been relegated to the status 
of a two-year study. The proposal gives to an NRSRO overseen by the SEC the 
power to provide initial ratings for structured products on a rotating basis. In 
this way the issuer is unable to select the initial rating, even if it is allowed to 
solicit additional ratings. The system, if suitably designed, could also provide 
the CRAs with the right incentives, because the probability of a given CRA being 
chosen for an initial rating may depend upon its past accuracy record for similar 
products. The Franken amendment has thus the advantage of (a) solving the 
shopping problem, as the announcement of the initial rating is public, and (b) 
solving the conflicts of interest as rotation breaks the collusion between a CRA 
and an issuer and provides incentives for accuracy if a CRA with a better record 
has a higher probability of being selected for the initial rating.
4.3.4  Monitoring the quality of ratings
Although certification of CRAs through the NRSRO has been criticised as a 
barrier to entry, once CRAs are accountable for their ratings, their registration 
has the benefits of strict regulation, with the ability of the designated regulatory 
agency, under the supervision of the newly created European Securities and 
Market Authority (ESMA), to verify the CRAs’ procedures. This has led European 
regulation to introduce a registration procedure for credit rating agencies, which 
will be the European equivalent of the NRSRO. In addition, because of the 
diversity of legal and regulatory regimes in Europe, on 2 December 2009 the 
Council of the Economics and Finance Ministers of the European Union Member 
States (ECOFIN) proposed the centralised supervision of CRAs, so as to avoid 
duplication of monitoring, risk of inconsistent or divergent application of CRA 
regulation across countries, red tape and home biases in CRA regulation. The 
new proposals establish the possibility of applying penalties to CRAs, including 
suspension of registration to enforce compliance. Also, the Dodd-Frank Act 
makes it easier for plaintiffs to engage in legal action for money damages against 
rating agencies if they have not fulfilled their due diligence by knowingly or 
recklessly failing to conduct a reasonable investigation of the characteristics of 
the issue. Consequently, by putting in place a system of ex post penalties, current 
regulatory proposals go in the right direction and provide ex ante incentives to 
produce accurate ratings.
Still, it is not clear from the reading of the regulatory proposals how accuracy is 
to be measured ex post. Here a simple straightforward recommendation to be put 
forward is to stick to statistical properties of ratings, a recommendation related 
to the Dodd-Frank suggestion of establishing procedures that clearly define the 
meaning of any rating symbol. If this is the case, it is easy to make it compulsory 
to disclose the confidence intervals provided by the CRA, their basic assumptions 
and the rules the CRA explicitly establishes for rating upgrades and downgrades. 
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This approach would allow measurement of whether rating changes are within 
some confidence interval. Although it would not be possible to monitor the 
accuracy of rating of a specific issue, it does allow monitoring of the quality 
of the ratings process when applied to multiple issues. As a consequence, CRAs 
might be reluctant to rate instruments without sufficient information and have 
incentives to improve their models, two recommendations that are explicitly 
made in the European regulation.
4.4  Stress test recommendations
It is important to define a stress test scenario that is realistic, informative to 
the market, and which allows precise conditional information to be provided. 
In our view, the European stress test of 2010, in spite of benefiting from the 
previous US experience, was ill-designed as it limited the access of the market to 
the financial industry’s performance under the stress test scenario (see also the 
discussion in Greenlaw et al, 2011). It was a mistake that only a fraction of the 
banking industry, amounting to 50% of the respective national banking sectors, 
was forced to take the test. Clearly, there is no need to impose the cost of the test 
on every single small institution, but it is of paramount importance to disclose 
the result of the stress test for all relevant institutions, in particular SIFIs, but 
also those institutions that cover more than, say, 10% of the market, which also 
involves institutions that the European test did not include. This was all the more 
important in Europe because financial institutions needed access to cross-border 
funding. So, our stress test recommendation is that it should be characterised by
1. disclosure to the market;
2. being compulsory for all institutions requiring access to the money 
market;
3. being exhaustive regarding the different types of assets, whether on 
banks’ trading books or on the assets held to maturity;
4. allowing financial analysts and portfolio managers to perform ‘what if’ 
simulations with the information disclosed.
In part, market forces have already promoted these rules. Nevertheless, the issue 
that arises is that some countries may have an interest in hiding information. In 
particular, countries facing a situation of budgetary restraint so that the bailing 
out of systemically important institutions is not guaranteed, as was the case in 
Iceland, will clearly oppose a rigorous transparent stress test. Still, the alternative 
of not running the stress tests only leads to increased market diffidence, liquidity 
shortages and the perspective of a worsening of the crisis.
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5  Conclusion
Information problems were at the heart of many problems during the recent 
financial crisis, and, quite naturally, the immediate reaction from the G20 
general recommendations to regulatory authorities has been to require that 
market participants have access to better information. While this seems a natural 
implication of basic microeconomic theory on efficient resource allocation, we 
argue here that transmission of information may be a more involved process, 
related to asymmetric information, moral hazard, and incentives. In particular, 
one of the points we emphasise in this paper is that it is important to distinguish 
between disclosure and transparency. We interpret disclosure as providing 
information, while transparency arises when the information is effective in 
reaching the market, being adequately interpreted and used. Both parts of the 
communication process are ultimately linked. However, it is useful to distinguish 
them when discussing possible regulatory measures as regulators often seem to 
believe that disclosure is sufficient for transparency. As we discuss in the paper, 
there are several obstacles to a simple mapping of the former to the latter.
The regulators’ highlight of transparency and its role in providing market 
discipline is not without contradictions, as regulatory authorities do not seem 
to trust in market discipline during a crisis and use the argument of market 
inefficiencies as a justification for intervention (regulatory forbearance). Although 
there might be a point in the possible overreaction of market participants and 
resulting distortion of market prices, changing the rules of the game by selective 
intervention can be preposterous. Market participants will foresee the chance 
to relax the rules and try to take actions to influence them, which can have 
detrimental ex ante and ex post incentive effects. More research is needed on 
the reactions of the market in a crisis and the involved trade-offs, but clearly, the 
universal claim of ‘better information’ has to be nuanced and better qualified.
To be more specific, two obstacles seem to hinder market participants’ use of 
better information. The first obstacle is government intervention and regulation 
itself. For example, because of government bail-outs and regulation based on 
ratings, investors’ incentives to use, scrutinise and demand certain information 
are limited. To improve transparency, this issue has to be understood and taken 
into account. Regulation has to tackle the problem of markets failing, potentially 
because of intervention and regulation.
The second obstacle is the cost of processing information, in particular, of 
providing reliable information on the part of the issuer as well as collecting and 
understanding information on the part of the investor. There a several issues 
involved: what type of information should be disclosed, how do investors react 
to the information, and what are the consequences for market efficiency? These 
questions provide a challenge to regulators as they involve complex trade-offs. 
An example is the classical ‘winner’s curse’ problem, that better information can 
only be understood and processed by sophisticated market participants. When 
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this is the case, it is not clear any longer that better information increases market 
efficiency, as it may come at the cost of lower liquidity, since the existence of 
informed insiders will tax uninformed agents on every trade they engage in. 
Another example is the potential overreaction of market participants. Should 
information be hidden to avoid overreaction or would this cause even greater 
overreaction in a crisis? While regulators might demand the disclosure of 
additional information, it is impossible to limit access to different sources of 
information that investors might use.
Because of these obstacles, regulating disclosure and providing a framework 
for better transparency is difficult. We have discussed several of the underlying 
issues for two main sources of information to the market, financial statements 
and information provided by credit rating agencies. Of course, we are not able 
to ‘solve’ all the issues, but understanding the obstacles and trade-offs is an 
important move towards designing better regulation and guiding future research.
References
Admati, A R, DeMarzo, P M, Hellwig, M and Pfleiderer, P (2010), ‘Fallacies, 
irrelevant facts, and myths in the discussion of capital regulation: why bank 
equity is not expensive’, mimeo, Stanford Graduate School of Business.
Allen, F and Carletti, E (2008), ‘Mark-to-market accounting and liquidity pricing’, 
Journal of Accounting and Economics 45, pp 358–78.
Armstrong, C S, Guay, W R and Weber, J P (2010), ‘The role of information and 
financial reporting in corporate governance and debt contracting’, Journal of 
Accounting and Economics 50(2–3), pp 179–234.
Ashcraft, A and Schuermann, T (2008), ‘Understanding the securitization of 
subprime mortgage credit’, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Report 318.
Ashcraft, A, Goldsmith-Pinkham, P and Vickery, J (2009a), ‘MBS ratings and the 
mortgage credit boom’, mimeo, Federal Reserve Bank of New York.
Ashcraft, A, Goldsmith-Pinkham, P and Vickery, J (2009b), ‘The role of incentives 
and reputation in the rating of mortgage-backed securities’, mimeo, Federal 
Reserve Bank of New York.
Barberis, N and Thaler, R (2003), ‘A survey of behavioral finance‘, in G M 
Constantinides, M Harris and R M Stulz (eds), Handbook of the Economics of 
Finance, vol. 1, Amsterdam, Elsevier, pp 1053–1128.
Becker, B and Milbourn, T T (2010), ‘How did increased competition affect credit 
ratings?’, Journal of Financial Economics, 101(3), 493-514.
Benmelech, E and Dlugosz, J (2009), ‘The credit rating crisis’, NBER Working 
Paper 15045.
Bolton, P, Freixas, X and Shapiro, J (2012), ‘The credit ratings game’, Journal of 
Finance 67(1), pp 85-112.
Brunnermeier, M K (2009), ‘Deciphering the liquidity and credit crunch 2007–
2008’, Journal of Economic Perspectives 23(1), pp 77–100.
102   The Crisis Aftermath: New Regulatory Paradigms
CGFS (Committee on the Global Financial System) (2008), ‘Ratings in structured 
finance: what went wrong and what can be done to address shortcomings?’, 
CGFS Paper 32, Bank for International Settlements.
Chemmanur, T J and Fulghieri, P (2006), ‘Competition and cooperation among 
exchanges: A theory of cross-listing and endogenous listing standards‘, Journal 
of Financial Economics 82(2), pp 455–89.
Cremer, J (1995), ‘Arm’s length relationships’, Quarterly Journal of Economics 
110(2), pp 275–96.
Dang, T V, Gorton, G and Holmström, B (2009), ‘Opacity and the optimality of 
debt for liquidity provision’, working paper.
De Ceuster, M K and Masschelein, N (2003), ‘Regulating banks through market 
discipline: a survey of the issues’, Journal of Economic Surveys 17(5), pp 749–66.
de Larosière, J (chair) (2009), Report from the High-Level Group on Financial 
Supervision in the EU, Brussels.
European Commission (2010), ‘Audit policy: lessons from the crisis’, Green Paper 
COM(2010) 561, Brussels.
European Parliament (2009), Regulation (EC) No 1060/2009 of the European 
Parliament and of the Council on credit rating agencies.
FASB (Financial Accounting Standards Board) (2010), ‘Accounting for financial 
instruments and revisions to the accounting for derivative instruments and 
hedging activities’, Financial Accounting Series, Exposure Draft: Proposed 
Accounting Standards Update, 26 May.
Fischer, P E and Verrecchia, R E (2000), ‘Reporting bias’, Accounting Review 75, pp 
229–45.
Flannery, M .J. (1998), ‘Using market information in prudential bank supervision: 
a review of the US empirical evidence‘, Journal of Money, Credit and Banking 
30(3), pp 273–305.
Gorton, G B (2009), ‘The panic of 2007’, in Maintaining Stability in a Changing 
Financial System, Proceedings of the 2008 Jackson Hole Conference, Federal 
Reserve Bank of Kansas City, pp 131–262.
Gorton, G B and Metrick, A (forthcoming), ‘Securitized banking and the run on 
repo’, Journal of Financial Economics, forthcoming.
Greenlaw, D, Kashyap, A K, Schoenholtz, K and Shin, H S (2011), ‘Stressed out: 
macroprudential principles for stress testing’, conference draft prepared for 
the US Monetary Policy Forum.
Griffin, J M and Tang, D Y (forthcoming), ‘Did subjectivity play a role in CDO 
credit ratings?’, Journal of Finance, forthcoming.
Grossman, S J and Stiglitz, J E (1976), ‘Information and competitive price systems’, 
American Economic Review 66(2), pp 246–53
Healy, P M and Palepu, K G (2001), ‘Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, 
and the capital markets: a review of the empirical disclosure literature’, Journal 
of Accounting and Economics 31, pp 404–40.
Hellwig, M F (2005), ‘Market discipline, information processing, and corporate 
governance’, mimeo, Max Plank Institute for Collective Goods.
Hellwig, M F (2009), ‘Systemic risk in the financial sector: an analysis of the 
subprime-mortgage financial crisis’, De Economist 157(2), pp 129–207.
 Disclosure, Transparency and Market Discipline  103
Holmström, B (1979), ‘Moral hazard and observability’, Bell Journal of Economics 
10(1), pp 74–91.
Holmström, B (1999), ‘Managerial incentive problems: a dynamic perspective’, 
Review of Economic Studies 66(1), pp 169–82.
Huizinga, H and Laeven, L (2009), ‘Accounting discretion of banks during a 
financial crisis’, IMF Working Paper 09/207.
Krahnen, J P and Wilde, C (2010), ‘CDOs and systematic risk: why bond ratings 
are inadequate’, mimeo, University of Frankfurt.
Laux, C and Leuz, C (2009), ‘The crisis of fair-value accounting: making sense of 
the recent debate’, Accounting, Organizations and Society 34(6–7), pp 826–34.
Laux, C and Leuz, C (2010), ‘Did fair-value accounting contribute to the financial 
crisis?’, Journal of Economic Perspectives 24(1), pp 93–118.
Leuz, C and Wysocki, P (2008), ‘Economic consequences of financial reporting 
and disclosure regulation: a review and suggestions for future research’, 
working paper.
Leuz, C, Triantis, A and Wang, Y (2008), ‘Why do firms go dark? Causes and 
economic consequences of voluntary SEC deregistrations’, Journal of Accounting 
and Economics 45, pp 181–208.
Lowenstein, R (2008), ‘Triple-A-failure’, New York Times Magazine, 27 Apr.
Morris, S and Shin, H S (2002), ‘Social value of public information’, American 
Economic Review 52(5), pp 1521–34.
Morris, S and Shin, H S (2008), ‘Financial regulation in a system context’, Brookings 
Papers on Economic Activity, Fall, pp 229–61.
Morrison, A D and White, L (2009), ‘Level playing fields in international financial 
regulation’, Journal of Finance 64, pp 1099–1142.
Onaran, Y. (2008), ‘Lehman cuts $130 billion of assets to end bear stigma’, at 
Bloomberg.com, http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601087&sid=aUa
JYcbwzbjI&, 8 June (updated version accessed Feb. 2012).
Pagano, M and Volpin, P F (2009), ‘Securitization, transparency and liquidity’, 
mimeo, Università di Napoli Federico II and London Business School.
Peristian, S, Morgan, D P and Savino, V (2010), ‘The information value of the 
stress test and bank opacity’, Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Report 
460.
Plantin, G, Sapra, H and Shin, H S (2008), ‘Marking-to-market: panacea or 
Pandora’s box?’, Journal of Accounting Research 46, pp 435–60.
Rajan, U, Seru, A and Vig, V (2008), ‘The failure of models that predict failure: 
distance, incentives and defaults’, Chicago Graduate School of Business 
Research Paper 08-19.
Shleifer, A (2000), Inefficient Markets: An Introduction to Behavioral Finance, Oxford, 
Oxford University Press.
Spargoli, F (2010), ‘Information disclosure and market discipline of banks’, 
mimeo, Universitat Pompeu Fabra.
Stein, J C (1989), ‘Efficient capital markets, inefficient firms: a model of myopic 
corporate behavior’, Quarterly Journal of Economics 104, pp 655–69.
Story, L (2010), ‘Merrill’s risk disclosure dodges are unearthed’, New York Times, 
9 Aug.
104   The Crisis Aftermath: New Regulatory Paradigms
Verrecchia, R E (2001), ‘Essays on disclosure’, Journal of Accounting and Economics 
32, pp 97–180.




 Lessons from the Crisis
Mathias Dewatripont and Xavier Freixas
Université Libre de Bruxelles (Solvay Brussels School and ECARES) and CEPR; 
Universitat Pompeu Fabra and CEPR
1  Introduction
In the aftermath of every banking crisis the effectiveness of the procedures to deal 
with financially distressed banks is questioned. The 2007/9 banking crisis has 
been no exception and the issue has been revisited with an important number of 
contributions and original proposals designed to redress the inefficient transfer 
of resources from taxpayers to private banks’ claimholders. The aim of this paper 
is to review bank resolution procedures, defined here as the mechanisms that 
are used to prevent the impact of a banking crisis and its ultimate effects on 
economic activity. Whether banks facing financial distress should be liquidated 
or bailed out, and how, is clearly a critical issue. This is not only because of 
the huge amounts of taxpayer transfers that are involved in the process, but 
also because it defines the expectations other banks have to be bailed out in 
the future, and therefore their incentives for risk-taking. Yet, in spite of the 
commonly shared view that the issue is of paramount importance, the analysis 
of how regulators and government authorities deal with a banking crisis does not 
reveal a common pattern. Indeed, the study of bail-out interventions showed 
rather an amalgamation of procedures – private, public and mixed, dealing with 
assets or with liabilities – and does not provide a way to identify the entities to be 
liquidated and the ones to be bailed out. In addition, there is no clear consensus 
on which procedures are the preferred ones, even if the generally accepted view 
is that the Swedish banking crisis in the 1990s was expertly dealt with, while the 
cost of other crises was much too high. This lack of consensus on the efficiency 
of resolution policies is in our view the consequence of our relative ignorance, 
while bank resolution regimes are nevertheless of paramount importance, and 
this for two reasons.
First, because the main justification of banking regulation is the existence of 
the externalities that originate in banks’ bankruptcies, whether because of the 
existence of small uninformed depositors or because of contagion effects. Since, 
according to standard microeconomic theory, externalities should be dealt with 
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at the originating point, it is crucial to start by correcting at least partially this 
core externality, even if other externalities turn out to require reliance on other 
instruments. Second, as alluded to above, considering bank resolution regimes 
is critical for the management and prevention of possible future banking crises, 
because these regimes have implications for incentives of shareholders, board of 
directors and managers regarding risk, compensation and dividend policies.
In order to analyse bank resolution procedures it is necessary, first, to point out 
that by ‘bank in distress’ we mean a bank that is facing difficulties in continuing 
its usual activities because of lack of funding or lack of capital. The period during 
which the bank is in distress will end up either with the bank’s bankruptcy or 
with its return to normal conditions of capital and funding. We are then able to 
define a bank resolution procedure as any public intervention that is intended 
to restore the bank’s normal business conditions or to liquidate it, thus restoring 
normal business conditions for all other banks. Bank resolution procedures 
should therefore be designed so as to minimise the cost to society of distress 
episodes.
The need to cope with banks in distress was already identified in the nineteenth 
century, with Bagehot’s rules on lender-of-last-resort policies. At that time, the 
main issue was the existence of a lender of last resort to avoid the bankruptcy of 
a solvent bank unable to meet its payment obligations. Since then, the view has 
significantly changed because, first, the payment system nowadays relies much 
more heavily on banks’ transactions, thus increasing the social cost of a bank’s 
bankruptcy; second because the modernisation of financial markets facilitates 
access to funding (eg through repo operations); and third, because today’s 
monetary policy implementation in a world of fiat money does not have much 
in common with the management of the stock of gold in the nineteenth century.
More than ever, the current crisis has brought to light the significant potential 
costs and benefits of the resolution of a bank to the various ‘constituencies’. In 
the aftermath of the banking crisis we are bound to acknowledge that academic 
research in the area of banking has so far failed to identify a ‘best regulatory 
response’ to each type of banking crisis. Although such a goal is ambitious, and 
clearly beyond the scope of this paper, it has provided us with the motivation to 
clarify the key issues surrounding bank resolution. The aim of our paper is precisely 
this: to provide a framework of analysis to understand the main issues, the main 
tensions and the main trade-offs involved in a bank resolution procedure. Indeed, 
a bank resolution should be seen in all its complexity, with three main types of 
parties involved: the bank and its shareholders, the regulator (particularly the 
deposit insurance company), and the Treasury, with bank managers and bank 
debtholders at times entering the picture. In addition, the dynamic dimension of 
a bank resolution, starting with a bank being in distress, defines a bargaining game 
among the parties involved. Consequently, our approach has been to address 
the bargaining game by backward induction, which justifies the structure of our 
paper. Starting first with bankruptcy, we then move to the ‘bank in distress’ stage 
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of the bargaining game and end up by examining the mechanisms and rules that 
the regulator should set ex ante in order to maximise the social welfare function.
Our paper will be structured as follows. We first address in section 2 the general 
issue of bank distress and the procedures that are most commonly implemented 
to avert its social cost. Next, in section 3, we turn to the bankruptcy procedure 
and argue why banks’ bankruptcies are different. Section 4 is devoted to the 
comparison of bank resolution schemes and section 5 explores the ex ante design 
of the bank resolution rules. Section 6 surveys the specific issues of cross-border 
bank resolution and section 7 concludes.
2  Broad principles
We begin by pointing out some of the complexities of a bank resolution procedure 
that a rigorous analysis has to address. These concern the timing of the resolution, 
the possible biases in the regulator’s objectives, as well as the constraints the 
efficient design of a bank resolution procedure has to acknowledge.
A bank resolution regime can be seen as the result of a constrained cost–benefit 
optimisation. Regulatory authorities’ most common mandate is the preservation 
of both financial activity and financial stability, in such a way that the objective 
function weighs both the total surplus from the banking industry and the possible 
expected cost of financial instability. This social cost of banks’ bankruptcy is the 
cost of real economic activity and reflects, first, the cost of the possible impairment 
of the payment system, with some agents lacking the liquidity to operate in the 
market for goods and services. Second, it takes into account the costs in terms 
of lower lending, lower growth, higher unemployment, lower investment levels 
and so on.
This implies that bank resolution should occur while allowing the bank to remain 
in operation. This requirement of a special resolution regime where activity is 
preserved is not specific to banks. Indeed, utilities such as power or water supply 
face the same type of constraint. Yet, there are two key differences. First, the 
banking industry is susceptible to contagion. Second, a distressed bank that is 
kept in operation faces a high cost of funding that generates losses for as long as 
it continues being distressed. The implication is that resolution should take place 
rapidly.
The complexity of the problem stems from three broad classes of problems that 
we examine in turn: (1) the time dimension of resolution options; (2) possible 
biases in the regulatory objective function; and (3) ‘misspecification’ of the 
regulator’s decision-making framework.
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2.1  The time framework of bank resolutions
Because a bank resolution occurs in response to a bank crisis, it is useful to clarify 
the different stages, from the ex ante stage of the design of the bank resolution 
rules and their implementation to the final outcome of the crisis.
We distinguish three phases where policies can impact bank resolution: (i) stage 
1, the initial stage when the regulatory rules of intervention are designed; (ii) 
stage 2, a phase of distress where bankruptcy is not inevitable, and where other 
types of resolution can be implemented with a continuation of bank activities in 
some form; and (iii) stage 3, a phase where bankruptcy has become inevitable.
Proceeding by backward induction, consider first the last stage. When bankruptcy 
is inevitable, the regulator has to apply the bankruptcy laws and its only choice 
is determining (i) what accrues to each type of claimholder, and (ii) how the 
portfolio of the bank’s assets is to be managed or sold.
In stage 2, by contrast, when the intervention concerns a bank in distress that 
is threatened by bankruptcy but not yet in default, the regulator has additional 
options open, as it can transfer resources to the bank and renegotiate with 
the different types of claimholders. If successful, that is, in particular, if the 
commitment to support the bank in the future is credible, this allows the regulator 
to restore market confidence by reducing a bank’s probability of default and the 
existing agency problems (gambling for resurrection) and, therefore, improve 
its access to funding. The precise definition of when a bank is in distress is, to 
some extent, open to interpretation. Nevertheless, whatever the definition, it is 
important to keep in mind that this second stage is a time interval that begins with 
the bank being in distress and ends with the bank being either back to normal 
business conditions or in bankruptcy. One natural way to envision this process 
is to think that during this time interval the bank’s assets will follow a stochastic 
process that results in losses and that during this process information is either 
voluntarily disclosed by the bank or is obtained by financial analysts and passed 
on to the market. During this interval, both the bank and the regulator will make 
choices: the former regarding its investments (eg gambling for resurrection) and 
the latter in deciding whether or not to support the bank, and, in the first case, 
with which associated conditionality.
As far as this stage is concerned, three remarks are important: First, the outcome 
of bankruptcy is the result of an equilibrium process involving depositor 
coordination, as illustrated by the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model. Second, 
the intervention by regulatory authorities is the result of a bargaining process 
that takes time, generates rents to shareholders and, therefore, determines the 
ultimate cost to taxpayers. Third, by backward induction, the disagreement point, 
that is, the bank bankruptcy regime, is a critical determinant of the equilibrium 
of the bargaining game, and thus of the cost of resolution.
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Coming now to the initial stage, note first that, even if the regulator wants to 
commit to a specific set of rules, it is not clear that, once confronted with a 
bank in distress situation and under all kinds of pressures, it will follow them, 
so that the non-commitment approach may sometimes be the correct one. Still, 
how bankruptcy and intervention rules are defined at the initial stage is vitally 
important, because this determines the environment of the resolution, the 
relative bargaining positions, the extent of the ability of the regulator to commit 
to pre-existing rules and, in the end, the final cost of resolution. Obviously, 
each claimholder will use his or her rights as a bargaining tool. So, for instance, 
shareholders may claim that they are expropriated through the dilution of their 
shares if the possibility for the regulator to inject additional capital at the current 
market prices of assets has not been clearly defined and turns out to penalise 
shareholders. Because the regulator’s objective may be a speedy resolution, this 
may lead to an increase in the amount transferred to shareholders at the cost of 
taxpayers. The European Council’s highlighting of the need for ‘certainty and 
predictability around bank resolutions for all stakeholders: owners, creditors and 
counterparties’1 reflects this concern. The Basel core principles define some basic 
characteristics these rules should satisfy, but because of their generality, they 
have the drawback that each country has to apply them within its bankruptcy 
law and in accordance with its overall legal structure and this may lead ex ante 
to legal uncertainty and ex post to huge litigation costs. (Basel Committee on 
Banking Supervision, 2006).
2.2  The regulatory objectives
Broadly speaking, the objective of any bank intervention should be to minimise 
the social cost of bank distress by choosing the best procedures to cope with it, 
which might imply transferring funds to some of the bank claimholders. Ex ante 
contingent planning will be critical at the time of intervention, as it will define 
the negotiation framework. Yet, ex post, once confronted with a banking crisis, 
the regulatory authorities and the Treasury may have different perceptions as to 
what the benefits of intervention are.
First, the regulator may want to allow the bank to continue operating by providing 
the market with sufficient guarantees so as to give the bank access to funding 
at a reasonable cost and thus avoiding a bank run and preserving the value of 
borrower–lender relationships. Second, alternatively, the regulator’s overriding 
concern may be to avoid a disorderly liquidation of a bank in distress that would 
imply a high cost generated by the disruption of the payment system, contagion, 
litigation and the complexity of unwinding the bank’s contracts. Third, the 
regulator’s objective may be more generally to avoid a credit crunch and a 
severance of firms’ access to credit, a point that has been repeatedly emphasised 
by political authorities during the crisis. Fourth, the regulator may be concerned 
with its own reputation (and the fact that intervention may indicate a failure of 
1 2981st Council meeting, Economic and Financial Affairs, Dec 2009, p 19.
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earlier monitoring). Fifth, the regulator’s objective may be to protect the banks’ 
interests as assumed in the theory of regulatory capture.
Notice that these objectives are intertwined, so that, for instance, in the case of 
the resolution of Bear Stearns in March 2008, it is impossible to identify whether 
the decision to avoid bankruptcy and go instead for the absorption by J P Morgan 
Chase was motivated by the cost of a bankruptcy or by the preservation of Bear 
Stearns’s borrower–lender relationships.
2.3  ‘Model misspecification’
Note that the regulator may be unaware of some constraints that it might 
face, a point we refer to as ‘model misspecification’. The first cause of model 
misspecification is to ignore the feasibility constraint: the Icelandic crisis showed 
that it was impossible for the Icelandic deposit insurance fund to guarantee the 
Icelandic deposits and also for the government to bail out the defaulting deposit 
insurance fund because of the obvious fiscal imbalances it would have caused. 
Allowing the banking industry to grow to the extent it did in Iceland was ignoring 
the fact that the deposit insurance fund could not fulfil its commitments under 
the European rules (the ‘too big to save’ problem).
Second, the model could be misspecified because the ex post bargaining game 
itself is not well understood. Thus, for instance, at the initial stage the regulator 
may expect banking crises to be solved at a low cost because it is confident it 
has the legal instruments to deal with them efficiently but may find out later 
on that this is not the view of the courts. More generally, the regulator may 
underestimate the capacity of claimholders to extract rents from taxpayers, as 
this is the result of a complex game.
Third, the model could be misspecified because of time inconsistency. Indeed, 
the regulator may want to commit to liquidating banks that are not systemic but, 
ex post, find itself in a position where this is not the best option. The Northern 
Rock crisis of 2007 illustrates this point.
2.4  Principles of interventions
As Bulow and Klemperer (2009) and Beck et al (2010) put forward, a bank 
resolution can (i) operate either through asset revaluation or through a liability 
devaluation; (ii) be contingent or not; and (iii) involve bankruptcy or not.
Note first that recapitalisation can be accomplished unilaterally by the banks 
themselves, through one of three means: by issuing new equity, by liquidating 
assets to pay off current liabilities, or by negotiating with debtholders to convert 
some debt into equity.
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However, in a crisis, the first of these means is at least initially extremely difficult 
and the second risks worsening the situation, both by freezing new lending in 
the interim and by forcing the sale of assets at fire sale prices, much below their 
hold-to-maturity value. The third means (debt–equity conversion without public 
intervention) is often difficult too, because debtholders have an incentive to hold 
out in the hope of receiving the full value of their claim, and in doing so do not 
internalise the costs their resistance imposes on other stakeholders in the same 
bank and on other banks.
If policymakers wish to bring about a different outcome without allowing 
automatic insolvency procedures to run their course, some public intervention2 
for recapitalisation may be unavoidable. This does not imply that all 
undercapitalised banks should be recapitalised; indeed it is likely that the cost of 
recapitalisation will exceed the benefits for some banks, which should therefore 
be closed. Sometimes this may need to take place via a staged procedure, as in the 
case of the US’ prompt corrective action, in order to avoid any risk of systemic 
panic brought about by a disorganised process for closing a bank that, in itself, 
does not have a good claim to recapitalisation.
An intervention will thus be characterised by (i) whether it affects assets or 
liabilities; (ii) how it affects the rights of liability holders; and (iii) how assets 
are managed. Interventions may differ in their conditionality, and also in their 
appropriateness for individual or systemic crises.
2.4.1  Asset revaluation
Asset revaluation through public intervention could in theory take place in a 
completely transparent way, through a cash injection financed by the government 
budget. This policy, which is lenient on shareholders if they keep a positive 
equity stake and is costly to taxpayers, has the disadvantage of introducing a 
distortion in the bank’s cost of capital, with bankruptcy not a credible option 
any longer and the bank given a right to issue debt with the implicit guarantee 
of the government.
Asset purchases and price guarantees by the state involve a cost to taxpayers and 
a benefit to shareholders. The difference is that both the cost and the benefit 
are much less easy to predict in advance. The shareholders clearly benefit from 
receiving prices (or obtaining guarantees) that private markets would not currently 
provide, but because it is typically not clear at what price well-functioning private 
markets would buy the assets and provide the guarantees, both the real value of 
the shareholder benefit and the real cost to taxpayers cannot easily be calculated. 
Governments (especially but not only the United States government) have been 
claiming that these costs are lower than they appear on paper because asset prices 
are artificially depressed. This means that price guarantees may not need to be 
2 We leave aside here liquidity facilities through open market and related operations that are nowadays 
a standard tool in the implementation of monetary policy and in the provision of emergency liquidity 
assistance.
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called, and asset purchases may involve the possibility of future upside gains for 
the taxpayer if prices rebound. But there are very strong incentives for politicians 
to exaggerate the likelihood of this outcome.
Asset purchases can also be made by other private sector institutions, which can 
be given incentives to do so, either by price guarantees (which raise the same 
concerns as above) or by other inducements such as a likely increase in market 
power (which would raise the value of assets, for instance by raising the fees and 
interest rates the bank could charge or lower the rates it would have to pay on 
deposits). In the latter case, those who bear the costs would not be taxpayers but 
the bank’s customers (borrowers and depositors). Unless some inducements of 
this type are offered, other private sector institutions will participate only under 
political pressure, which would imply some transfer from the shareholders of the 
banks buying assets to the banks selling them (and would evidently do nothing 
for the capitalisation of the sector as a whole). Asset purchases by other private 
sector institutions are therefore typically very non-transparent. In spite of this, 
the benefit of a general asset purchase is that it can be credibly made once and 
for all and does not discriminate among banks. Consequently, the distortion in 
terms of marginal cost of funds is theoretically non-existent.
Note finally that, as well as raising issues of equity accountability, this lack of 
transparency in burden-sharing raises two types of efficiency concerns. First, 
there is the standard moral hazard issue: if shareholders and managers of the 
bailed-out banks are more aware of the benefits than the counterparties are 
aware of the costs, future behaviour may be riskier than is envisaged by the 
safeguards set up to restrain it. Secondly, a desire to minimise transparency may 
lead to recapitalisation being insufficient: a reluctance to admit the poor quality 
of assets may encourage bank management to lobby for repeated piecemeal 
recapitalisations in order to protect shareholders without having to be in a weaker 
bargaining position to recapitalise once and for all for the required amount of 
capital that would allow the bank to restart its activity efficiently.
2.4.2  Liability revaluation
The simplest and most transparent form of revaluation of liabilities is a bail-in 
consisting in the transformation of some or all unsecured liabilities into equity. 
The burden of recapitalisation is then borne by those who had made the unsecured 
loans to the banks in question. This has the merit of being highly transparent as 
far as the first-round effects are concerned. Still, the regulatory authorities may 
not have the legal instruments required to force this type of debt/equity swap. 
To the extent that some banks would still be undercapitalised (because they 
have very few unsecured liabilities), authorities could be forced to be transparent 
as to the sharing of the remaining burden through the mechanisms for the 
securing of those liabilities (eg via deposit insurance). This would strengthen the 
presumption that at least some of the junior creditors would be expected to share 
responsibility for monitoring banks in the future, thereby alleviating the moral 
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hazard problem, and by so doing probably also making it more expensive, or less 
subsidised, for banks to raise unsecured finance in the future.
Moreover, there are second-round issues. A significant proportion of the liabilities 
of banks have their counterpart in assets of other banks. Therefore, such a forced 
recapitalisation may threaten the solvency of other banks. In practice, it is 
not clear how serious the problem is. If regulators are doing their job, loans to 
currently seriously undercapitalised banks should already be marked down on 
the balance sheets of the creditors in question. However, if this is not the case, 
other methods may be used (such as corralling the liabilities in a ‘bad bank’ and 
therefore leaving open their ultimate status and value (see below)).
Some other liability restructuring methods change the rules of precedence for 
existing creditors without formally revaluing their claims (for instance by issuing 
preferred equity or various convertible instruments). These are typically less 
transparent than forced debt-to-equity conversions, but may have the advantage, 
when combined with asset revaluations, of mitigating some of the costs if 
bank solvency improves by more than implied by current asset valuations on 
unchanged policies.
Note also that the regulatory authority can commit to use a specific scheme and 
this can be publicly announced in advance. For example, Hart and Zingales (2009) 
suggest introducing mandatory CDS-triggered equity issues, under the threat of a 
liability revaluation. In the same vein, Kashyap et al (2008) put forward a capital 
insurance proposal, as an alternative to higher, non-contingent, capital ratios.
Finally, liability revaluations can be combined with contingent asset revaluations: 
Caballero (2009) has proposed that if the bank issues new equity in a given 
amount to private investors, the government could provide a loss guarantee for 
the new equity owners by promising to buy back the new equity at a fixed price 
in the future. In other words, the government distributes free put options to the 
new equity holders.
2.4.3  Joint assets and liabilities restructuring
Obviously, the two previous methods can be combined, thus providing the sum 
of their benefits. Still, there is a case where the combination may allow greater 
benefits to be obtained than the sum of assets and liabilities restructuring, and 
this occurs when the bank is split into two component parts, dividing the balance 
sheet so as to create a ‘good bank’ capable of continuing a profitable activity and 
a ‘bad bank’ as a shell for the residual assets and claims. A number of proposals 
have argued in favour of this form of resolution, thus moving away from a going 
concern perspective. This was the solution adopted in Ireland, where bad loans 
have been transferred to the National Asset Management Agency (NAMA).3 
3 The Irish government’s decision to guarantee all bank liabilities, which was at the origin of the Irish 
sovereign debt crisis, is independent of the transfer of assets to the bad bank.
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Perhaps a better classification would be ‘good banks’ and ‘uncertain banks’, 
where the latter concentrates all the valuation uncertainty either of a specific 
bank or of all distressed banks in the economy.4 In principle, the division of the 
bank can take place on the asset side of the balance sheet, with ‘troubled assets’ 
being separated from the rest. It can also take place on the liability side, with 
the existing assets (or a subset thereof) being grouped with a subset of the most 
senior liabilities, and the remaining junior liabilities being placed in a ‘bad bank’.
3  Final resolution and absorption
In this section, we focus on the last of our three stages, where the objective 
of keeping the bank as a going concern is abandoned and the bank files for 
bankruptcy. Bankruptcy is triggered by debt. It occurs either because an institution 
cannot face the payment of its debt, or because the total value of debt is larger 
than the value of the institution’s assets, yielding a negative value for its equity. 
We first clarify the role of debt in the funding of a firm. Next, given the social 
cost of bankruptcy in banks, we study the specific characteristics of bankruptcy 
when it concerns banks.
3.1  Debt, market discipline and bankruptcy for non-financial firms
To begin with, let us recall the obvious fact that bankruptcy is intrinsically 
associated with the existence of debt as a hard claim that can force managers to 
make payments out of non-verifiable profits. The existence of debt in an optimal 
liability structure may therefore be justified because of its positive impact on 
managers’ incentives, as put forward, for example, by Jensen (1986), Hart and 
Moore (1995) or Kose et al (2007).
One should stress that there is a tension between the debt and bankruptcy 
literatures. On the one hand, models of debt emphasise that, for debt to have 
maximum impact on managerial incentives, the renegotiation of its terms should 
not be too easy: otherwise, this could lead to a ‘soft budget constraint’, with 
debtholders realising that ex post debt maximisation may require ‘being soft’, that 
is, accepting refinancing/forgiveness, which in turn reduces managers’ incentives 
to put in effort earlier on. This argues in favour of ‘hard-to-renegotiate’ debt, for 
example because it is widely held (see Bolton and Scharfstein, 1996; Dewatripont 
and Maskin, 1995). On the other hand, the bankruptcy literature, for example 
4 Khan and Winton (2004) show how the separation of an opaque bank into two subsidiaries, one with 
the high risk assets and another with the low risk assets, can be efficient by allowing a reduction in 
asymmetric information and moral hazard. Under the critical assumption that investors know the 
characteristics of the assets in each subsidiary, the pricing of the debt for each institution will be more 
accurate than in the combined entity, thereby reducing the banks’ incentives to invest in high risk, 
negative NPV projects and increasing incentives to screen and monitor loans more accurately within 
each subsidiary, as there is less cross-subsidisation among different types of loans.
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Bebchuk (1988) or Aghion et al (1992), devise schemes that try to induce ex post 
efficiency, that is, the maximisation of creditor proceeds in bankruptcy (as well as 
the respect of priority rules). But of course, if ex post efficiency were to be the goal 
ex ante, we should observe much simpler capital structures. Instead, it looks as if 
ex ante structures are almost ‘meant’ to make renegotiation more difficult, which 
seems attractive if, as in the debt literature, fighting moral hazard is the objective.
Interestingly, in banking the tension is not the same. Indeed, there is an agreement 
that one cannot afford to have banking panics, so short-term claimholders 
cannot be hit (this agreement has been around since the 1930s, and the ‘Lehman 
experiment’ has generally reinforced the general consensus). Banks are really in 
a stronger position than non-financial firms: thanks to the understanding by 
short-term claimholders that they will be rescued in case of trouble, they can 
avoid financial distress by raising funds at roughly risk-free rates even when they 
are not in good health. This means that there is a strong bias towards leniency 
as far as the bank is concerned. The main regulatory goal should therefore be to 
put in place mechanisms that penalise managers and claimholders when things 
go wrong, while ensuring ‘continuity’ for short-term depositors. This is precisely 
the aim of a well-defined bank bankruptcy procedure.
Notice that in equilibrium any variation of the bankruptcy procedure and its 
costs to claimholders will have an impact on the banks’ debt strategy (see Acharya 
et al, 2011). Still, the key issue here is to try to align private and social costs of 
bankruptcy in such a way that bank managers and shareholders internalise the 
social cost of banks’ bankruptcy.
3.2  Bank-specific bankruptcy procedure
How should a bank-specific bankruptcy procedure be structured? From a legal 
perspective, bankruptcy might be triggered by the failure to pay obligations when 
due (equitable insolvency) or by a negative value in a bank’s equity (balance 
sheet insolvency). The two types of bankruptcies are often concomitant for 
non-financial firms but need not occur simultaneously in the case of a financial 
institution. In theory, bankruptcy, whether triggered by a firm’s inability to fulfil 
its commitments, possibly due to lack of access to liquidity, or triggered by a 
negative value of its equity, should not be considered as a perfectly defined event, 
but rather as the outcome of a game with multiple equilibria. The simplest model 
where this happens is due to Diamond and Dybvig (1983), where a bank is solvent 
or not depending on the coordination equilibrium selected by its depositors, that 
choose whether to run the bank or not. While this is true for every corporation, 
the externalities generated by financial intermediaries’ bankruptcies are higher, 
and therefore –except in the case of Lehman – for the last 75 years bank depositors 
have been protected from such runs and, most often, from bankruptcy altogether.
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3.2.1  Burden-sharing in the absence of bankruptcy
From a legal point of view, a bank is either bankrupt or not. If it is not bankrupt, 
claimholder rights cannot be ignored. So, it was not surprising to see in 2007 a 
bank in a dire financial condition distributing generous bonuses to its managers 
and dividends to its shareholders (Acharya et al, 2009), or later on, in 2008, to 
see that banks receiving government support were distributing generous bonuses 
to their staff.
The fact that, from a legal point of view, in the absence of bankruptcy, banks are 
committed to fulfilling their obligations vis-à-vis their claimholders has also been 
observed recently regarding the payment of coupons on the so-called hybrid 
securities. So, although the issue of this type of securities has been fostered as a 
good compromise between cost and flexibility, with the understanding that the 
bank could stop paying the coupon, in fact the legal structure in some countries 
is such that this was not the case. A possible lesson to be learnt is the existence of 
an ex ante conflict of interests facing the government and regulatory authorities 
typical of a political economy situation. Regulators agreed to include hybrids 
in capital, but in order to facilitate banks’ access to inexpensive funds they did 
not clarify that the rights of hybrid securities holders to a coupon payment were 
contingent on the bank not being in distress.
As regulators learn from their mistakes, it may be the case that, despairing of 
resolving this legal uncertainty and worried about future financial innovations 
to ‘beef up’ capital, they might decide it was safer to go for ‘better capital’ and 
insist on Tier 1 capital, a point repeatedly made in the motivation of Basel III. 
Still, notice that this is not a substitute for a clear-cut transparent bankruptcy 
procedure: if a choice between the two were to be made, better bankruptcy 
procedures would dominate the better capital option because equity is more 
expensive than hybrid securities. Fortunately, no such choice is necessary and 
once the right bank resolution procedures are in place, it is possible to fine-tune 
capital regulation.
3.2.2  Designing bank-specific resolution procedures
We now examine the characteristics of a bank-specific resolution procedure. 
Such a procedure will stipulate a number of steps that a bank has to take as 
its financial conditions deteriorate, in such a way that lack of compliance will 
suffice for regulatory authorities to declare the company bankrupt, thus wiping 
out shareholders and probably replacing the management team. Because of 
the global approach of this step-by-step procedure, a bank-specific bankruptcy 
procedure leaves open the possibility of a bank’s recovery if it complies with all 
the regulatory requirements. As such, a bank-specific bankruptcy procedure can 
also be seen as a set of pre-emptive measures to avert the crisis. However, we 
regard the main characteristic of a staged bank-specific bankruptcy procedure to 
be the fact that the regulator has the right to declare the bank bankrupt at every 
stage, not the fact that the bank might recover and avoid bankruptcy.
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The inadequacy of general bankruptcy procedures is well described by Wall 
(2010):
The bailouts and costly failure of nonbank financial firms during the 
recent crisis arose in large part because their failure could be resolved only 
through the bankruptcy courts using laws designed for nonfinancial firms. 
The bankruptcy courts are set up to provide a fair distribution of a firm’s 
claimants. These laws are not designed to take into account the effects of 
a firm’s failure on the rest of the economy. Commercial and savings banks 
are not resolved under the bankruptcy code, however, but instead by the 
FDIC [Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation] (Dwyer 2010). The agency’s 
procedures have proven reasonably efficient for creditors while providing 
a mechanism that can take into account systemic externalities.
A number of countries like Canada, Italy, Norway, the US and now the UK have a 
specific bank bankruptcy code (lex specialis), while others lack one and are under 
the regime of the lex generalis. A number of contributions have underlined that 
because banks are different they do require a different bankruptcy procedure. In 
fact, this very general assertion should be qualified, as the key relevant issue here 
is the social cost associated with the bankruptcy process for banks. The recent 
crisis has confirmed the need to have a special procedure to deal with systemic 
institutions. The externalities stemming from a bank’s bankruptcy have long 
been acknowledged (see eg Freixas and Rochet, 2007), as it affects uninformed 
depositors and the payment system, triggers contagion and impacts the overall 
stability of the financial industry.
The bank-specific bankruptcy procedure has to be set not only to maximise value 
to creditors and provide a fair treatment to claimholders, but also to minimise 
the social cost of banks’ bankruptcies and preserve the safety and soundness of 
the banking system. This implies the procedure has to be speedy in order to 
avoid speculation and bank runs, and it has to be orderly, characterised by legal 
certainty and no renegotiation. In particular, this may be crucial for large complex 
financial institutions (LCFI) and systemically important financial institutions 
(SIFI), since unwinding their positions may be a Promethean task. According to 
Claessens et al (2010), ‘The administrators of the Lehman bankruptcy in the US 
have estimated that at least $75 billion have been wasted because of the complete 
lack of any preparation for bankruptcy.’ This has led the Bank of England to 
require banks to write living wills so as to reduce the cost of unwinding the 
different contracts and the overall cost of a bank’s bankruptcy, thus increasing 
the credibility of such a threat. Finally, the liquidity of claims involved in the 
procedure should also be preserved (see Diamond and Rajan, 2005). Indeed one 
of the lessons of Lehman’s bankruptcy is that the liquidity of derivatives markets 
greatly simplified the unwinding of Lehman’s derivative positions (see Summe, 
2010).
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A good example of bank-specific insolvency procedure is the US system put in 
place in 1991 (ie after the Savings and Loan crisis of the 1980s) under the Federal 
Deposit Insurance Corporation Improvement Act (FDICIA), and it has been 
influential in various other countries. It is centred around the important notion 
of PCA, or ‘prompt corrective action’. This system has the advantage of starting 
to address a crisis gradually, classifying banks in five categories depending on 
(various measures of) capital ratios that roughly could be referred to as well-
capitalised (capital ratio >10%); adequately capitalised (>8%); undercapitalised 
(<8%); significantly undercapitalised (<6%); and critically undercapitalised (<2%). 
The first two categories face no restrictions, but the bottom three categories 
face more and more severe restrictions on actions (eg dividend payments, asset 
growth, acquisitions, and, in the extreme, receivership). The key idea is to 
allow the supervisor to intervene before things become too bad. There is broad 
agreement that PCA has had a beneficial effect (see for example Benston and 
Kaufman, 1997, and Aggarwal and Jacques, 2001).
Note however that even PCA is not a panacea. This is because the accounting 
system is imperfect and lags evolutions in an institution’s financial condition 
that can be very rapid. On the one hand, banks’ losses may be higher than their 
capital. Indeed, there is a wide consensus that bank losses in an FDIC resolution 
average some 30% of their assets (see James, 1991, and Bennett and Unal, 2009), 
which does not really fit in with the prompt corrective action’s thresholds. On 
the other hand, in the recent crisis, Kuritzkes and Scott (2009) stress: ‘The five 
largest US financial institutions subject to Basel capital rules that either failed or 
were forced into government-assisted mergers in 2008 – Bear Stearns, Washington 
Mutual, Lehman Brothers, Wachovia and Merrill Lynch – had regulatory capital 
ratios ranging from 12.3 per cent to 16.1 per cent as of their last quarterly 
disclosures before they were effectively shut down.’
The bottom line is therefore that, while PCA is helpful as a way to reduce the 
probability and magnitude of insurance fund and/or taxpayer intervention, we 
cannot hope for a foolproof system.
4  Comparing interim banking resolution schemes
In this section, we discuss the second of our three stages, the pre-bankruptcy 
one, where distress has occurred but it is still an option to keep the bank 
running as a going concern. The analysis differs from the initial stage in that 
we look here at what supervisors can be expected to do when initial conditions 
have not succeeded in committing them to maximising the ex ante objective 
function. We start from the key question: is the situation one of systemic crisis 
or not? A systemic crisis is characterised by a higher probability of contagion, 
and consequently, a larger social cost of banks’ distress and liquidation. We first 
examine the financial distress of a single bank (although one sufficiently large for 
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its liquidation to be problematic) and consider why, how and when a resolution 
procedure will be helpful. Then we turn to the systemic risk case.
4.1  In the absence of a systemic crisis
The regulatory intervention that is aimed at preventing the worst effects of a 
financial crisis of an individual bank raises some questions we briefly address 
hereafter. First, are the regulator’s objectives in line with the maximisation of 
social welfare? Second, would a liquidity injection through exceptional lender 
of last resort mechanisms be sufficient to restore the investors’ confidence in 
the bank and end the bank’s crisis? Third, what type of intervention should be 
preferred, and fourth, when should it be implemented. Last, and not least, what 
information is needed in order to implement an efficient resolution?
4.1.1  Welfare maximisation versus cost minimisation
At the level of an individual bank, an intervention is expected to restore market 
confidence by restructuring the bank’s balance sheet and by clarifying its 
investment strategies (reducing excess capacity, excessive leverage and excessive 
risks). In assigning an intervention mandate to the regulatory authorities two 
possible avenues are open with a clear trade-off.
To begin with, the mandate may reasonably define welfare maximisation as 
the objective the regulatory agency has to pursue. Yet, measuring ‘welfare’ may 
be difficult and may leave too much latitude to the regulator in the interim 
stage. Indeed, welfare means not only trying to defend the bank debtholders’ 
interests (the regulator being the ‘representative’ of debtholders, as suggested 
by Dewatripont and Tirole, 1994), but also trying to avoid contagion effects and 
ensure a proper supply of credit. The combination of these objectives can lead 
to a ‘fuzzy’ mission and make it difficult to assess the results of the regulatory 
activity, leading to a lack of accountability and an impossibility of monitoring 
the regulatory authority.
If there is a risk of bias or even capture, a ‘tighter’ mission can be preferable, like 
an explicit cost-minimising objective. This ties the regulator’s hands and limits 
regulatory capture. Because of the perceived risk of capture, we observe a recent 
trend from a general mandate for regulators to look after the stability of the 
financial system to a more specific mandate of cost minimisation, as in FDICIA.
4.1.2  Lender of last resort financing
Lender of last resort interventions consist in providing banks with funds when the 
market sources of liquidity dry up for some of the banks. This implies replacing 
private investor financing by Central Bank or Treasury financing. The structure 
of assets and liabilities remains the same, so that the bank’s solvency position is 
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unchanged. Gorton and Huang (2004) argue that the government is in a better 
position than the market because it can provide liquidity more effectively.5
Liquidity provision helps prevent bank runs. Depositor bank runs like the one 
that developed at Northern Rock in 2007 are the exception in contemporary 
banking systems. More frequently, banks face sudden difficulties in accessing 
funds in the wholesale market (a problem that Northern Rock also faced) and 
are therefore at risk of defaulting on their debt. This was the case, for instance, 
on 24 September 2008 when access to interbank funding for Fortis suddenly 
collapsed in the aftermath of the Lehman bankruptcy. Of course, as previously 
mentioned, distinguishing between illiquidity and insolvency is an impossible 
task as illiquidity implies insolvency, and the very expectation of the bank being 
in distress, even if ill-founded, condemns it to insolvency by increasing the cost 
of funding.
Still, at this stage, the objectives of the different parties involved may differ: 
while the regulator is concerned about contagion and even systemic effects and 
therefore is ready to make concessions to obtain a speedy orderly resolution that 
will restore the bank’s access to funding, shareholders have no time constraint 
and will use all possible legal options to protect the value of their shares, as 
did happen in the Fortis case. This makes liquidity injections more costly to 
taxpayers.
4.1.3  Choosing the right resolution instrument
When a bank is insolvent, what kind of mechanism is desirable? In a perfect 
market without asymmetric information, the Modigliani-Miller theorem tells 
us that a debt/equity swap will solve the bankruptcy issue and, if in addition 
there are bankruptcy costs, will increase the bank’s expected value. Of course, 
this benchmark is unrealistic. When departing from it, the answer will depend 
on assumptions concerning the regulator’s objective function and on the 
bargaining game between the regulator and the banks.6 However, it can be said 
that if contingent capital mechanisms like the ones we explore in 5.2 are in place, 
efficient resolution will first take advantage of this source of additional equity to 
reduce the capital shortage.
4.1.4  Optimal timing of intervention
Once a bank is in distress, three elements intervene to aggravate or to alleviate the 
state of its financial affairs. First, its assets evolve following a stochastic process 
5 See also Diamond and Rajan (2005), Repullo (2005), Rochet and Vives (2002), and Philippon and 
Skreta (2009).
6 Landier and Ueda (2009) assume the regulator’s objective function is to decrease the probability of 
bankruptcy beyond some threshold while respecting the shareholders’ right to block any proposal 
that does not assure them at least the same value for their claims. Assuming no debt renegotiation, 
they find that asset sales are the most expensive form of intervention, followed by guarantees and by 
debt buybacks. Instead, in Philippon and Schnabl (2010), the regulator’s concern is that when the 
bank’s returns fall below some level, the bank faces a debt overhang problem. Also assuming away debt 
renegotiation, as well as adverse selection on the value of the bank’s asset in place, they show that the 
optimal intervention mechanism is a combination of preferred stocks and warrants.
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which, typically, implies a decrease in value over time. Indeed, distress means a 
sharp rise in the cost of funds (if the bank still has access to funding), so that the 
intermediation margin becomes negative. In addition, as already pointed out by 
Rochet (1992) and as observed in the 1980s S&L crisis, when a bank’s capital is 
eroded, the convexity of its profit function due to its limited liability may prevail 
over the risk aversion behaviour of the managers, so that it will prefer to take 
high risks or, in an asymmetric information framework, engage in gambling for 
resurrection. Second, as the prospect of a bankruptcy becomes more likely, the 
bargaining positions of the bank’s shareholders and of the regulatory authorities 
may vary in one way or another, increasing or reducing the cost of a bail-out. 
Third, information about the bank’s financial position will be made available to 
the market by the banks themselves, by the regulator or by financial analysts.
The consequence is that it is difficult for the regulator to fine-tune the timing 
of the recognition of the crisis, as well as the timing, the amount and the type 
of intervention designed to restore investors’ confidence. As with the exercise 
of an option, it will be necessary for the regulator to weigh the risk of an early 
intervention against the cost of forbearance. Waiting has the benefit of providing 
a chance for recovery, possibly a better bargaining environment and, above 
all, better information. Of course, with hindsight it will be easier to accuse the 
regulator of doing ‘too little, too late’, but the ex ante trade-off is there and 
injecting taxpayer money into private hands has a cost to society.
Boot and Thakor (1993), Dewatripont and Tirole (1994) and Morrison and White 
(2010) point out an additional reason for regulatory forbearance: the fact that 
intervention may signal the incompetence of the regulatory authority, because it 
has failed to monitor the bank properly. In these models, ‘rules’ make more sense 
than ‘discretion’: the distortion in closure policy arises because the regulator 
manipulates the closure decision to obscure possible ineptitude in his asset-
quality monitoring. An obvious way to eliminate this distortion is to separate 
responsibility for bank closures from that for asset-quality monitoring. This is 
done in the US where the Office of the Comptroller of the Currency (OCC) is 
responsible for ex ante monitoring and the FDIC for ex post intervention.
4.1.5  Information disclosure
A lesson of the 1980s Savings and Loan crisis is that ‘liberal’ accounting changes, 
designed to ‘beautify’ bank balance sheets, are dangerous. Indeed, when in 
January 1982 the Federal Home Loan Bank Board allowed S&Ls to use the more 
liberal regulatory accounting principles (RAP) instead of the generally accepted 
accounting principles (GAAP), several insolvent S&Ls took advantage of this to 
gamble for resurrection, thereby significantly raising the losses for taxpayers. 
However, in spite of the strong criticisms of this change in accounting rules, in 
the recent crisis, a change in the accounting of portfolio loans was allowed in 
some countries in November 2008, following the declaration of a ‘rare event’ by 
the International Accounting Standards Board on October 2008. This allowed the 
assets in the trading portfolio to be reclassified in the loan book on a cost basis, 
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that is using pre-Lehman bankruptcy asset prices. Although improving the banks’ 
balance numbers, this type of measure increased uncertainty and did beautify 
bank accounts. In a similar vein, the illiquidity of markets allowed banks to use 
non-market information to determine the value of their assets, also increasing 
the uncertainty surrounding the solvency of banks (Laux and Leuz, 2010). So far, 
bank misbehaviour linked to these accounting changes has not been identified, 
but one cannot claim it has not occurred or will not occur.
From the perspective of information provision, another theoretical question 
has been addressed by Aghion et al (1999) and Mitchell (2001). They show how 
bail-outs can be designed so as not to distort ex ante lending incentives, in a 
setting where regulators have to rely on banks to provide relevant information 
on their asset values. Interesting, the stress-testing exercises implemented first by 
the US in April/May 2009 and a year later by the European Union have shown 
that the regulator is best placed to extract rigorous information out of banks 
and this exercise allows for a reduction in the uncertainty in financial markets, 
particularly in the US.
4.2  Intervention in a systemic crisis
A systemic banking crisis is characterised by three elements: macroeconomic 
fragility; contagion; and a triggering event that acts as a coordinating device. 
It is possible to distinguish different types of systemic risk depending on what 
the main factor is (a bubble, a macroeconomic shock or contagion, and whether 
the latter is based on expectations or balance sheet interconnection), but 
these distinctions are irrelevant for the analysis of resolution issues. Although 
macroprudential regulation allows a reduction of macroeconomic fragility and 
limits the probability of a crisis, once a systemic crisis unravels, the contagion 
dimension is so important that it is dangerous for the regulatory authorities 
to take the risk of declaring the bankruptcy of a financial institution. As a 
consequence, the cost-benefit analysis of bank restructuring operations has to 
be adapted to this crisis environment where a bank’s bankruptcy has a much 
higher cost. So, it would be efficient for the regulatory authorities to intervene at 
an earlier stage in the crisis, as the cost of a bankruptcy outweighs the benefits of 
forbearance. This would be in line with the findings of Borio et al (2010), which 
show that interventions in the recent crisis occurred earlier with respect to the 
business cycle than those during the Scandinavian crisis.
The emergency of a systemic crisis raises additional issues. Since the likelihood of 
contagion is much higher, regulatory authorities should use tougher mechanisms 
to contain it, for example monetary policy. This is true in particular since the 
amount of resources required for some interventions could be so large that it 
could have an impact on a country’s budgetary stability.
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4.2.1  Fostering a favourable macroeconomic environment
The recent crisis has been characterised by aggressive monetary policy with low 
interest rates, generous liquidity provision and coordination among the major 
central banks. While conventional wisdom prior to the crisis was that it was 
efficient to separate monetary policy from prudential regulation, a number of 
recent theoretical papers give support to the use of monetary policy to attain a 
prudential objective by combining liquidity injection (quantitative easing) and 
reduced interest rates. Allen et al (2008) show that in the presence of idiosyncratic 
shocks as well as aggregate shocks, in order to attain constrained efficiency in 
the interbank market, the Central Bank must intervene and set interest rates 
at a level the market cannot reach because of the non-existence of a market for 
hedging liquidity risks. Freixas et al (2011) also consider the role of the interbank 
market, which they introduce into the Diamond and Dybvig (1983) model. They 
demonstrate the existence of multiple rational expectations equilibria, only one 
of which is Pareto optimal. The Central Bank is then able to select the efficient 
equilibrium by setting interest rates (this allows banks to fulfil their commitments 
to depositors without generating a bank run).
While these papers make the interesting point that, in a liquidity crisis, it is 
efficient for the Central Bank to provide liquidity at a low interest rate, note that 
this policy is tantamount to a generalised bail-out, with a cost to the taxpayer 
which may be higher than the cost of a selective bail-out policy (see Fahri and 
Tirole, 2009). In fact, the policy of low interest rates may have been abused by 
banks that had access to funding at the market rates. Low interest rates have 
allowed some banks to accumulate profits during the crisis, as Greek bonds 
allowed a high return without the cost of high capital requirements, while the 
bonds could be repoed to obtain revolving liquidity. The release in late 2010 of 
details concerning the access to Fed liquidity lines made clear how in the US 
sound banks also benefited from the subsidised liquidity lines.
4.2.2  Limiting contagion
While in the case of the bankruptcy of an individual institution, the main 
channel of contagion is the interconnection of bank assets and liabilities through 
the interbank market, OTC derivative contracts and the payment system, in a 
systemic crisis there are three additional channels of contagion to be considered: 
expectations updating, liquidity shortages and the collapse of the prices of 
assets used as collateral. Each of these channels will have a reaction and amplify 
the effect of the others. Consequently, if a bank bankruptcy is inevitable, the 
regulatory authority will have to define a number of accompanying measures so 
as to prevent or minimise contagion through any of the three channels. While 
in an individual bank crisis the efficient closure policy is to provide liquidity 
support only for institutions that are expected to remain solvent, the risk of 
contagion in a systemic crisis leads to a policy of liquidity support for solvent 
and insolvent institutions that might be accompanied by a generalised guarantee 
to all bank creditors.
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In addition, as in a crisis loan officers use stricter credit standards and the supply 
of credit is reduced, the possibility of a credit crunch has to be considered. 
Philippon and Schnabl (2010) analyse this issue in a model of debt overhang 
where, because of the structure of debt seniority, under asymmetric information, 
banks may prefer not to invest in positive net present value projects. In this case, 
they demonstrate the optimality of government intervention. In a similar vein, if 
banks are constrained by capital requirements, the link between recapitalisations 
and credit supply is critical (see Berrospide and Edge, 2010, for an empirical 
analysis of the elasticity of credit supply to banks’ capital) in order to assess the 
impact of a government recapitalisation programme.
4.2.3  Budgetary constraints in a systemic crisis
The implication of a generous liquidity and capital injection in the banking 
system is an additional level of intermediation: instead of banks borrowing 
from households, they borrow from the Treasury, which in turn borrows from 
households. This implies that there is a cost of a systemic bail-out in terms of 
budget deficit. This has become apparent in the US, and in a more dramatic way 
in the Irish crisis of 2010. It is true that a Keynesian budgetary policy might be 
perfectly welcome, but the feasible amount of bail-outs has a limit beyond which 
a sovereign debt crisis will be triggered. If this is the case, it simply implies that 
the resolution of a banking crisis may end up in devaluation and inflation for 
those countries that are able to use their monetary policy. For those countries in 
the euro area, the dilemma is either to be bailed out by the other countries or to 
face the consequences of financial instability.
5  The ex ante design of a bank restructuring system
Let us now turn to the design of ex ante mechanisms, drawn up prior to a crisis but 
with a realistic anticipation of the interim bargaining game that will occur between 
regulators and claimholders. Committing to such mechanisms will decrease the 
uncertainty surrounding the process and will possibly improve upon the interim 
equilibrium solution. A well-defined bank restructuring system (with possible 
liquidity and/or capital injection) allows an enrichment of the class of contracts 
available to banks’ stakeholders for two reasons. First, it allows the definition of 
(legally acceptable) state-contingent contracts such as debt/equity swaps. Second, 
it allows the regulator to limit its own freedom and enhance its credibility (eg the 
Dodd-Frank Act limits the ability of the Federal Reserve to bail out a single bank), 
thereby reducing both the probability of future crises and their cost to taxpayers.
The ex ante perspective on intervention has to acknowledge that, once 
confronting a crisis, a number of mechanisms will be put in place to rescue 
banks, thereby benefiting bank claimholders. Consequently, as mentioned by 
Borio et al, ‘Interventions should strike a balance between limiting the adverse 
impact on the real economy and containing moral hazard’ (2010, p 5). The key 
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issue in this careful balance between ex ante and ex post costs is to acknowledge 
the outcome of the bargaining game between regulatory authorities and the 
bank claimholders that will take place at the time of intervention. The use of 
contingent securities and contingent contracts will, presumably, improve the 
efficiency of the ex ante design.
The optimal mechanism will result from cost-benefit analysis. Consequently, it 
should be stressed that having multiple ex ante mechanisms might be expected: 
one mechanism to cope with the crisis of small institutions that are not systemic 
(like the US prompt corrective action scheme), a second one to deal with the 
crisis of a systemically important financial institution and a third one to manage 
a systemic crisis, a point related to macroprudential regulation. This in turn may 
require legal adjustments.
5.1  The (ex ante) moral hazard issue
Consider, first, the impact of the bank resolution procedure on banks’ risk-taking. 
A lenient ex post resolution procedure where shareholders are not penalised for 
excessive risk-taking will clearly generate incentives to depart from efficient 
investment decisions and risks for taxpayers. Indeed, a generous bail-out can be 
seen as a put option written by the government in favour of shareholders. Even 
in cases where shareholders are wiped out but debtholders are bailed out, this 
will still increase risk-taking incentives, as the bank will maximise the net present 
value of investment projects plus the value of the put.
This is illustrated by the empirical literature on deposit insurance and on 
government bank guarantees. First, empirical evidence establishes that more 
generous deposit insurance schemes generate moral hazard, namely higher risk-
taking. According to Hoggarth et al (2005):
an explicit unlimited deposit protection scheme increases the likelihood 
of banking crises. The next most likely group to have a crisis is that 
without any scheme ex ante, which might seem paradoxical. But most 
countries without an ex ante deposit protection scheme introduce blanket 
government guarantees during a crisis and this is therefore likely to be 
built into market expectations and to create moral hazard. The group least 
likely to experience a crisis is that with an explicit but limited deposit 
protection scheme, and within that group those countries that require 
depositors to co-insure. Pre-committing to providing only limited cover 
therefore appears effective in limiting moral hazard. 
The same conclusion is reached by Demirgüç-Kunt and Detragiache (2002) 
and Barth et al (2006), who conclude that more generous deposit insurance is 
associated with a higher probability of a systemic banking crisis.
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Government guarantees, whether implicit or explicit, may have an impact akin to 
deposit insurance, as the bank benefits from a put option on its losses. Gropp et al 
(2010) empirically illustrate this point using the fact that in 2001 the guarantees 
for German savings banks were removed.7
Still, the existence of moral hazard does not mean that the ex ante bank resolution 
scheme should not include some form of bail-out, as a way to counter financial 
instability: there is a trade-off involved in limiting moral hazard, as is the case 
for managerial compensation, where the trade-off is between effort provision and 
risk-bearing.
5.2  Characteristics of an efficient restructuring system
Should contingent capital play a role as part of an efficient bank resolution? 
Theoretically speaking, the use of contingent investment vehicles endows 
banks with additional instruments to meet capital requirements and decrease 
the cost of restructuring by eliminating the costs and delays associated with the 
bargaining procedure. This will improve the efficiency of any procedure aimed at 
dealing with systemically important financial institutions (SIFIs) and global SIFIs. 
Indeed, the procedures are based on a restructuring of liabilities while the bank is 
kept as a going concern, and therefore do not impose losses on taxpayers.
5.2.1  Bail-in procedures
The simplest way to automatically provide capital to a bank facing financial 
distress is to have a contingency clause in the different claims it issues. This 
allows the debt charge of a financial institution to be diminished without the 
need to enter into a complex renegotiation process.
A bail-in procedure is a contract that triggers the conversion of some of the bank’s 
claims in such a way as to provide additional equity while reducing the amount 
of debt. A simple example would be the conversion of equity into an out-of-the-
money warrant, the conversion of subordinated debt and a fraction of long-term 
debt into equity and the conversion of the residual fraction of long-term debt 
into subordinated debt. As it is based on a contract, the bail-in prevents the 
declaration of bankruptcy and the cumbersome renegotiation process associated 
with it. Of course, the contract has to have two key characteristics. First, it has to 
have legal certainty, so that a court in New York and a court in Hong Kong will 
interpret it in the same way. Second, it has to fine-tune the write-down of claims 
so that the bank is provided with an adequate capital buffer when needed, while 
avoiding an excessive conversion that will increase the ex ante cost of the bank 
funds.
7 According to the authors, the impact was that (i) the Z-Score of average borrowers increased by 7%; (ii) 
the average loan size declined by 13%; (iii) remaining borrowers paid 57 basis points higher interest 
rates, despite their higher quality; and (iv) the effect was larger for banks that benefited more ex ante 
from the guarantee.
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As is clear, the definition of the trigger will play a key role in the contract. It could 
be automatic and based, for instance, on the market value of equity, or subject 
to the regulatory authorities’ discretion. If it is automatic, speculative attacks 
on equity with short sales might lead to the wipe-out of shareholders, making 
it highly profitable; if it is regulatory based, it could lead to forbearance or to a 
decision that is taken too late and might be contested in foreign jurisdictions. 
Consequently, although bail-ins open new contracting possibilities, how to avoid 
the associated drawbacks is still a matter of concern.
5.2.2  Contingent convertibles
First advocated by Flannery (2005), contingent capital securities are defined as 
securities that, once some threshold is reached, convert into capital or allow 
a loss to be sustained. A typical example of contingent securities concerns the 
reverse convertibles issued by Deutsche Bank in 2005, that is, bonds that convert 
into equity once a firm’s equity reaches a floor. Another example concerns 
the bonds issued by Rabobank that are redeemed below par, say at 25 cents to 
the dollar, if a low capital level threshold is reached. Contingent securities are 
interesting because they correspond to a debt or insurance contract in the good 
states of nature and provide capital when the financial institution is in distress. 
Consequently, while protecting the institution in case of a capital shortfall, they 
allow debt to play its role both as a tax shield and as a protection mechanism 
against the agency costs of free cash flows.
A necessary condition for contingent capital to play its role is legal certainty. This 
may simply mean a legal requirement when the contingent capital is structured 
as a debt/equity swap (or a similar instrument) which does not involve any 
external investor. Instead, as illustrated by the AIG crisis, if an external institution 
is to provide funds, as in the case of capital insurance, it does require the costly 
supervision of such an institution.
Note that the definition of the threshold that gives the bank the right to obtain 
additional capital will be critical in determining the speed of conversion, as well 
as the possibilities for investors in financial markets to manipulate the price or 
to cause a run on the securities. Alternative triggers are based on (i) accounting 
measures of capital; (ii) market measures of capital; (iii) declaration by regulators; 
or (iv) aggregate banking industry performance.
As the objective of a convertible security is to provide capital automatically 
and quickly in case of distress while preserving the incentive effects of debt 
and market discipline, it is clear that accounting based triggers should be 
avoided, as the conversion might take place too late. As the crisis has illustrated, 
if accounting rules are not clearly defined and can be manipulated, financial 
institutions will use their leeway for window dressing, in order to increase their 
accounting capital and profits, thus postponing the necessary restructuring and 
instead bargaining for a better treatment of its shareholders. The use of repo 
105 by Lehman Brothers is a good example of the case in point. As previously 
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mentioned, the crisis has also shown the limits of capital regulation based on 
accounting measures, as investment banks in the US were defaulting with an 
accounting capital that satisfied Basel II capital requirements.
Regulatory triggers should also be avoided as regulators may be reluctant to 
declare a systemic crisis. Consequently, it is generally accepted that conversion 
should be rule-based and market-based, although not necessarily based on the 
stock price of the financial institution, as other market indicators (like CDS 
spreads) could also be used. Thus, for instance, MacDonald (2010) puts forward 
the idea of a dual trigger mechanism where the conversion is only triggered 
when both the market value of equity is below a given threshold and aggregate 
industry performance also reaches a floor, so that conversion occurs only in the 
case of financial fragility.
The level of the trigger may reflect the regulator’s view: a high trigger means 
a high probability of conversion and early recapitalisation, while a low trigger 
means a focus on critically undercapitalised banks. The first option makes the 
convertible closer to equity and the second closer to debt.
The literature on contingent securities has identified a number of caveats 
regarding the design and characteristics of contingent securities. First, 
multiplicity of equilibria: Sundaresan and Wang (2010) have shown that for a 
unique equilibrium to exist, mandatory conversion cannot result in any value 
transfers between equity holders and contingent capital investors, and that, in 
fact, the uniqueness of price is only obtained for a par value conversion, while 
the multiplicity of equilibria when this condition is not met would make the 
security susceptible to price manipulation. Second, the trigger of a contingent 
security may lead to a death spiral if it implies dilution and a new decrease in the 
value of equity. Third, stock price manipulation may be an issue in the presence 
of a market for derivatives. Fourth, bondholders may have an incentive to force 
the bank into bankruptcy. This could be corrected by setting a sufficiently low 
recovery rate on the convertible securities. Finally, as shown by Pennacchi (2010), 
when the return of the banks’ assets follows a jump-diffusion process, a bank 
that issues contingent capital has incentives to increase its assets’ risk of jumps, 
particularly when the value of equity at the conversion threshold is low (but this 
effect is lower than for the issue of subordinated debt).
Beyond these questions, it should be stressed that, compared to bankruptcy, 
contingent capital will never wipe out shareholders, who will therefore be 
penalised only by the dilution of their shares. In the same way, regarding bank 
managers, there is no threat of a dismissal automatically triggered by distress 
as under bankruptcy, nor is there any clause regarding limits or clawbacks on 
bonuses. Consequently it is necessary to complement this instrument with 
additional supervision and regulation to provide managers and the board of 
directors with correct ex ante incentives.
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Finally, next to contingent securities, the ex ante design of banks’ restructuring 
mechanisms may require contingent regulatory rules, as is the case with US-style 
prompt corrective action. Indeed, upon the occurrence of a contingent event, 
defined here as a shortage in regulatory capital, a number of restrictions as well 
as a commitment to increase capital come into place.
Notice that a strong case in favour of higher capital requirements to be preferred 
to contingent capital is build by Admati et al (2010). To understand their point 
we should first recall that there are three classical arguments that go beyond 
the classical indifference of the Modigliani-Miller theorem and put forward 
justifications for debt: the tax shield, the market discipline and agency costs 
argument, the dilution cost, and a fourth, additional one, in favour of the issue 
of safe debt by banks.
The first argument is that firms use debt because it is not subject to corporate 
taxation, and Admati et al are right in stating that the problem to be addressed is 
the one of debt, not the one of the excessive cost of capital.
The second justification of debt, as providing market discipline and thus helping 
to reduce the agency costs, is dismissed because of the very weak evidence on 
which this notion is based. Indeed, during the crisis, if there has been any market 
discipline it has been rather counterproductive.
The third justification, the dilution cost of equity, is also weak according to 
the authors because, first, if the issue of new equity is regulated and its timing 
pre-specified, there would be no stigma associated with the issue of equity. In 
addition, a higher capital implies larger retained earnings that may allow an 
increase in capital provided the dividend policy is not proportional.
The fourth justification, the fact that banks provide ‘safe’ securities, by using 
deposit insurance provided by the deposit insurance company usually backed by 
the government, is, as the authors state, somewhat independent of their holding 
of additional capital, as the boost of the balance sheet generated by an increase 
in banks’ equity may be matched by an increase in the banks’ holding of market 
securities.
Although the argument is quite correct, two caveats should be made. First, that 
their point is conditional on changing the regulation elsewhere: changing debt 
taxation or changing the regulation of equity issuance by banks. So, this implies 
balancing the cost and feasibility of one versus the other, and requires some 
additional justification on the likelihood of an international agreement on the 
neutral taxation of debt and equity or on banks’ equity issues. Second, once 
we agree that the conditions for the Modigliani-Miller theorem are not satisfied 
(otherwise banks are redundant), then any decrease in the cost of bankruptcy 
and more generally in the cost of banks’ resolution will improve the efficiency 
of the banking industry. So, our argument is that even if bank interventions 
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are less likely with a higher equity buffer, decreasing the cost of banks’ distress 
is still worth it and a lower cost of bankruptcy will then lead to a lower capital 
requirement.
So, once we agree that there might be some merit in debt financing, their argument 
that straight capital requirements dominate contingent capital becomes rather 
weak.
5.3  Limits in the design of a bank restructuring system.
Finally, we should be careful in stressing the limits to the possibilities of banks’ 
resolution procedures. Any realistic approach to bank restructuring should 
consider a number of legal and institutional constraints. While some of these can 
be lifted in order to foster a cost-efficient banking resolution, some fundamental 
informational and incentive constraints will always remain. In particular, those 
pertaining to multi-agent decision-making and its decentralisation, and those 
concerning limited commitment, have to be taken into account in the design of 
a bank resolution system.
Multiple regulators
The existence of multiple domestic regulators, and possibly more importantly the 
choice of banks regarding the country where they will be regulated will always 
limit the regulator’s bargaining power and ability to supervise banks effectively 
(see for example Dell’Ariccia and Marquez, 2006).
Commitment ability
As in the case of central banking, the issue of rules versus discretion is relevant 
here too. As argued for example by Freixas and Parigi (2008), while discretion is 
always preferred if the regulator has an unbiased objective function, committing 
it to rules implies a verifiable objective which, although limiting its leeway, will 
eliminate biases. However, a policy of no bail-out means some bank liabilities 
will be risky. Making this policy credible implies informing investors who 
may otherwise not believe it. This may generate a conflict for regulators and 
governments who desire a growing, prosperous banking system where every 
investor feels its banking assets are safe, even if this conflicts with efficient 
lending. Indeed, the prospect of a prosperous economy with booming credit 
will always be supported as a political economy equilibrium. Here, institution-
building in order to guarantee the independence of regulatory authorities, at 
both the microprudential and macroprudential levels, is essential to limit the 
cost of the bias in the government objective function.
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6  Cross-border resolution
Globalisation has underlined both the current limits of, and need for improvements 
in, international cooperation in the treatment of distressed banks. There is 
indeed a tension between the tendency to favour the growth of international 
banks (through global or regional pro-trade and pro-capital mobility policies) 
and the reliance on national (whether ‘home’ or ‘host’ country) supervisors. In 
fact, the need for coordination in times of crisis – and in particular ‘who takes 
care of depositors’ – is crucial, especially between closely integrated countries 
which have limited means of effectively guaranteeing deposits. A crisis in one 
such country where depositors would fail to be protected could have devastating 
effects, by triggering bank runs on other, ‘similar’ countries. The problem is less 
severe for intercontinental relations involving large rich or emerging economies, 
because (i) they have more ammunition to tackle crises; and (ii) they have more 
limited cross-banking relations, even though these have been growing over 
time, especially with the opening up of banking markets and the spread of risks 
through securitisation.
However, unfortunately, the regulatory and supervisory safeguards have not been 
raised to match the evolutions linked to globalisation: harmonisation still has 
not taken place concerning the treatment of banks in distress, leading to several 
problems, especially since crisis management has to take place under great time 
pressure. A first key problem concerns the time when public intervention can 
take place and using which public intervention powers. As stressed earlier, the US 
prompt corrective action system is an efficient way to deal with banks in distress 
below a critical size. However, this system is not generalised, making such prompt 
action unavailable in many countries. A second key problem, discussed below, 
concerns depositor protection. There are clear potential incentive problems 
faced by the home supervisor in terms of consolidated supervision, with the 
risk of being pressured to ‘limit damage’ and leaving part of the mess to foreign 
countries, with potential dangers in terms of contagion.
6.1  Cross-border bankruptcy
As bankruptcy codes are national, cross-border bankruptcy resolutions raise a 
number of issues concerning the boundaries of application of these codes. 
Addressing these issues implies defining what assets and liabilities are affected by 
the bankruptcy procedure. Two key points are therefore to be considered. First, 
whether bankruptcy refers to a single country or to a single bank; second, how 
the legal structure, of the bank as a single entity with branches abroad or of a 
bank holding company, affects the claims of the different types of claimholders 
and their priority in bankruptcy.
Of course, the bankruptcy procedure will generate incentives for a bank to use its 
multinational structure to benefit from the wider range of strategies it provides. 
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So a bank may engage in shifting losses and gains between the different countries 
or shift assets and liabilities from one country to another.
6.1.1  Universality versus territoriality
A multinational bank bankruptcy code has to define how the value of the bank’s 
assets has to be assigned to the claimholders, not only according to priority, 
but also according to the countries of residence. Two possible ways to deal 
with international insolvencies exist: the universal or single approach and the 
territorial approach. In the universal/single approach the totality of the assets 
are allocated to claimholders independently of the country where their claim 
has been contracted. Under territoriality, instead, the value of the assets in 
one country is assigned to the claimholders in that country. Universality is the 
insolvency resolution procedure that is consistent with financial integration, 
while territoriality is associated with segmentation of the international financial 
market. Consequently, the European objective of a unique financial market should 
require the legal structure to be designed in such a way as to ban territoriality. 
Regrettably, the Icelandic crisis has shown that anti-terrorist legislation can be 
used to restore partial territoriality and that emergency legislation can be used 
to instantly change the bankruptcy rules and to protect domestic claimholders, 
a point summarised in Mervyn King’s statement that ‘global banks are global in 
life, but national in death’.
6.1.2  Branches versus subsidiaries
In their cross-country operations banks have the possibility of operating as 
branches or as subsidiaries. The branch structure implies a unique institution 
that in Europe is supervised by the home country. Note however that, as stated 
for example by Krimminger (2008, p 384), even for branches, deposit insurance 
rarely extends beyond a country’s borders: 
Under most national deposit insurance systems, deposits of domestic 
branches are insured by the domestic deposit insurance system and 
deposits in a host country are insured, if at all, by the host country’s deposit 
insurance scheme. Thus, for instance, under US law, depositors in foreign 
branches of a US bank are not insured under the FDIC’s deposit insurance 
and are subordinated to uninsured depositors of the US branches in the 
distribution of the proceeds from the sale of the bank’s assets. Depositors 
in foreign branches of US banks are covered by FDIC deposit insurance 
only if the deposit is payable in the US in addition to the foreign branch.
If, instead, a subsidiary is created, since it is a distinct legal entity, the subsidiary 
may go bankrupt without leading to the insolvency of the parent company. As 
a distinct legal entity in the host country, the supervision of a subsidiary is the 
responsibility of the host country, so that the bank’s choice of its multinational 
structure determines who will be the regulator and supervisor in charge.
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6.2  Cross-border resolution and the financial trilemma
Schoenmaker (2011) has put forward the idea that the three objectives of financial 
stability, financial integration and national financial policies are incompatible, 
thus giving rise to what he refers to as a ‘financial trilemma’. Any two of the three 
objectives can be achieved, but not all three. Of course, the precise meaning of 
the three objectives has to be rigorously defined, but the intuition carries over 
to most definitions: financial stability in a cross-border set-up may imply the 
coordinated bail-out of systemic financial institutions. This implies that national 
financial autonomy is not possible.
The idea of a financial trilemma is relevant and quite realistic, and implies the 
need to put in place a mechanism against financial instability in the presence 
of financial integration. If the cost of financial instability is considered to be 
sufficiently high, this means that either we curtail financial integration, 
or financial authorities commit to coordinating their bail-outs of systemic 
institutions in distress (or a combination of these two avenues). Implicitly, the 
financial trilemma relies on the impossibility of a well-orchestrated bail-in and 
on the unavailability of a sufficient amount of contingent convertibles, thereby 
leading a bank in distress to bankruptcy. Note also that the existence of a bail-in 
or of contingent convertibles for some financial institutions may put them at a 
disadvantage as their cost of funds may be higher, thus limiting the level playing 
field hypothesis of financial integration.
Committing to coordinating the bail-out of systemic institutions implies ex post 
fiscal transfers only if no mechanism has been put in place beforehand. If instead 
countries offer one another insurance against the default of their SIFIs, there 
is no ex ante transfer of resources and through time the fiscal transfers should 
cancel out. The problem is then, of course, that national supervisors may tend 
to be lenient, a problem which could be partially solved by the existence of a 
deductible for the supervisor. Creating an insurance mechanism for the bail-
out of SIFIs, possibly complemented by the issue of contingent convertibles, 
is therefore possible and can foster efficiency, provided the computation of 
insurance premiums means that SIFIs obtain funding at their risk-adjusted cost.
6.3  International cooperation and competition among supervisory 
agencies
The legitimacy of the regulatory structure stems from the banking and financial 
legislative framework that decentralises some powers to the banking regulatory 
authorities. As a consequence, the mandate of the banking regulator consists 
in preserving financial stability while fostering the expansion and health of its 
own banking industry. This has to be kept in mind in any analysis of cross-
border cooperation as the acknowledgement of this conflict of interests and the 
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resulting conflict among countries is a necessary condition for an orderly cross-
border bank bankruptcy resolution.
Each country’s supervision, regulation and deposit insurance schemes not only 
influence its own financial stability and banking industry surplus, but they also 
generate an externality on the other countries. No national supervisor will take 
into account the impact of the quality of its supervision on the financial stability 
of other countries, with the classical implication that a positive externality creates 
an underinvestment in the level of supervision. The effect of other instruments 
such as deposit insurance or capital ratios is more involved. A more generous 
deposit insurance scheme generates more moral hazard in the country and thus 
a higher probability of a crisis and of a crisis spillover to the other country. As 
the effect in the other country is disregarded, the implication will be that each 
country will provide excessive deposit insurance resulting in excessive risk. The 
mechanism for capital requirements is akin to the one on deposits: because the 
cost of a spillover to the other country is not taken into account, capital will be 
set at an inefficiently low level.8
Nevertheless, if customers are sensitive to the quality of regulation and 
supervision, an equilibrium might emerge where, as suggested by Morrison and 
White (2010), supervisors choose strong regulation in order to attract additional 
foreign customers. This effect will counteract the existence of the externality and 
its possible ‘race to the bottom’ implication. Considered in the aftermath of the 
crisis, with the lessons of Iceland and Ireland in mind, this framework of analysis 
would justify countries with large banking systems investing more on prudential 
regulation than those less affected by cross-country banking competition. The 
case of Switzerland, with its imposition of large buffers of contingent capital on 
its systemically important financial institutions, is a perfect illustration of the 
reputational dimension of a country’s choice of regulation and supervision.
All in all, the above externalities mean that, while a global supervisor and deposit 
insurer may be beyond reach, it has to be considered seriously if there is a real 
desire to integrate the global banking market further. Namely, real powers could 
be given to a supranational authority like the Basel Committee on Banking 
Supervision. And if centralisation happens to be either impossible or undesirable, 
at least joint crisis management should be taken seriously, keeping in mind the 
two goals of avoiding contagion and avoiding regulatory arbitrage by banks. 
Beyond harmonising intervention thresholds along the lines of PCA, if the idea 
of domestic deposit insurance is retained, whatever the legal form of cross-border 
banking relationships, it is crucial to think of a more even-handed approach 
between home-country and host-country supervision. Indeed, the decision of 
whether to ‘save’ the bank, and therefore fully protect all its depositors, and 
on which conditions, should in fact be taken jointly by the various authorities. 
More generally, in the absence of a supranational supervisor, what is required 
8 One can argue, however, that if possible, host countries will insist on high capital requirements for 
foreign bank subsidiaries as they do not have to bear their cost.
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is an ex ante credible agreement, or memorandum of understanding, between 
the various countries about how to share supervisory and deposit-insurance 
responsibilities. Such an MoU should be as explicit as possible in order to have a 
chance of functioning in times of crisis. And there should be standardisation of 
such MoUs to spread best practices.
6.4  Europe at a crossroad
The recent crisis has put European structures to a test. The Icelandic crisis, as well 
as the crisis of some cross-border banks such as Fortis, have been an important 
lesson for European authorities. As a consequence the de Larosière Report has 
put forward recommendations to strengthen the resilience of European financial 
integration. Although a number of issues are yet to be solved, some progress has 
been achieved in identifying the drawbacks of the current financial institution 
resolution mechanisms and the way to improve them.
6.4.1  Lessons from the Icelandic crisis
The Icelandic banking system developed in the 1990s and became a key part of 
the country’s economy. The complete failure of the Icelandic banking industry 
with assets worth ten times the country’s GDP has important lessons for European 
coordination. The fact that the UK’s best option when confronting the crisis, on 
7 October 2008, was the use of anti-terrorist legislation to protect UK interests 
indicates how poor the European cross-border bankruptcy procedures are.
Still, the single European passport implies that foreign bank branches are not 
supervised by the host country, and in this case it implies that the inadequacy 
of the Icelandic regulation and supervision was unknown to UK and Dutch 
regulatory authorities.9
Indeed, according to Danielsson (2010), the Icelandic regulatory framework was far 
from satisfactory (notwithstanding the rating the credit rating agencies bestowed 
on Icelandic banks), leading to several critical reasons for the development of the 
crisis. First, supervision was particularly lax. In particular, banks were allowed to 
invest in their own shares as well as in cross-holdings, and their management 
and boards had limited experience in international banking. Second, the deposit 
insurance fund did not have the means to cover all the deposits insured without 
generating an unsustainable fiscal deficit. Third, cross-border expansion based 
on high-yield internet accounts in the UK and in the Netherlands was dramatic. 
The UK could not prevent the expansion of Landsbanki through attractive 
deposit rates (Kaupthing, instead, chose to hold deposits in subsidiaries that were 
under the host countries’ regulation and supervision). Interestingly, and while 
everyone advocates transparency, note that informing British depositors that in 
9 Notice that some governments, like France, were less diligent in processing the paperwork for these 
banks and therefore avoided the problems in the UK and in the Netherlands.
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case of bankruptcy their uninsured deposits might not be covered could have 
been interpreted as a barrier to entry!
Finally, the Icelandic emergency legislation passed on 6 October 6 2008 created 
‘new banks’ to hold domestic deposits and loans, while the old banks kept the 
foreign operations and were on their way to normal bankruptcy. This was in 
clear conflict with the equal treatment of domestic and foreign deposit holders 
required by the EU Deposit Insurance Directive.
6.4.2  The tensions in European banking integration
In the European Union, the tension between the prevalence of national 
regulators and the emergence of cross-border banks, which has been encouraged 
by the Single Market initiative, is very significant. This is particularly problematic 
because two competing policy rationales have been witnessed over recent 
years: the first saying that the potential of the Single Market, and its associated 
productivity gains, could only be realised through synergies resulting from cross-
border mergers; and the second one worrying that it is important for Member 
States to retain national ownership of their big banks, for ‘strategic control’ 
reasons or mere national pride motives.
In this respect, what happened to the banking and insurance group Fortis is 
very instructive. The 2007 takeover battle over ABN-Amro, which was ultimately 
‘won’ by the trio Royal Bank of Scotland, Santander and Fortis, was hostile 
and controversial (and, ex post, an operation that turned out to be much too 
expensive for the acquirers); but it was very much in line with the Single Market 
programme, since it accelerated cross-border banking ties. However, by breaking 
up a ‘Dutch jewel’, it was definitely not popular in the Netherlands. And the 
question of who should be the lead supervisor of the Belgian-Dutch Fortis was a 
subject of debate between the two countries. This did not facilitate cooperation 
between public authorities when the crisis came in September 2008, a crisis 
which the Dutch authorities did take advantage of in order to reassert control 
over ‘their’ share of the bank.
The lesson of this episode is that one can expect competition to be at times 
‘controversial’, especially when things go sour ex post, because of business 
mistakes or market reversals. In such circumstances, nationalistic reactions can 
be expected, especially since national authorities see the acquisition of national 
firms by foreign ones quite differently from the acquisition of foreign firms by 
national ones.
Just as with protectionism in general, such adverse asymmetric reactions have 
to be kept under control through a credible set of legal provisions. These should 
take as a starting point the fact that national supervisors can be expected to be 
pressured to pursue national objectives, just as public supervisors can be expected 
to face lobbying by national industry.
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However, current practices until the crisis have not been reassuring in this 
respect. Indeed, relying on national supervisors (which is currently the case, 
with consolidated oversight by the home country supervisor supplemented by 
domestic oversight by the host country supervisor) requires coordination and 
cooperation that is going to be tested in times of crisis, as the Fortis example 
demonstrates. Note that the Fortis crisis happened just after the introduction of 
the European ‘Memorandum of Understanding’, which was meant to promote 
cooperation in financial stability and crisis management! While this MoU was 
full of good intentions (on information exchanges, involvement of all interested 
parties, the pursuit of the interests of the banking group as a whole, ‘equity’ …), 
its enforceability was clearly questionable. And while beefing it up is possible, 
if the aim is really to promote the Single Market in banking (which does make 
sense if one wants to pursue the Single Market in non-financial sectors), and 
therefore the emergence of European and not just national banks, one should 
simultaneously favour the emergence of a European supervisor and of a European 
deposit insurer. How far have we gone in this respect since 2008?
6.4.3  EU financial regulation reform: the de Larosière Report and its follow-up
These issues have been discussed at length in the de Larosière Report (2009), 
which has prompted regulatory reform in the EU. The report acknowledges 
the need for better coordination among Member States, in order to allow for 
a well-functioning Single Market in banking, while falling short, however, of 
recommending full centralisation of EU regulation and supervision.
The report discusses many issues linked to the financial crisis. Recommendations 
relevant for the treatment of distressed cross-border banks include the call 
for harmonising crisis prevention and crisis intervention tools; the call for 
harmonised, pre-funded deposit guarantee schemes that provide high, equal 
protection to all bank customers throughout the EU; the call for improved MoUs 
in terms of burden sharing; and the call for increased coordination through a 
European System of Financial Supervision, meant in particular to upgrade the 
quality of national supervision and harmonise enforcement (with a detailed 
roadmap to achieve these goals).
The report thus recognises the need to harmonise crisis management, and 
recommends steps that clearly help progress in this direction. By sticking 
to national supervisors, albeit increasingly coordinated, the report clearly 
internalises existing EU political constraints, which begs the question of systemic 
cross-border crisis management: when deposit insurance funds are exhausted 
and taxpayers have to come to the rescue of banks, how will the fiscal burden 
among Member States be shared in these circumstances? Can we really hope that 
MoUs will provide credible ways to do this? This remains an open question. One 
can only hope that vigorous crisis prevention, coupled with substantial deposit 
insurance premiums, would make this an infrequently tested matter.
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This problem is related to the Single Market, that is, it applies to the entire 
European Union and not just the euro area. We understand that this complicates 
things, since there would be an asymmetry between central banking, which 
would involve several players, and an EU-wide supervisor and deposit insurer. 
The case for a euro-area supervisor and deposit insurer therefore seems stronger. 
However, it is important to stress the crucial need for much stronger coordinated 
mechanisms of enforcement than exist now whenever two territories face 
significant cross-border banking relationships.
As far as the follow-up to the influential de Larosière Report is concerned, it is 
worth stressing that it has not yet settled issues directly linked to bank resolution. 
Indeed, following proposals put forward by the European Commission in 
October 2009, which constitute a clear step forward in its aim to design an 
efficient new regulatory and supervisory framework, both a microprudential and 
a macroprudential structure have been set up. The European Banking Authority 
(EBA) is concerned with micro regulation issues, while a European System Risk 
Board (ESRB) is in charge of macroprudential issues. Since these proposals are not 
directly concerned with bank resolution, we do not discuss them in detail here.
Concerning bank resolution, let us wait and see whether the reforms will match 
(or even improve upon) the de Larosière proposals. We can take some comfort in 
the December 2009 Council Declaration:
The Council agrees with the Commission’s suggested approach to focus 
on developing a crisis management framework to deal with cross-border 
banks, covering both cross-border banking groups as well as single entities 
which only operate cross-border through branches, and to give further 
consideration as to the case for extending and adapting this framework 
to other types of financial institutions. The Commission is invited to 
address the need to revise, and develop, resolution tools. In addition, 
the Commission should also consider working over the medium-to-long 
term towards introducing and implementing a common set of tools 
for all national authorities. With a view to their consistent application, 
appropriate conditions could provide a basis for the use of such tools. In 
particular, subject to appropriate caveats, intervention should be possible 
before the relevant threshold for the purposes of ordinary insolvency 
proceedings is reached.10
As for the Bank Crisis Management (BCM) Communication of 20 October 2010, 
it is a consultation document concerned with the way the European framework 
copes with financial institutions in distress, pointing at key issues and opening a 
consultation on a number of critical questions directly related to the treatment 
of financially fragile institutions in the light of the recent multinational bank 
bankruptcies (such as Fortis or the Icelandic banks). While the process has not yet 
converged, let us stress the Communication’s acknowledgement of the need for 
10 2981st Council meeting, Economic and Financial Affairs, Dec 2009, p 20.
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ex ante ‘recovery and resolution plans’, which would be coordinated between the 
various national resolution authorities grouped into ‘resolution colleges’. While 
these plans would not be binding, the Communication also points to the need, 
in the medium term, to move towards the harmonisation of bank insolvency 
law across jurisdictions and, in the longer term, to go for ‘a more integrated 
framework’, which ‘could involve a European resolution authority’, which could 
rely on a European resolution fund (which, as stressed in the Communication, 
may be distinct from the supervisory authority, as a way to minimise the risk of 
forbearance). We can only welcome such a direction, which seems to us a necessary 
counterpart of a Single European Market in banking. Note, however, that one can 
question the ability of Europe to set up such a system while respecting the ‘fiscal 
safeguard’ that guarantees fiscal sovereignty of Member States, a principle which 
is explicitly restated in the Communication.
7  Conclusion: What should be done?
The crisis has challenged regulatory authorities all over the world, forcing them 
to improvise, think ‘out of the box’ and implement unorthodox microprudential 
and macroprudential policies. From this a number of lessons have been drawn 
that lead to our main policy conclusions.
First, it is efficient to define a bank-specific bankruptcy code able to cope with the 
specificities of such bankruptcies. The lesson learnt from Lehman’s bankruptcy is 
that a bank bankruptcy code should allow every investor to fully understand the 
risks they are bearing. This allows a move to a speedy resolution that decreases 
uncertainty as well as the liquidity freeze associated with bankruptcy and 
therefore limits contagion. By defining an efficient bankruptcy procedure the 
social cost of bank bankruptcies is reduced which is the raison d’être of banking 
regulation.
Once the bankruptcy code is in place, contingency planning is essential. If they 
are part of banking regulation, contingent convertibles allow for an increase in 
bank capital in case of bank-specific or systemic trouble. Similarly, living wills (as 
required by UK regulatory authorities) simplify the liquidation of bank assets and 
reduce bankruptcy costs.
Of course, the issue is more involved when we refer to global institutions, as 
bankruptcy extends over different legal constituencies implying possible conflicts 
of rules. The coordination of these bankruptcy procedures should be planned in 
advance, knowing that when the bank is in distress, MoUs are not enforceable 
and only perfectly clear-cut commitments will be acceptable in the face of 
taxpayer pressure. From that perspective, the European Union has appeared 
in the light of the crisis as a particularly fragile structure that requires urgent 
changes. Fortunately the recent decisions of the Council meeting indicate that 
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this is the road that may be followed. Still, we would advocate the centralisation 
of both resolution and deposit insurance mechanisms, so as to provide more 
credible discipline for banks and legal certainty for depositors over Europe.
Contingent convertibles and contingent capital will be a definite improvement 
upon a framework where the basic externality has already been contained. In 
addition, Basel III new capital rules will obviously go in the right direction. Yet, 
to conclude, let us stress that because the origin of banking regulation is the 
social cost of bank bankruptcy, the first point where regulation should act is in 
decreasing the externalities generated by such bankruptcies by defining a specific, 
well-designed bankruptcy code.
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Mathias Dewatripont and Xavier Freixas
The current crisis and its high social cost have shattered the confidence of 
economic agents in the banking system and questioned the capacity of financial 
markets to channel resources to their best use. While it is essential for the well 
functioning of economic activity that financial institutions do take risk, the 
decisions taken by financial intermediaries have proven ex post to be excessively 
risky. So, what was wrong with financial regulation? How were overoptimistic 
expectations, short termism and inaccurate risk models implicitly encouraged? 
This book is devoted to exploring the general issue of the origins of excessive 
risk-taking in the banking industry. The four years since the start of the crisis, 
covering the period from the first turmoil in the interbank market to the fully 
fledged sovereign crises of 2011, gives us sufficient perspective to make a better 
assessment of some of the main issues and challenges it has raised. We focus here 
on the four main issues that provide the incentives for excessive risk-taking. 
Because it is the board of directors that is ultimately accountable for the level of 
risk that is taken in a firm, we start with financial institutions’ corporate 
governance. We analyse whether, in their strategic decisions, board members 
consider their own bonuses, short-term stock price movements, shareholders’ 
short-run interests (rather than stakeholders’ long-run ones) or simply the 
financial institution’s culture of risk. 
We next turn to the misperception of risks, related to managers’ and shareholders’ 
understatement of the business-cycle risk of downturn, as the procyclicality of 
capital may lead to excessive lending, the emergence of bubbles and a financial 
accelerator effect. The regulatory proposal of Basel III on countercyclical buffers 
is intended to solve this issue. Still, rigorous analysis of the procyclicality of banks’ 
capital may indicate that the matter is more complicated than it seems. 
In a third chapter, we ask why neither supervisory authorities nor market 
discipline, which was given a preeminent role in Basel II, did a proper job. Is it true 
that information disclosure was inaccurate?  
Finally, in our last chapter we consider whether excessive risk-taking was the 
result of implicit guarantees such that all banks in distress expected to be bailed 
out. This implies that the way regulatory agencies and treasuries organise banks’ 
resolutions is critical in determining future moral hazard. It is therefore worth 
considering how a bank in distress can be restructured in an orderly way – 
whether it is to be closed or bailed out in such a way as to preserve banks’ 
incentives and be credible while limiting contagion to other banks. 
This volume will provide the analytical ammunition required to rigorously 
examine regulatory policy at a time when it is undergoing a complete 
metamorphosis.
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